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Abstract
The Principle of Parsimony states that by and large, agents try to complete tasks using as little
effort as possible. This thesis demonstrates that the Principle of Parsimony operates in human
task-oriented dialogue by showing the effects of Parsimony in a corpus of human dialogues
about a map navigation task and by using the main points of the analysis in order to guide
simulated conversations between two computer agents within the JAM system. It makes four
major contributions:
• an analysis of "communicative posture", or a range of choices in dialogue which can be
characterised by decisions about how much effort to spend constructing one's utterances,
leading to either careful or risky behaviour about different aspects of communication,
• an analysis of "recovery strategies" which allow the participants to recover from failures
which have been brought about due to risky postures,
• a heuristic model of belief which risks failing to capture the full meaning of the dialogue
in favour of efficiency in a way which simulates human belief updating more plausibly
than previous models, and
• a layered agent architecture which allows the simulated agents to make all of their deci¬
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This thesis is concerned with what people say when they have to cooperate to solve a particular
task, that of describing a route on a map. There are a great number of decisions which agents
must make in order to engage in task-oriented dialogue. The kinds of decisions which we will be
concerned with in this thesis are directly related to the agents' primary goal of getting across
information about the route: how to describe the route, how to organise the description, how
to decide upon a series of utterances which will convey the description, and how to realise each
of those utterances in language. We hypothesise that there is one principle, the Principle of
Parsimony, which governs the decisions which we discuss: by and large, people try to complete
tasks with as little effort as possible [Sha84]. Thus people will make whatever decisions about
what to say in the dialogue they believe will bring about completion of the task using the least
effort. Part of this thesis describes a computer program, JAM, which allows two computer
agents to complete the map task using AI planning techniques to implement a model of the
decision making observed in a corpus of human map task dialogues. In dialogue, unlike in
more traditional planning domains, it is quite often more efficient to behave carelessly, and
take the risk of having to recover from failures in one's plans, than to behave carefully in the
first place. This technique is frequently used in the human dialogues. This leads us to the main
theme of our thesis: that one of the things which makes human dialogue seem more natural
than traditional computer dialogue is that the Principle of Parsimony leads human agents
to run into plan failures and then use strategies for recovering from these failures, whereas
computer dialogue agents rely on more careful behaviour in the first place. Thus one way to
make computer dialogue seem more natural is to make it use this same strategy of failure and
recovery that humans use, by giving the computer agent some notion of the effort involved in
an utterance and using Parsimony to govern its behaviour.
1
1.1 The Approach: Corpus Analysis Plus Implementa¬
tion
Our approach to supporting our claim is to show that humans use this strategy and then to
demonstrate that the kinds of decision making and recovery from failure required to simulate
their behaviour can be incorporated into a working system. We will do this by taking as given
without further discussion the naive, one line version of the Principle of Parsimony which has
already been presented and demonstrating that it can be used to explain much of the variety
of behaviour which occurs in the map task dialogues. Thus, in the same vein as much A.I.
work, we will not justify our main assumption or claim that our analysis is psychologically
plausible in any meaningful way, but only that it "works" and is a useful way of thinking
about task-oriented dialogue, both as an explanation of human behaviour and for the purposes
of building computer dialogue agents. This thesis can be divided into two parts: an analysis
of human task-oriented dialogues, and a system description. The task domain which we will
be using throughout this thesis is one which was first described in [BASY84], in which two
participants who are separated by a partition have slightly different versions of a simple map
with approximately fifteen gross features on it, such as the two versions of the same map which
occur in figures 1.1 and 1.2. The maps may have different features or have some of the features
in different locations. In addition, one participant, the "route giver" or agent "A", has a route
drawn on the map. The task is for the second participant, the "route follower" or agent "B",
to duplicate the route. The agents are given instructions that indicate that the two versions
of the maps are "drawn by different explorers", and therefore may vary somewhat.1 This task
provides the opportunity for a great many different dialogue decisions, failures, and recoveries
but closely constrains the topic of the dialogue.
A fundamental part of our approach is that we provide a working simulation of some of the
dialogue decisions, failures, and recoveries which are discussed in the analysis. The JAM system
provides important support for the analysis, since it gives concrete examples of dialogue agents
behaving according to the principles uncovered in the analysis and allows their behaviour to be
compared with the original data. Implementation helps to highlight parts of an analysis which
are underspecified or ambiguous. Experimentation with the system gives a sense of some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the analysis which may not be obvious without a computational
model. Finally, having a working system which uses the principles of the analysis in order to
generate dialogue which seems more natural than traditional computer dialogue supports our
1 These instructions are reproduced in appendix A along with the maps to which we will refer in the remainder
of the thesis.
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Figure 1.1: The Route Giver's Map
Figure 1.2: The Route Follower's Map
claim that failure and recovery are essential to human dialogue and should be considered in
future computer dialogue systems.
1.2 The Major Contributions
This thesis makes four major contributions: two related to the analysis of a human corpus of
task-oriented dialogues and two related to the simulation of this data using the JAM computer
system. These contributions are:
• an analysis of some kinds of decisions which agents make during dialogue (called "com¬
municative posture"), which can be characterised by a choice either to risk completion
of some part of the task on the current attempt or to expend extra effort in order to
safeguard success;
• an analysis of the strategies which agents use to recover from failures which occur when
they have risked too much;
• a heuristic model of belief which better simulates the human agents by failing on the types
of inferences they find difficult, since it chooses not to expend all of the effort needed to
model belief accurately unless it is absolutely necessary; and
• a system architecture which allows agents to choose the next action to take in the dialogue
flexibly and according to the Principle of Parsimony, whether that involves planning the
dialogue or attempting to recover from a plan failure.
1.3 The Corpus Analysis
Our analysis of a corpus of map task dialogues shows that many of the decisions which agents
must make in order to engage in task-oriented dialogue can be characterised as a choice between
"risking" completion of some part of the task on the current attempt or expending extra effort
in order to ensure success. Agents tend to try to complete the task with as little effort as
possible, and so they quite often decide to take risks. Such agents will then need to have
strategies for recovering from failures which occur when their risks turn out badly. Analyses of
the corpus revealing the nature of decision making in the map task and a number of recovery
strategies form the first two major contributions of this thesis.
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The HCRC Dialogue Database2 contains 128 map task dialogues; in this work we examined the
first eight dialogues which were collected by the HCRC plus a small set of dialogues from a pilot
study used in Shadbolt's work [Sha84], From time to time in this thesis we will wish to reprint
abstracts from the transcriptions. The data from the two different sources are transcribed
in slightly different ways; throughout the thesis we preserve the transcription provided by the
corpus. The dialogues from the pilot study are marked with a rough measure of the time elapsed
between parts of utterances; each plus sign (+) designates one to two seconds of silence. Both
sources indicate the interruption of an utterance using angle brackets (< and >), with a slash
(/) roughly indicating the place where the beginning of the overlap occurs. Places where the
transcription is not clear are indicated with question marks (??).
1.3.1 First Contribution: An Analysis of "Communicative Posture"
Within the map domain there are many different ways that agents can approach the task,
leading to dialogues with widely varying structures. For instance, the agents might begin by
discussing the objects on the map:
MAP 2
A: right now would you like to describe your picture to me or shall I describe mine
or just lead in
B: well I've got start and then next to it pretty much in the right-hand corner and
on the same sort of horizontal level there is there are three things an old well
deserted village a church
A: aha er where is the old well are they equidistant or
B: well no not really well the old well's nearest to the start point and it's about
er let me see south easterly direction from the start point it's about two inches
from it
A: and is it on a level with the deserted village
B: er well the top of the well is on a level with the bottom of the deserted village
A: right and then is on mine the church is in the top right-hand corner
B: yeah that's roughly the same as mine not exactly the top right-hand corner but
pretty much the top right hand corner
A: below it are some flat rocks
Other agents might decide to simply begin describing the route and deal with difficulties as
they arise:
MAP 6
2For more information, contact the Human Communication Research Centre, University of Edinburgh, 2
Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9LW, Scotland. The email address is HCRCOedinburgh.
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C: OK, from start point... So what you want to do now is a straight vertical line
upwards that will loop round the stone pillars.
K: Right. OK.
C: So the top of your line will be slightly curved.
K: Yes.
C: And it will be about an inch and a half off the top of the page.
We will return to the difference between these two approaches in section 3.2.2.1. In the first
case, the route giver is careful to make sure that the agents mutually understand any objects
which might come up in subsequent descriptions of the route, whereas in the second case, the
route giver relies on his or her partner to interrupt if some utterance occurs in the dialogue
which he or she do not understand. Thus the difference between these two approaches is that
the first two agents are careful to establish mutual understanding of the objects on the maps
and spend a significant amount of effort to do so, whereas the second two agents are careless
about mutual understanding and spend more effort after problems occur. This difference
in approach is central to the thesis. In chapter 3, we will introduce "communicative posture
parameters", based on Shadbolt's work [Sha84], which use this same basic distinction to explain
twelve different kinds of decisions which agents make in the map task corpus; the one which we
have introduced in these examples is called "difference", since it involves an assumption about
how much difference there is between the two maps. The parameters give a theoretical basis
for decision making in all parts of the map task, from choosing a description of the route to
realising an utterance in natural language. The JAM system uses some of the communicative
posture parameters found in the analysis of the human map task corpus in order to allow
different computer agents to mimic some of the different human approaches.
1.3.2 Second Contribution: An Analysis of Recovery
The approach taken in the second human dialogue extract above requires the agents to be able
to fix problems which arise when they take risks. In these cases, the human agents commonly
use what we, followingMoore [Moo90], shall term "recovery strategies"; these range from having
short subdialogues which convey any information which was missing from an explanation to
abandoning an entire description and starting over. The ability to take risks and then recover
if things turn out badly is exactly what makes human dialogue so robust, and, in the cases
where the risks turn out to be good ones, efficient; thus giving computer dialogue systems the
ability to make the same kinds of risks and then recover from failures is an important step
towards making their behaviour seem more natural. Chapter 4 identifies a number of recovery
strategies and shows them in use in the human corpus. The first two major contributions of
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the thesis are analyses of the decisions which the human agents make which involve risk and
the strategies which they use to recover from subsequent failures. Together with the Principle
of Parsimony, these developments suggest why the human agents make the decisions they do
when they are engaged in the map task.
1.4 The JAM System
Given this analysis, the remainder of the thesis shows how the communicative posture param¬
eters and recovery strategies are incorporated into JAM, a working computer program. There
are two major contributions which are made in this area: a heuristic model of belief which
is more suited to simulating the human agents than previous models because it fails on the
same kinds of inferences that humans find difficult, and a system architecture which allows the
recovery strategies to be incorporated in a way which is both flexible and easy to modify.
1.4.1 Third Contribution: The BeliefModel
Previous methods for representing beliefs in dialogue systems have used logical representations
so that the system could represent beliefs nested to arbitrary levels and involving arbitrary
numbers of agents. Although this flexibility is desirable where the system designers cannot be
sure ahead of what depth of reasoning will be required, it has one major drawback: running
the logic of belief after every utterance in the dialogue is slower than it needs to be, since moves
in a dialogue introduce predictable changes to the belief system.
If one knows ahead how many agents are involved in the dialogue and how many levels of
nesting will be necessary, it is possible to build a fairly simple representation which is easier
to maintain. We propose a belief representation which is especially designed to show the
regularities of belief changes during dialogue and which can be tailored to different dialogue
systems depending on the number of agents and the levels of nesting which will commonly
be needed. It proposes assigning to every concept in the domain a state which describes how
the agent thinks the other agents stand with respect to the concept. The state designations
themselves depend on the needs of the particular dialogue system. For instance, suppose
that any one agent can be unaware of P, be aware of P, or be an expert about P. No agents
can represent that they are themselves unaware of P, but they can represent that any other
agent stands in any of the three conditions with respect to P. Taking a cross product, for two
agent dialogues, considering only one level of nesting, there are six possible states: on the first
dimension, A can either be aware of P or be an expert about P, and on the second dimension, A
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can think either B is unaware of P, B is aware of P, or B is an expert about P. With two agents
and two levels of nesting (allowing the representation of facts like "A thinks that B thinks
that A is unaware of P"), there are eighteen states. Then, analysing the dialogue in terms
of conversational games as in Houghton [Hou86], for instance, there are simple, well-defined
transitions in the network of states for each possible move in the dialogue (such as asking a
question, giving an answer, or making a statement). For example, asking a question of the
partner will, in ordinary conversation, allow one to assume that the partner now thinks that
one doesn't know the answer but is aware of the predicate involved. These transitions allow a
simple and very efficient way of representing changes in belief that come about as a result of
conversational moves. In addition, changes in belief can be propagated within a network of the
domain concepts to change the states of related concepts. There are several possible ways of
handling uncertainty within the representation. The state transition network can be regarded
as a compiled version of a more general belief representation. We also show how the heuristic
mechanism can be connected to a more complete belief representation, allowing more complex
reasoning when the need arises. The heuristic mechanism allows us to fulfill the Principle of
Parsimony concerning the effort involved in belief modelling, since running it requires less effort
than running a more complete mechanism but also yields correspondingly less accurate results.
Thus choosing to use the heuristic mechanism is another form of risk-taking similar to any of
the high risk communicative posture decisions.
1.4.2 Fourth Contribution: The System Architecture
Since we have suggested that an agent's choice of recovery strategy is governed by the Principle
of Parsimony, any computer process which is to simulate a human map task participant must
be able to choose whichever strategy involves the least amount of estimated effort to complete
the task. Very few systems have incorporated recovery strategies at all, and those which have
incorporated more than one have chosen which one to use based on a rigid ordering of the
strategies. This is the case because such systems have tended to view the recovery strategies
as outside procedures which can be called in to "mop up" difficulties when they occur. JAM
agents treat using a recovery strategy in exactly the same way as they treat all other possible
ways of continuing from a point in the dialogue, giving a uniform mechanism to which the
Principle of Parsimony can be applied. In effect, the recovery strategies, along with normal
planning and execution, make up a layer of meta-operations which can be planned analogously
to domain level plans. JAM agents uses a layered planning architecture modelled on Stefik's
MOLGEN [SteSO]. By continuing the abstraction of layers upwards, further levels of operators
meta-plan the choice of a recovery strategy and the choice of a way to choose a recovery
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strategy. This arrangement has the advantages that it is easy both to change the way in which
recovery strategies are employed and to add new recovery strategies, simply by changing the
operator definitions at the higher levels. The same style of layered architecture is beneficial
more generally in any planning domain where different ways of continuing from the same point
in the plan apply.
1.5 The Organisation of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter two contains a review which describes previous research which has had a substantial
impact on this thesis.
Chapter three gives the results of an analysis of the data in the human corpus which yields
a detailed set of communicative posture parameters.
Chapter four gives the results of an analysis of the data in the human corpus which yields a
set of strategies for recovering from failures in the dialogue.
Chapter five describes all aspects of the JAM system except the two which form major
contributions: its model of belief and the layered planning architecture.
Chapter six describes JAM's model of belief.
Chapter seven describes JAM's layered architecture.
Chapter eight gives a number of dialogues generated by the JAM system and discusses them.
Chapter nine gives our conclusions and a number of ideas for further work.
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to a review of the past literature.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Work
Work from a number of fields is relevant to the research described in this thesis. Section
2.1 describes two previous attempts to explain the variety of behaviours possible in human
dialogue. It describes Hovy's work on the influence of pragmatic goals on natural language
generation, in order to show the variety of choices that are open to communicating agents. It
also gives details of Shadbolt's definition of the Principle of Parsimony, about communicative
posture, and about his parameters governing the choices which must be made in dialogue, since
these are the ideas which underly the central theme of the thesis. Section 2.2 reviews three
areas of relevant work on the structure of dialogue: dialogue game theory, a prevalent model
of how agents take turns in a dialogue, and a method for simulating both agents in a dialogue.
Section 2.3 describes a number of issues that arise in implemented dialogue systems: how to
interleave planning and execution and allow agents immediate access to sensory data, ways of
classifying the different types of goals an agent might have into independent sets, and methods
for controlling meta-planning (or planning about what to plan). Section 2.4 reviews past work
on recovery strategies, both analyses and implementations. Finally, section 2.5 reviews work
which is relevant to the model of belief presented in chapter 6. This includes work on theorem
proving approaches as well as the idea of "degrees of acquaintance" about a concept from the
intelligent tutoring systems literature. This review is not intended to be the definitive word
on developments in all of these areas, but only to provide the necessary background for an
understanding of the work described in the remainder of the thesis.
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2.1 Modelling an Agent's Choices
Agents have a great many decisions to make when they engage in dialogue, concerning every¬
thing from what goals they have right down to lexical choice. Very little work has been done
on explaining why individual agents make the decisions that they do. There are two main
pieces of work which have dealt with the issue of such choices: Hovy's PAULINE program and
Shadbolt's communicative posture parameters.
2.1.1 Hovy's PAULINE
In his thesis, Hovy [Hov87] begins to account for some of the choices which human agents
make while planning a discourse by cataloguing a number of different pragmatic factors which
generators need to take into account. The pragmatic information which is relevant includes:
• the interlocutors' factual knowledge (so that a speaker might have the goal of accessing the
hearer's knowledge, increasing it, reorganising it, or decreasing it);
• the interlocutors' opinions (so that one might want the topic to seem good or bad to the
hearer, whether that is contrary to his or her opinion or bolsters it);
• the interlocutors' emotional states (so that one might have goals to be polite, provoke anger,
and so on);
• the interlocutors' goals (so that one might have a goal to activate or deactivate one of the
hearer's goals);
• the interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors (so that one might want to affect
the hearer's emotions towards the speaker, the "distance" between the interlocutors, and
their relative statuses); and
• the conversational atmosphere or setting (i.e., the amount of privacy, background distur¬
bance, and so forth).
These goals are implemented in PAULINE by means of twenty-three different pragmatic pa¬
rameters with two or three possible settings each. Before a run of PAULINE, these parameters
must be set, and the choices which are made affect the resulting text. Of course, this prag¬
matic information is described at too high a level to be of use to a natural language generator
directly. PAULINE incorporates the speaker's pragmatic goals by means of a number of rhetor¬
ical goals which directly affect the generator's syntactic decisions. For instance, the rhetorical
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goal formality has three possible settings (highfalutin, normal, and colloquial) and controls the
complexity of the syntactic constructions used by the generator and whether or not oppor¬
tunities for ellipsis are exploited. PAULINE has a set of rules which determines the settings
for rhetorical goals based on the pragmatic settings. The relationship between pragmatic and
rhetorical goals is quite complex because the pragmatic goals do not have independent elfects;
typically two or three pragmatic goals working together will determine a rhetorical goal setting.
Hovy contrasts a number of texts generated by PAULINE using different pragmatic settings
in order to demonstrate that the link which PAULINE uses between pragmatic and rhetorical
goals does in fact produce reasonable effects.
Hovy's work bears a family resemblance to the work described in this thesis in that a number
of parameter settings control decisions which the planner must make when it is generating text.
However, Hovy was unable to give the underlying reason why agents choose to behave in the
way that they do or to explore satisfactorily the relationships among his parameters, making
them, and the settings used for particular agents, seem arbitrary. This thesis will attempt to
explain why agents make some of the choices that they do. We will be able to make this analysis
only because whereas Hovy considers a number of pragmatic goals all at the same time, this
thesis is only concerned with goals that involve accessing or increasing the agents' information
about the map task. Moreover, the decisions which are modelled in this thesis are for the most
part unified by involving what sorts of information should be transferred between the agents
explicitly and what sorts should be left to be inferred, since these are exactly the aspects of
a dialogue which can lead to a failure and the need for recovery. Closely delimiting the area
under investigation will allow us to explain better the reasons behind an agent's decisions and
to explore the relationships among the communicative posture parameters. However, we share
with Ilovy the basic idea of setting a number of parameters which govern decision-making
in order to generate a variety of behaviours, and any future work which claims to model all
aspects of generation may wish to take the other aspects of Hovy's work into account.
2.1.2 Shadbolt's Communicative Postures
Our work is closely based on Shadbolt's analysis of the map task introduced in section 1.1.
Shadbolt notes in his thesis [Sha84] that agents use different strategies for task-oriented dialogue
in different situations. His strategies primarily concern how much information is transferred
explicitly between the two agents and how much is left to be inferred. He calls the different lines
along which the dialogues may vary parameters. He calls the settings which a particular agent
uses for these parameters communicative postures and describes them in terms of risk: for the
most part, high risk settings leave the agent to infer information and risk the possibility of plan
13
failure, while low risk settings are more likely to work as planned. He then argues that human
agents decide upon their communicative postures according to the Principle of Parsimony,
which is "a behavioural principle which instructs processors to do no more processing than is
necessary to achieve a goal" (p. 342). Agents choose the parameter settings which they believe
will prove most efficient. For each parameter, Shadbolt provides two settings, or communicative
postures, between which the dialogue participant may choose; a more comprehensive treatment
might allow choice along a continuum. The following summary of Shadbolt's communicative
postures is taken directly from pages 346-7 of his thesis, with our clarification in square brackets:
High Risk Posture
1.1 Minimal Difference - assume that your partner has the same information about the map
features as yourself
1.2 Minimal Specification - in the case of referential instigation, for example, minimally specify
the DO [discourse object; in this case, usually a reference to one of the map features]
1.3 Minimal Ontology - select as few objects as possible to relate the task to
1.4 Shared Focus - assume that your partner shares your area of focus
1.5 Minimal Decentering - assume your information is secure; do not take on board incom¬
patible information
1.6 Minimal Feedback - do not expect and do not provide feedback about each other's discourse
contributions
Low Risk Posture
2.1 Maximal Difference - do not assume that your partner has the same information about
the map features as yourself
2.2 Maximal Specification - in the case of referential instigation, for example, provide as much
information as possible so as to identify a new DO and establish its inter-relations with
other mutually shared features. As a referential interpreter demand location of new DOs,
check the meaning of orientation terms, etc.
2.3 Generous Ontology - be prepared to introduce new DOs into discourse; be prepared to
separate out what was previously assumed to be one common feature
2.4 Conservative Focus - move minimally away from the current focus; constantly check cur¬
rent focus of your partner
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2.5 Decenter - construct a view of your partner's knowledge state; be prepared for it to be
different
2.6 Maximal Feedback - provide constant information so that your partner is reminded of:
the task goals, the state of your understanding of his contributions, the information you
have on your map etc.
2.7 Hypothesis Formation - Constantly test your partner's representations, and hypothesise
about what they might have on their map, what the next step in the task is etc.
Shadbolt's definition of communicative posture provides a clear hypothesis about how agents go
about making a great many of the decisions which are necessary in order to complete the map
task. Unfortunately, it is not possible using Shadbolt's methodology to show that his categories
are either replicable or stable. In chapter 3, we adopt the Principle of Parsimony and much of
Shadbolt's terminology, but introduce a revised set of parameters. Our extension to Shadbolt's
set is open to the same methodological criticisms; this issue is discussed further in section
3.1.4. The one way in which we improve upon Shadbolt's methodology is by implementing
the parameters in a working system as an appeal to computational adequacy. One of the
assumptions behind our research is that implementing theories can show up weaknesses or
strengths which are not at all obvious from the analysis. Implementation is particularly useful
for showing parts of an analysis which are incomplete; for instance, one of the first things which
we realised about Shadbolt's analysis when we considered building an implementation is that
it did not specify enough information about the possibilities open to the explainee (see section
3.1.1). This caused us to expand his set by, for instance, splitting maximal specification into two
parameters. Implementation also made us redefine the parameters so as to make their effects
more independent and to place them into sets which correspond to the part of the agent's
planning which they affect. The revised set provides a more solid foundation on which to
build the implementation found in the JAM system and from which to determine the recovery
strategies in chapter 4.
2.2 Dialogue
This thesis relies heavily on previous work on the computational modelling of dialogue. There
are three distinct aspects of past work which are important: the notion of "dialogue games",
turn-taking strategies, and architectures which allow a program to simulate all of the utterances
in a dialogue rather than just those of one agent.
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2.2.1 Dialogue Gaines
This thesis requires a way of abstractly describing the utterances which agents make in a
dialogue which notes that dialogues have an internal structure. There are actually many
different levels at which one can find "building blocks" in a dialogue; for example, Sinclair
and Coulthard [SC75] identify five different size units in classroom discourse, from an entire
"lesson", taking up a classroom period, to an "act" which expresses one "idea". However,
the most interesting unit from our point of view is what they call an "exchange" and what
we, following the dominant terminology, term a "dialogue game." Dialogue games express the
fact that, by and large, questions are followed by answers, greetings by greetings, statements
by affirmations or denials, and so on. Because all agents know, for instance, what it means
when someone asks a question, they can use dialogue games to obtain or share information.
There are many different theories of dialogue games which exist, but all of them share the
feature of indicating what expectations agents have when they engage in dialogue. The one
which we have followed most closely is Houghton's [Hou86] notion of "interaction frames".
We have chosen this version because it is intended to be used computationally and because
it makes reference to what agents believe as a result of playing a dialogue game, which will
become important in chapter 6. It expresses the games in much the same way as plans, in
terms of goals, preconditions, effects, and actions. Houghton's frames are described in terms of
participants (the agents involved and the proposition expressed), an end goal (the reason for
starting the game), an immediate effect (what the agents can be sure they have accomplished
when the game is over), preconditions (conditions which must be true before the start of the
game), a response (actions which the agents take when the game is initiated), and the type of
reply which the initiating agent expects its partner to make. For example, the following is the
specification of the MAKE-KNOWN game which Houghton gives on page 90 of his thesis:
Making Something Known
Participants — initiator := <TYPE actor>
addressee := <TYPE actor>
prop := <TYPE fact>
End Goal — know(addressee, prop)
Effect — know(addressee, (know(initiator, prop)))
Precondition — know(initiator, not (know (addressee, prop)))
Response — addressee => update worldview
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initiator => check acceptance
Reply — accept or reject information
Commentary — The goal of this interaction is to get the addressee to know something. The
immediate effect here is that they will at least know that you know it and the precondition
is that the initiator believes the addressee does not already know it. The response of the
addressee is to attempt to integrate the information into its current beliefs. The initiator
waits for uptake of the information which is indicated by the addressee's reply.
Houghton has four games in all; the other three are for asking the addressee for some informa¬
tion, getting the addressee to do something, and getting the addressee's attention. The main
difference between our dialogue games and Houghton's interaction frames is that our games
sometimes have more than the two moves allowed by his initiation and reply; in some cases it
will be useful to allow, for instance, an agent to accept or reject the reply to a wh-question.
Allowing more than two moves is quite common (for instance, in Carlson [Car83], Kowtko et
al. [KID91], Levin and Moore [LM77], and Sinclair and Coulthard's exchanges [SC75]). Our
own dialogue games are described in section 5.4.
Of course, there are many different versions of dialogue games that we could have adapted for
use in the JAM system, both simpler and more complex than Houghton's interaction frames
and stressing different properties of dialogue. Power [Pow74] implements seven games sim¬
ply as routines in a programming language; although his implementation is less flexible than
Houghton's, it still suffices. Levin and Moore's games [LM77] are completely goal-based like
Power's and are described in terms of the process of playing them (recognising what game is be¬
ing played, pursuing it, and terminating the game). More recently, another goal-based account,
Clark and Schaefer's [CS89] "discourse contributions", has stressed the importance of contri¬
butions from both agents even during games in which information predominantly originates
with one of them. Their work concentrates on the intention of dialogue to establish mutual
understanding and allows for different ways of expressing a move to give different strengths of
evidence about an agent's understanding and beliefs. All of these versions of dialogue games
are oriented towards computational mechanisms, but there are also formulations of dialogue
games which are concerned primarily with analysis. Sinclair and Coulthard's exchanges [SC75]
are one example. Carlson's [Car83] dialogue game moves have much the same information
structure as Houghton's, but are more loosely strung together; rather than giving predictions
about what will happen next and thus guiding the addressee's behaviour, his dialogue game
rules only specify possible behaviours such as in the rule which he calls "D.answer" — "When a
player has put forward a question, an addressee may put forward an answer to it" (page 60). In
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addition, Carlson allows moves to be made in the head (by allowing the agent to play dialogue
games with a special agent called "Nature") or even unconsciously (by having "Nature" only
be aware of the moves, as in the case when one raves deliriously in an otherwise empty room).
These properties make Carlson's games admit very diverse dialogue structures but make them
difficult to adapt for computational modelling. Finally, very recently Kowtko et al. [KID91]
have analysed the structure of dialogues in the map task corpus specifically and created a set
of games which the participants use. It would not be difficult to convert their games to a form
which is similar to the one which we adopt in section 5.4; the resulting structures would be
more detailed than the ones which the system uses. It would be likely to improve the simulation
if we were to incorporate their analysis; regrettably, this is left to further work because the
JAM system was written before their analysis was complete.
2.2.2 Turn-taking
In section 5.4, we will claim that the model of dialogue employed in the JAM system is a
reasonable one because if one makes certain assumptions it fits empirically observed data about
turn-taking. Models of turn-taking describe how control of the channel of communication is
shifted among a set of agents. The model which we will be adopting for this purpose is that
of Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson [SSJ78]. In their model, which is designed for ordinary
conversation, there are four different unit-type (loosely speaking, length) turns which a speaker
can make; turns can be sentential, clausal, phrasal, or lexical. They leave open the question of
how agents recognise the unit-type in progress in any one move, but provide empirical evidence
that agents are able to recognise which type is being used before the turn is complete. Speakers
are initially entitled to have one unit, after which a transition-relevance place (TRP) occurs.
Transfer of speakership can occur at any TRP, and these occur at the end of every unit.
There are two rules which govern transfer of speakership at any TRP and which both allocate
the next turn to a particular agent and coordinate the transfer in such a way as to minimise
the timing gap or overlap between utterances. These rules are taken directly from [SSJ78] page
13, with clarification added in square brackets.
1. At initial turn-constructional unit's initial TRP:
(a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a "current speaker selects
next" technique, then the party so selected has rights, and is obliged, to take next
turn to speak, and no others have such rights or obligations, transfer occurring at
that place. [One "current speaker selects next" technique involves direct address, as
in, "John, what do you think?"]
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(b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a "current speaker
selects next" technique, self-selection for next speakership may, but need not, be
instituted, with first starter acquiring rights to a turn, transfer occurring at that
place.
(c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a "current speaker
selects next" technique, then current speaker may, but need not, continue, unless
another self-selects.
2. If, at initial turn-constructional unit's initial TRP, neither 1(a) nor 1(b) has operated,
and, following the provision of 1(c), current speaker has continued, then the Rule-set
(a)-(c) reapplies at next TRP, and recursively at next TRP, until transfer is effected.
The dialogue model used in the JAM system fits this turn-taking model, given some assump¬
tions about the flexibility with which we can map JAM dialogue games into surface level
utterances. Justification for this claim is deferred to section 5.10.
2.2.3 Simulating Both Agents in a Dialogue
An important aspect of the JAM simulation is that it allows two computer agents to converse
without outside intervention. We have chosen this style of system rather than one which
converses with a human user for two reasons: it makes the simulation clearer, since particular
agents will be consistent in their choices of communicative postures and recovery strategies, and
it ensures that the main issues of the thesis are not obscured by the need for natural language
understanding. However, our choice does have a complication which is unique to systems that
simulate both agents in a dialogue; more traditional systems do not require a way of bringing
two agents to "life" on a serial processor at the same time. We have adopted Power's [Pow74]
solution to the problem. In his work, which involves dialogues between two computer agents
about getting in and out of a room in a world with a door and a bolt, the system starts up by
calling a "chair" program which alternately wakes the two agents one at a time. If an agent
wants to communicate with the partner, then it passes an utterance to the partner for it to
read the next time it is awakened by placing it in the partner's "mailbox". This arrangement is
also used in Houghton's [IIou86] work. He considers a "turn" to be one awakening of an agent,
but we do not adopt this definition, since, as we shall see in section 5.10, in order to conform
to the the Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson [SSJ78] model of turn-taking, we must allow turns to
occasionally span several awakenings, between which the partner only provides the affirming
response or feedback moves. The most significant failing of this arrangement is that it does
not allow both agents to "think" at the same time. Nevertheless, Power's approach suffices for
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the JAM simulation; our implementation of it is described in section 5.10.
2.3 Issues in Implementing Dialogue Systems
There are three major problems in the implementation of dialogue systems for which we take
specific approaches from the literature: the problems of how to combine planning and execution
in a way that is reactive enough to account for the human behaviour in the map task corpus,
how to characterise the different types of goals which agents have, and how to control meta-
actions such as deciding what domain action to take next.
2.3.1 Interleaving Planning and Execution
Most work in planning to date has concerned creating complete plans for some task up to
a specific level of detail, without reference to the execution time of the plan. However, the
benefits of being able to interleave planning and execution in the face of uncertainty were
recognised very early on (e.g., [Sac73]). Young and Simon [YS87] claim that this technique is
especially useful in human-computer interaction, because in dialogue all actions are undoable
and so they are relatively "safe" to perform even if their consequences are not entirely known;
Gilbert [Gil87] claims that such an arrangement is more plausible than the traditional model
as a description of human planning in general. Ambros-Ingerson's IPEM [AI86] has the most
thorough treatment of interleaving planning and execution to date. It operates on a partial
plan that may have certain properties known as flaws by applying plan transformations called
fixes. One possible fix is executing an action, and so execution is given the same status as any
other planning activity. IPEM uses a scheduler to decide which fix to apply next, providing for
a set of different problem solving strategies including both the traditional method of planning
and then executing and interleaving planning and execution. The architecture of the JAM
system, as described in chapter 7, fits IPEM's structure. In particular, we have a level (the
strategy level) of operators which encode all of the possible next planning actions which an
agent can take, and can be thought of as fixes; scheduling is performed by a further level (the
mode level). For the most part, our strategy level operators do not correspond directly to fixes
which are discussed by Ambros-Ingerson, since they are specifically tailored to simulate the
human corpus. There are also many different fixes and scheduling techniques used in IPEM
which do not have corresponding strategy level operators in JAM since they are not useful for
demonstrating our central thesis.
JAM also differs structurally from IPEM in that JAM has the same two-phase operation
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separating perception and action that can be found in a number of AI systems. Each time
an agent is awakened using a Power-like [Pow74] communication model as described in section
2.2.3, before it begins to decide what actions to take using a mechanism like IPEM's, it processes
all of the communications from the partner which have accumulated since the last time it was
awakened. This process is described in section 5.11. These communications can be considered
to be the JAM agent's sensory data. It is quite common for sensory data and reactive actions
for "emergencies" to be treated in a separate component from the main planner; such an
arrangement may be more psychologically plausible than integrating the two (a claim made
by, among others, Bartle [Bar86]). Bartle gives three different ways in which perception and
action can be kept separate in a working system and dangerous flaws in a plan (such as an
upcoming division by zero) can be avoided. Kaelbling's architecture for intelligent reactive
systems [Kae87] divides perception and action into two different components and continually
processes sensory data even during long computations. McCalla, Reid, and Schneider [MRS82]
describe a taxi-driver simulation, ELMER, which uses situated action rules in the form of
daemons on sensory data in order to avoid obstacles such as red lights and pedestrians. Not
as much control of perception is necessary in the JAM system, since the top level control
structure ensures that new sensory data is present only when an agent is first awakened and
never arrives after the agent has begun planning. However, JAM could easily be adapted to use
an approach similar to any of these ways of handling perception if a top level control structure
were contrived which required it.
2.3.2 Characterising an Agent's Goals
Most researchers agree that even an agent's direct goals to achieve a domain task can be
divided into different categories. We will use such a division in chapter 3 in order to separate
our communicative posture parameters into sets which affect different parts of a JAM agent's
planning process. The most usual distinction which is drawn is between strategy ("what to say")
and tactics ("how to say it"), in Thompson's terms [Tho77], In working systems, there are a
number of different sets of terms which describe similar distinctions. Ferrari and Reilly [FR86]
divide dialogue into "substantive real life" goals (S-goals) and "communicative" goals (C-goals)
which can be used to bring about completion of the S-goals. Cawsey's [Caw89b] content and
presentation plans for the EDGE system and Litman and Allen's [LA87] domain and discourse
plans for plan recognition divide in roughly the same way as S-goals and C-goals. Iida et al.
[IYA90] introduce a "three typed pragmatics" for recognising plans in spoken dialogue which
divides Litman and Allen's discourse plans into three separate parts: dialogue plans (plans
to engage in cooperative dialogues), communication plans (corresponding to one utterance
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goal), and interaction plans (characterised by turn-taking and playing the role of "discourse
expectations" or dialogue games). Their divisions closely resemble the analysis of classroom
instruction dialogues done by Sinclair and Coulthard [SC75]. Appelt [App85] further divides
what is roughly Iida's communication plan into four different hierarchically arranged levels:
illocutionary goals (such as informing or requesting), surface level goals (such as asserting or
commanding), concept activation (which involves the planning of descriptions which will refer
felicitously to the necessary concepts), and utterance creation (involving, among other things,
lexical choice). Since Appelt's levels have been used in a working system and are more specific
than the other divisions, we will be adopting them for use in our own work. Divisions similar
to Appelt's will be introduced in chapter 3 in order to demonstrate that the communicative
posture parameters described there form independent sets affecting different levels of planning.
2.3.3 Meta-Planning
There are two basic ways in which past researchers have controlled decisions about what plan¬
ning action to take next. In the first, the planning agent uses a blackboard-style approach
([HRHR79]), either specifically representing meta-goals and meta-actions (as in Wilensky
[Wil83] and Macmillan and Sleeman [MS87]) or allowing a supervisor to control the meta-
planning, in effect, by having it choose among different planning options (as in Sabah [Sab90]).
Another option is to explicitly cycle through a sequence of meta-actions, either choosing the
first applicable one that is found (as in the TEAMWORK project [Dor85]) or choosing from a
set of applicable actions based on some measure of priority (e.g., Georgeff and Ingrand [GI89]
and Ramshaw [Ram89]). The strategy which will be adopted for the JAM system is a variation
on the cycling approach which allows greater flexibility by having agents also choose different
ways of cycling through the possibilities in different situations. The way in which this is im¬
plemented is described in chapter 7. The JAM system's architecture was designed by analogy
to MOLGEN [SteSO], a planner which uses a layered problem solver in order to move through
a search space of possible molecular genetics experiments. Although MOLGEN uses its layers
to solve a different kind of problem than JAM, the way in which the two systems break down
their problems into smaller pieces are very similar. We will first discuss why Stefik designed
MOLGEN with a layered control structure, and then describe his choices for each of the layers.
2.3.3.1 Why MOLGEN lias Layered Control
Stefik's motivation for providing layered control for his planner stems from the fact that quite
often, scheduling the tasks involved in problem solving is difficult in its own right. Layered
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control is a flexible and "potentially steerable" approach to scheduling. Most problem solvers
are agenda-based; that is, they work on a fetch execute cycle in which the objects retrieved,
and the retrieval and selection procedures which make up the interpreter, can be quite compli¬
cated. The problem is knowing how the interpreter should decide which objects to select. The
decision can be arbitrary (e.g., selecting tasks in the order in which they were created), but in
general better behaviour is produced if selection is based on some domain-dependent notion of
"priority" or importance. Stefik's solution, based on work by Hayes [Hay75], is to apply the
same problem solving techniques to the scheduling problem as to the domain problem, forming
a meta-layer for the planner. If scheduling the tasks for this problem solver is difficult, then
yet another layer can be added, and so on, until the top level interpreter is trivial. Choosing a
task to schedule at any level of the planner is either an easy problem or it is broken down using
the higher levels of the planner. Additionally, the interpreter for any level, which consists of
all of the higher levels of the planner, is structured in such a way that it is easy to change the
way in which tasks are scheduled and to examine the way in which the interpreter works.
2.3.3.2 MOLGEN's Layers
One of MOLGEN's novel features is that the top level control of the planner is a simple "select
and execute" loop; all planning strategies are incorporated into the planner by using the layers,
of which there are four. The lower layers plan the task and the upper layers meta-plan the
planning. The bottom level, the domain space, contains normal laboratory operators coding
actions that molecular geneticists can take in an experiment, and abstractions of those actions.
These are the normal planning operators that would occur in a non-layered architecture. The
second layer, the design space, contains operators that control hierarchical planning and other
techniques that would ordinarily be part of the planner's algorithm. For instance, there are
operators propose-goal and propose-operator which choose laboratory goals and operators
to add to the plan, refme-object which which satisfies plan constraints, and refine-operator,
which develops a plan to a lower level of abstraction. The third layer, the strategy space,
contains operators that allow the planner to use either a least commitment or a heuristic
approach to planning. Operators at this level focus on building a particular part of the plan,
resume work on a previous part of the plan, guess at solutions to constraints, and undo plans
if they become overconstrained. Finally, the interpreter (the top layer of the planner) simply
chooses which of the options at the strategy level to take. If the interpreter always focuses
and resumes work rather than guessing, it takes a least commitment approach. If it guesses at
solutions, then it uses a heuristic approach and takes the chance of having to undo some work.
This layered approach to planning allows different planning strategies to be tried with minimal
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changes and elegant control.
When MOLGEN is run, it is invoked at the top level, the interpreter, with the goal of con¬
structing an experiment that satisfies a given set of constraints. The interpreter uses a least
commitment approach to planning as far as possible, and then if the plan is still undercon-
strained, uses a heuristic approach. In the least commitment approach, the interpreter applies
the focus operator, which tries to design new steps and carry them out. It does this by asking
each of the design operators (such as refining an operator or propagating a constraint) what
work they can do given the current state of the plan and preferring those which propose new
goals and operators over those which do not. If some design task is underconstrained, then it
is suspended for later consideration. When the focus operator runs out of things to do, then
the interpreter has the resume operator go through the different suspended tasks looking for
one that can be restarted. If only the focus and resume operators are used, then the planner
does not commit itself to any decisions which could cause the plan to become overconstrained.
However, if the interpreter can not complete the plan using only these two operators, it must
adopt the heuristic approach to planning, using the guess operator to make a plausible decision
which will allow the plan to be developed further. If at any time guessing causes the plan to
become overconstrained, then the undo operator is used to backtrack.
MOLGEN uses its layers to explicitly break up the problem of planning in a fairly complex
formalism into decisions such as what kind of global planning strategy to use (least commitment
or heuristic), which activity to use to extend the plan (e.g., add a new goal or apply an operator
to a goal), and which domain level operator to use. JAM uses its layers to break up a problem
as well, but instead of solving the problem of how to plan, it solves the problem of how to decide
what to do next in the dialogue. Thus its layers are different from MOLGEN's; they decide
which way of choosing a way to continue the dialogue to use (such as "communicate as early
as possible", or "if possible, don't replan"), which way to continue the dialogue (e.g., planning,
communicating, or attempting some kind of recovery), and which domain level operator (or
dialogue game) to use. In fact, all of the decisions which are made in MOLGEN belong
properly to the one way of continuing the dialogue in JAM which is encoded in the plan
operator. However, JAM's planning is sufficiently simpler than MOLGEN's so that it does
not need to break down planning into different levels. The relationship between MOLGEN
and JAM is one of analogy. We adopt from Stefik his way of looking at problem solving and
apply it to a problem with different characteristics. The layered architecture used in MOLGEN
is appropriate for JAM for the same reasons that it is appropriate for MOLGEN: the layers
provide flexible control for the system by breaking up the problem of choosing the next move to
make in the dialogue into smaller problems using meta-planning. JAM's layers are described in
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section 7.4. A worked example of a JAM run which demonstrates the layered control is given
in section 7.5.
2.4 Recovery Strategies
In chapters 4 and 7, we introduce a number of strategies which are used by agents in the human
corpus to recover from plan failures, and describe an agent architecture which is especially
designed to allow flexible access to these recovery strategies. There are three distinct issues
from the past literature which affect our treatment of the recovery strategies. The first concerns
classifications of different kinds of failure. The second is definitions of recovery strategies which
directly influence the analysis of recovery strategies used in the corpus, as found in chapter
4, and their JAM implementations, as described in section 7.2. The third issue is how past
researchers have incorporated recovery strategies into working systems, so that we can compare
their techniques with the flexible approach used in the JAM system, as introduced in section
7.4.
2.4.1 Classifying Misunderstandings
A number of researchers have tried to categorise misunderstandings. Their work is useful in
categorising the different kinds of conditions under which an agent might require a recovery
strategy. Most work has been done on classifying and recovery from referential failures (e.g.,
Goodman [G0086]; McAllister [McA87]); work at this level of detail is beyond the scope of this
thesis. More generally, Schuster and Finin [SF83] give five different conditions which can lead
to misunderstandings in a dialogue. The conditions are expressed from the system's point of
view in an interactive system:
1. The system and the user may use different terminology.
2. The user may fail to make an intended inference, make an inference other than the
intended one, or make an invalid inference.
3. The user may misunderstand a referring expression.
4. The user may not see a step as an alternate procedure rather than as an additional step
to an existing procedure.
5. The user may fail to recognise the issues because an explanation is too general or too
specific.
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These classifications suffer somewhat from being a bit vague. For instance, one might consider
conditions three and four to be special cases of condition two where the inferences involved are in
some sense not in the "real world" but in the realm of discourse. The recovery strategies which
we will be describing in chapter 4 do involve failures which fall into Schuster and Finin's classes.
Condition one may arise due to a high risk setting for a parameter which we shall identify
in section 3.2.1.2 as partner modelling. Conditions three and four are caused by high risk
settings for parameters which we shall identify in section 3.2.3 as specification and description
resolution in the former case and context articulation and context resolution in the latter; the
most usual recovery from them falls generally in the category which we will define in section
4.2.3 as repair. Condition five may arise as the result of high risk settings for the ontology
and ontological resolution parameters defined in section 3.2.1; recovery from it can be achieved
using the strategies elaboration and omission, which are defined in sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4,
respectively.
2.4.2 Past Approaches to Recovery
We will be adopting a number of recovery strategies almost directly from the literature. We
will be using Moore's [Moo90] definitions for repair, replanning, and reinstantiation:
Repair: A plan may be repaired after it has been executed and failed if at least one of the
prerequisites of the plan is found not to be satisfied. In this case, the repair can be
brought about by fulfilling the failed prerequisites and executing the plan's operations
again.
Replanning: If some part of a plan has failed and there is some other possible plan which
will achieve the same goal (i.e., one which uses a different plan operator), then the failed
plan may be abandoned in favour of the other plan. Replanning can occur not only at
the lowest level goal which has failed, but also at any of the higher level goals for which
that low level goal is being performed. For instance, if a plan to get an agent to know
the location of the swamp fails, and that goal is being performed in order to get the
agent to know how to complete a particular part of the route, then the agent may wish
to substitute a new plan for that part of the route which does not involve knowing the
location of the swamp.
Reinstantiation: If a plan has failed due to a problem with the value of one of the plan's
variables and there are other possible values for that variable, then the plan may be
reinstantiated with a different value for that variable and then reexecuted. For example,
if a plan for nailing a bookcase together fails because the nail is bent in the process, one
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way to recover is to begin again with a different nail. For reasons which we shall give
in section 7.2.3, this strategy does not occur in the map task but is implemented as one
way of replanning in the JAM system.
Moore's recovery strategies are defined simply but specifically, and repair and replanning match
behaviours found in the map task corpus quite well. However, in more complex planning
domains, where plans cannot be changed as flexibly as in dialogue, more special purpose versions
of the recovery strategies may be necessary (e.g., involving cleaning up the adverse effects of a
failed plan before executing a replan). Although we will be adopting Moore's definitions of the
recovery strategies, we will not be adopting her method of incorporating them into a system,
for reasons which we will give in the next section. There are also recovery strategies which will
be introduced in chapter 4 which Moore has not discussed. We will require a simple version
of plan recognition in order to implement one of these, goal adoption, which we will define
in section 4.1.1 and our implementation of which we will describe in section 7.2.5. There are
several different approaches to plan recognition available ([KA86] and [Car90] provide good
reviews); we have chosen to adapt part of Allen's approach only because, given the rest of the
JAM system, it seemed the simplest to implement. Allen's plan recogniser uses two different
techniques. The first, which we do not adopt, starts from some expected goals and searches
for a plan for one of the goals which includes the observed action. The second applies the
plan construction rules which the partner might have used in reverse to the observed action, in
effect, putting the system "in the partner's shoes" in order to determine why the partner might
have taken the action. This part of the plan recogniser uses inference rules such as "If S believes
A has a goal of executing action ACT, and ACT has an effect E, then S may believe that A
has a goal of achieving E." (pg. 113), which is very similar to the rule which the JAM system
uses. However, the JAM system's method for recognising plans is much simpler than Allen's,
and provides less coverage, since the point of including it is to create a better simulation of the
human behaviour in the corpus, not to improve upon work in plan recognition in its own right.
2.4.3 Using Recovery in a Program
Even very early work in planning suggests the use of various different recovery strategies,
usually called "replanning". STRIPS and PLANEX are combined in a system for controlling
the SRI robot [FIIN72] which can reuse arbitrary subsequences of operations from the original
plan when replanning after execution failures. This is primarily an efficiency measure, however,
and is not often applicable. Hayes [IIay75] improves upon this approach by recording in the
structure of the plan details about why each of the planning choices was made; when a separate
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execution monitor signals specific failures, then the replanning can invalidate some of the
decisions and all parts of the plan relying on them. Then replanning involves filling in the gaps
in the resulting partial plan. Ambros-Ingerson's IPEM [AI86] has the capacity to replan more
generally, but only when it is strictly necessary to do so and only on the lowest level failed
goal. Peachey and McCalla [PM86] build plans which allow several routes through lessons in
an intelligent tutoring system, and so the system can replan in a limited way when its initial
plan fails. In addition, if none of the possible routes through the lesson work, the system can
take the improved student model (which results from having the failed dialogues) back to the
planner and generate a new plan for the lesson. All of these systems implement restricted plan
recovery but do not need to choose among different strategies because each has only one way
of handling plan failure.
Wilkins' SIPE [Wil88] implements recovery (which he terms "replanning") more comprehen¬
sively by using a problem recogniser to diagnose particular failures when unexpected situations
occur, and then applying one of eight different replanning actions to effect the recovery. The
replanning actions work by manipulating the plan in such a way that it contains new unsolved
goals; then the plan can be sent back through the planner to be specified well enough for
reexecution. These actions combine to form reinstantiation, replanning, and repair as defined
by Moore [Moo90], and another strategy, repetition, which is defined in section 4.2.1. They
can also take advantage of serendipitous effects and allow some other forms of recovery which
work with failures which are too complex to be expressed in JAM's planning language (which is
described in section 5.6). However, Wilkins' replanning actions can not be used to reconstruct
all of the recovery strategies found in our analysis of the human corpus.
None of the systems which can use more than one type of recovery have very flexible methods
for deciding which one to use, nor has there been much analytic work on the choice of strategies
in human dialogues. In Moore's work [Moo90], there is a strict ordering placed on the possible
forms of recovery which decides which of them to apply. The system attempts repair first,
reinstantiations next, and, if none of these work, begins all of the different possible replanning
options working from the most specific (bottom level) failed goal upwards. SIPE [Wil88]
similarly has strict orderings on the application of the replanning actions, although most of
them only apply to particular kinds of plan failure, so there are not usually many possible
actions to take. McTear [McT85] suggests from empirical evidence on simple surface level
repairs in conversation that people tend to favour self-initiated recovery over relying on the
partner to initiate the recovery, as long as no recovery has yet been initiated. We argue in
section 7.1 that a strict ordering on the recovery strategies cannot possibly cover the range of
behaviours found in the human dialogue corpus, and suggest that by applying the Principle of
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Parsimony we can choose the strategy which will allow the entire task to be completed with
the lowest estimated cost. This seems a likely way to explain McTear's observation (since self-
initiated recovery can reasonably be expected to have a lower cost than some possible future
recovery initiated by the partner) while providing an underlying principle that can explain
other aspects of human choices as well.
2.5 BeliefModelling
The vast majority of research in belief modelling has been based on standard theorem proving
techniques. These methods are formal, elegant, and relatively easy to build and manipulate.
However, there is no natural way within them to limit reasoning about beliefs to that which
humans can do. In chapter 6, we present a belief model which takes into account the intuitive
organisation of dialogue and domain knowledge in order to restrict belief updating in a way
that better simulates the behaviour of the human agents. In this section we review the theorem
proving approaches against which we will be arguing and provide some background information
which is relevant to the new belief model.
2.5.1 Theorem Proving Approaches
At an abstract level, Konolige [Kon86] gives the best description of how a theorem-proving
based belief model can be incorporated into a computer agent. He defines a deduction structure
to have the form given in figure 2.1. It has a knowledge base of beliefs, a set of inference rules,
and a control strategy for applying those inference rules. When a query is put to the system,
the system tries to match the query to some fact in the knowledge base or to derive the query
from some sequence of inference rule applications. Then the belief set of the system is that
set of sentences for which the system answers "yes". Konolige assumes that the system has a
fixed, short amount of time in which to answer each query, allowing the system to be logically
inconsistent. Konolige also allows nested beliefs to be represented by, for instance, agent A
believing that agent B has a deduction structure of a certain form. In this case, B is not
required to use the same inference rules or even language to express beliefs as agent A. Because
Konolige's way of representing belief as deduction structures is general enough to encompass
all of the possible theorem proving approaches, it is useful as a way of comparing the different
options. However, his concern is to explain the cognitive structure of AI planning programs
and not to model people, so he does not specifically try to simulate human belief updating.
There are many different approaches to belief modelling which fall into the category of theorem
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proving and which can be described using Konolige's framework. Despite the fact that they
rely on a process which has no basis in psychology whatsoever, most of the variations have
been invented in order to better match the kinds of inferences that people make. Israel [Isr85]
investigates a number of standard modal logics in order to determine how specific axioms
relate to likely inferences for humans to make if the operators of necessitation and possibility
are read to mean knowledge and belief. Different axioms add properties such as introspection.
Experimentation with them might allow the creation of a system which is baroque but well
suited to modelling people. Both autoepistemic logic [Moo84] and default theories [Rei90] have
been used to describe the kinds of inferential jumps which people make; more recently, Konolige
[Kon87] has shown that each can be embedded in the other and so the choice between them
is not crucial. Konolige also [Kon88] introduces a default logic with a hierarchy of evidential
spaces so that intuitions about some inferences blocking others can be encoded; this formalism
has been applied to speech acts [AK88a] and reference [AK88b]. Levesque's logic of implicit
and explicit belief [Lev84], Frisch's inference without chaining [Fri87], and the work of Fagin
and Halpern (for example, [FII88]) specifically tackle the problem of creating a representation
in which agents are not necessarily logically omniscient. Finally, Ramsay [Ram87] and Ballim
[Bal87] look at problems which arise in nested belief spaces and involve representing that
other agents know information which the self does not. These techniques have some success
in capturing the kinds of inferences which come naturally to humans; their major limitation is
that the closer their behaviour gets to that of humans, the more convoluted their logics become,
until they are so complex that they are very difficult to work with and not at all plausible. We
believe that this is a necessary characteristic of the "logic in the head" approaches. In chapter
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6 we will argue for an alternative approach for which we make no psychological claims but
which takes into account the organisation of an agent's knowledge in order to limit inferencing
in a way that better simulates the human agents.
2.5.2 Degrees of Acquaintance
Our own belief representation, presented in chapter 6, is very different from the theorem prov¬
ing approaches which we have just described, but provides a heuristic solution to the same
problems. In section 6.1, we will be introducing the term "degrees of acquaintance" to refer
to all of the different kinds of understanding (coarsely speaking) that an agent can have with
respect to a domain concept. For instance, we might want to distinguish between agents that
are unaware of a concept, aware of it but do not know much about it, have enough knowledge
to execute plans using the concept (a position which Steel and Reichgelt [SR90] formalise in a
hybrid of epistemic and dynamic logic and term vividness), know everything there is to know
about a concept, and so on. We will have more to say about the positions which an agent
might want to represent in section 6.1. The notion of degrees of acquaintance is related to
that of stereotypes used to start off a model of an agent in an overlay model for an intelligent
tutoring system; for instance, systems quite commonly designate some agents as novices and
some as having more knowledge than that, and then associate a set of concepts to each stereo¬
type which designates those concepts which the agent is likely to know (e.g., [Cla87], [Sel88]).
However, in the usual usage, each agent is either assumed to know or be ignorant of a particular
concept; we extend this concept so that agents can have different degrees of acquaintance with
each concept. In addition to the idea of different degrees of acquaintance, we also borrow from
user modelling the idea of heuristic rules which can be used to reason about another agent's
knowledge, such as the following, which plays a role in the JAM system:
If the agent believes that P is vivid for another agent, then the agent believes that
there is some way of dividing P in which all of the subparts of P are vivid for that
agent.
Kass [Kas88] discusses rules which are very similar to this one and some of the others that we
introduce in section 6.7.
JAM's belief representation works by associating standard belief updates with each of the pos¬
sible dialogue moves using a finite state transition network. Very recent work at the University
of Rochester [AS91] suggests a somewhat less general version of the same type of process for
keeping track of plans in a cooperative dialogue system; it attaches state designations to plan
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fragments which have arisen during the dialogue. These states represent whether the plan
fragments have been adopted by one or both of the agents, allowing the system to modify a
plan's state based on moves in the dialogue. The Rochester work is just beginning, but we
suspect that there will be some overlap with the ideas presented in chapter 6.
2.6 Summary
The novel work of this thesis is presented in chapters three to seven. Roughly speaking, the
following past research is relevant to each of the chapters:
For chapter three (Communicative Posture) - Shadbolt's work on communicative pos¬
ture parameters and Hovy's work on the effect of pragmatic goals on natural language
generation in PAULINE, as well as ideas about how to classify the different types of goals
that an agent might have;
For chapter four (Recovery Strategies) - Past work on recovery strategies, especially
that of Moore, and Allen's techniques for plan recognition;
For chapter five (The JAM System) - Dialogue game theory (especially Houghton's in¬
teraction frames), Power's work on simulating both agents in a dialogue, the Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson model of turn-taking, and ways of allowing an agent immediate
access to sensory data;
For chapter six (The Belief Model) - Theorem proving approaches to modelling belief
plus some ideas from intelligent tutoring systems and user modelling about heuristic
belief updating, and Steel and Reichgelt's definition of "vividness";
For chapter seven (The Layered Architecture) - Previous approaches to planning how
to plan (especially Stefik's MOLGEN) and to interleaving planning and execution.
The novel work of this thesis can be seen most clearly in relation to work left undone by
Shadbolt, Moore, and Stefik. We improve upon Shadbolt's analysis of communicative posture
in the map task corpus by completing a more extensive analysis and by looking at the use of
recovery strategies in the human corpus. In addition, we implement a number of communicative
posture parameters and recovery strategies in a working system, JAM, which demonstrates their
viability. We improve upon Moore's way of incorporating recovery strategies into a working
system by developing an architecture which allows agents to choose their next actions based
on the amount of effort which they believe remains to complete the task, given each of the
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possible next actions. This provides a principled choice and more flexible behaviour, as well
as making the architecture easy to modify. At the same time, we demonstrate Stefik's very
general approach to problem solving in a markedly different domain from molecular genetics
that requires the ability to interleave planning and execution. The remainder of the thesis is
divided into an analysis of the human map task corpus (chapters 3 and 4), an explanation
of how the JAM system works (chapters 5, 6, and 7), example output from the JAM system
(chapter 8), and conclusions and further work (chapter 9). Next, we turn our attention to the




This chapter examines the way in which communicative posture affects the behaviour of agents
in the human map task dialogues. Shadbolt's communicative posture parameters and the
Principle of Parsimony have been reviewed in section 2.1.2. Section 3.1 extends Shadbolt's
analysis of the communicative posture parameters by taking into account the decisions of the
explainee and by dividing the parameters into different sets for different discourse planning
stages, making their operation more independent and therefore simpler to control in a working
system. Section 3.2 lists the parameters used in the extended analysis. This analysis provides
a theoretical basis for the implementation of the parameters and lays important groundwork
for both the analysis of recovery strategies, found in chapter 4, and their implementation,
discussed in chapter 7. Within our analysis of communicative posture, examples of high and
low risk settings from the human corpus are given for each parameter. Only a selection of the
communicative posture parameters given are implemented in the JAM system. This chapter
records which parameters are implemented, but discussion of how they are implemented is
deferred to section 5.12. Finally, although all of the examples which we give in section 3.2 are
from the map task dialogues, in section 3.3 we argue that the analysis applies to interactive,
collaborative problem solving more generally.
3.1 Extending Shadbolt's Analysis
Shadbolt's analysis of communicative posture, as reviewed in section 2.1.2, covered important
groundwork for this thesis by providing a small, corpus-based set of parameters and invoking the
Principle of Parsimony as an explanation for why map task participants choose the parameter
settings which make them behave as they do. We will be adopting both Shadbolt's method of
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observing the parameters and his understanding of the Principle of Parsimony, and for the most
part we will adhere to his analysis of the parameters. However, there are two basic ways in
which Shadbolt's parameters can be improved. The first is by taking into account that agents
don't just give explanations, but also hear them, and the second is by dividing the parameters
into subsets, each of which affects a different part of the agent's process for planning what to
say in the dialogue. In addition, in preparation for the analysis which forms the rest of the
chapter we clarify what we mean by "success" and "risk".
3.1.1 Parameters for the Explainee
All of Shadbolt's parameters focus on the route giver, since the route giver takes a more active
role than the route follower in most of the dialogues in the human corpus.1 All of them, except
possibly decentering, have to do with building an explanation. Decentering at least partially
has to do with recovering from an error in an explanation once the partner has heard it and
indicated that something was wrong with it. However, dialogue takes two agents; as well as
having explainers, it also involves explainees. Explainees need parameters modelling things like
how carefully they disambiguate referring expressions, focus movement, and changes in context.
These parameters are usually more important for the route follower, since in this task most
explanations are about the route and use information that only the route giver has. However,
the route follower often produces explanations of where objects are, especially for objects that
do not appear on the route giver's map. In cases where the route giver is uncooperative or too
highly cognitively loaded to plan all the descriptions, sometimes the route follower produces
hypothetical descriptions of routes or the locations of objects to test out on the route giver.
For instance, consider the following extract:
MAP 9
A: just draw what I said + right you go over the big river + right
B: right over the big river right + there's not a bridge on it where's the bridge ?
A: dinnae ken
B: is it up from oxbow lake?
This happens more often than one might expect; sometimes the best way for an explainee to
disambiguate a description is to enumerate all the possibilities and ask the explainer to choose
one. In these cases, the route follower uses the parameters for constructing explanations and
route giver uses the parameters for understanding them.
1 Strictly speaking, this isn't true, since part of maximal specification is "as a referential interpreter demand
location of new DOs [discourse objects], check the meaning or orientation terms etc.". However, in practice
variations in the dialogue which can be introduced by the explainee are ignored.
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3.1.2 Grouping the Parameters by Planning Stage
Shadbolt's analysis of parameters, besides missing out variations introduced by the explainee,
fails to justify what parameters are on the list or relate the parameters to each other. It seems
reasonable that the set of parameters ought to divide further into subsets which affect different
stages of an agent's planning. For instance, some parameters ought to affect task planning (i.e.,
in this domain choosing a description for the current section of the route or for the location
of an object), others to affect creating a discourse plan which expresses the task plan (and by
this we mean what Thompson [Tho77] calls "strategic generation"), others to affect realising
that discourse plan (or "tactical generation"), and still others to affect what decisions are
made when a plan goes wrong. A parameter set that divided into these sets would involve less
interaction among the parameters and would have the practical advantage that planning could
be done in independent stages. It is clear in which category some of Shadbolt's parameters
belong. His ontology parameter clearly affects only task planning, since it has to do with
picking out objects relevant to the current explanation. However, some of his parameters cross
over these planning stages. His difference parameter, for instance, affects both how an agent
chooses a task plan and how the agent organises the discourse to explain that plan. A more
independently structured set of parameters would introduce no disadvantages to Shadbolt's
analysis, but would be a more reasonable computational model of what occurs in the human
corpus and would fit in better with traditional views of natural language generation.
3.1.3 Caveats about "Success" and "Risk"
Before we proceed, we should explain what we mean by both "success" and "risk". For some
tasks, it is absolutely clear whether or not a given solution completes the task successfully. For
instance, if the task is to get a message across town by noon, then the message either reaches
its destination by noon or it doesn't. However, for many tasks there is a tradeoff between the
amount of effort expended on the task and the quality of the result. For instance, if one is
writing a paper, then (up to a point) the more effort one spends on it the better it will become.
Shadbolt [Sha84] describes this kind of task as having "open texture" success, meaning that
the task has no objective measure of success. The map task is one such task; the agents are
told to "describe it [the route] exactly because it's the only safe route", but not how exact
they must be. A variant of the instructions which would give the agents an objective measure
of success might tell the agents to reproduce the path within a particular precision (say, for
instance, one centimeter on the piece of paper). In open texture tasks, agents must weigh the
amount of effort needed for particular solutions against the quality of the result and choose the
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solution with the best value for effort. This produces very interesting differences across human
agents in sections of the map task where there is a great increase in effort required for a small
improvement in the quality of the solution. Unfortunately, it also causes complications for the
analysis of communicative posture, since it is difficult to gauge what forms a "low" or "high"
risk position without knowing what amount of success the agent is aiming for. Exactly the
same behaviour may appear as the result of a "high" risk position for an agent with exacting
requirements for success as for a "low" risk position for an agent who is not so exacting. We can
only describe a behaviour as being "low" or "high" risk with respect to a particular criterion
for success. In the analysis of the human dialogues, we ignore this problem and judge all of
the behaviours as if the agents had the same criterion for success. This complication does not
arise for the computer dialogues because all of the agents have exactly the same idea of what
it means to complete the task.
We also need to clarify what we mean by "risk". Using a high risk strategy does not mean
that the agent is risking not being able to complete the task, since agents always have the
opportunity to attempt recovery from any parts of their plans which have failed. In terms of
completing the task, it is no more risky to take a high risk strategy and expect to do more
recovery than to take a low risk strategy in the expectation that less recovery will be required.
What is risked in high risk strategies is successful completion of the task on the current attempt.
Risk in this sense is related to the amount of preparation which the agent makes for the current
attempt; low risk agents use more effort initially, while high risk agents risk having to use extra
effort to recover from failures due to less stringent planning. It is often more parsimonious for
agents to use high risk strategies than to use low risk ones, because with a high risk strategy
the agent might "get away with" the initial behaviour; otherwise, agents would never use the
high risk strategies. Of course, using low risk strategies does not guarantee that recovery will
not be necessary, anyway; they just tend to make recovery necessary less often. Despite the
fact that the term "risk" is confusing, we shall continue to use it because it does convey the
basic nature of the parameter settings; low risk settings are designed to work without further
effort whenever possible, while high risk settings risk failure of the initial plan.
3.1.4 Methodological Issues
In section 2.1.2, we mentioned that the methodology which we use in analysing communicative
posture is susceptible to criticism on (at least) two grounds: we have not shown that other
analysts can use the parameter distinctions which we describe, making it unclear whether or not
the categories are replicable, and we have not shown that our set is complete or "psychologically
real" in any way, making it unclear whether or not the analysis is stable. These are tricky
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problems, not just for our analysis but for all analyses of its type, and we will not address
them properly. It would be possible to at least make some claim of replicability by adopting a
technique from Kowtko et al. [KID91]; we could give descriptions of our parameters to a number
of people who are not familiar with them and see if they analyse the same dialogue in the same
way. Although this would undoubtedly bring up some interesting points about the parameters,
we have not had time to do this work. Stability is an even harder question, since it is not clear
how one could show that there are no other decisions which agents make during task-oriented
dialogue on the basis of effort and risk or that the parameters could not be divided up in another
way. We do address both the issues of replicability and stability indirectly by appealing to the
computational adequacy of the analysis. The implementation supports the hypothesis that the
parameters are replicable because it clarifies what the parameters do and how they affect the
agents' behaviours. The implementation supports the hypothesis that the analysis is stable
in two ways: first, it shows that the parameters actually "work" in some sense because the
implemented versions simulate the associated human behaviours, and second, it forces us to
think about all the different decisions which are necessary to a dialogue agent, highlighting
parameters which might otherwise not have been noticed in the corpus. Nevertheless, our
failure to deal with these methodological issues satisfactorily mean that we can not make as
strong claims about the relevance of our analysis as would otherwise be possible.
3.2 The Parameters
The current set of parameters is constructed to extend Shadbolt's set in such a way that it will
provide a sound theoretical basis for a computer simulation of the map task data. We have
identified twelve parameters, which are grouped into four sets; the remaining sections describe
each of the sets, giving the parameters and examples of the different settings from the human
corpus. Figure 3.1 gives a summary of which parameters fall into each of the classifications,
to which of Shadbolt's parameters they are most closely related, and whether or not they are
implemented in the JAM system. Some of the implementations of the parameters in the JAM
system only simulate the most important effects of the parameters and not all of the behaviours
described in the analysis. More details about how the parameters are implemented and how
they affect the JAM system are given in section 5.12.
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Figure 3.1: The Communicative Posture Parameters
Our Shadbolt's Implemented
Parameter Closest Parameter in JAM?
Task Planning Parameters
Ontology Ontology yes
Partner Modelling Decentering yes
Ontological Resolution Ontology no
Discourse Planning Parameters
Difference Difference, Ontology yes
Coherence Focus no
Utterance Realisation Parameters
Context Articulation Feedback yes
Context Resolution Feedback no
Focus Articulation Feedback no
Focus Resolution Feedback no
Specification Specification no
Description Resolution Specification no
Meta-Planning Parameter
Plan Commitment Decentering yes
3.2.1 Task Planning Parameters
The task planning parameters (ontology, partner modelling, and ontological resolution) deter¬
mine the particular task plan which is chosen by the agents. In the map task, they affect the
descriptions of the route and of objects on the map which the agents use. Since these param¬
eters affect the way in which the task is planned, they must be implemented in a way that is
domain dependent. However, the parameters themselves are not domain dependent; they ap¬
ply in any task-oriented dialogue domain which divides into concepts which one or both of the
participants understand. For instance, in the domain of describing electronic circuit diagrams,
the concepts might be the different parts of a circuit and ways of explaining a circuit's function
like the "water flowing through a pipe" view or the description using Ohm's law. Whatever
the domain, the relevant concepts are all of the different parts of the domain plus the ways in
which they can be explained to the partner.
3.2.1.1 Ontology
Ontology controls the concepts to which an agent refers when she explains part of the task or
the task domain to the partner. The Principle of Parsimony, as reviewed in section 2.1.2, says
that in tasks in which differing amounts of effort give differing amounts of success, agents may
use heuristic approaches to completing the task rather than expend a great deal of effort in
order to achieve the optimal solution. The ontology parameter reflects the agent's choice of
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Figure 3.2: The Path Through the Mountains in Map 9
the amount of effort. The higher the agent's standards for the task, the lower risk her ontology
setting will be. In high risk posture, agents only refer to concepts which are easy to describe,
taking the risk that important details will be lost. In the map task domain, this involves using
simple descriptions which do not refer to very many objects, as in the following extract for the
map given in figure 3.2:
MAP 9
N: yeah ++ and then go + south west and round the waterfall
V: round the bottom of the waterfall + OK
N: North east until you get to the bridge + to the river
V: that's the big river half way there
N: yeah
V: straight north east
N: um yeah
V: yeah OK
N: you cross the river
This is a fairly minimal approach; agent N accepts the consequences of this dialogue as satis¬
factory, and, of course, agent V, not having any further information, draws the route as given
in figure 3.3.
In low risk posture, on the other hand, agents use whatever concepts are necessary to describe
the route accurately, even if these concepts are quite complex, as in the following extract:
MAP 9
G: so + as you're coming up towards + the base of the mountain that YOU have
S: yeah
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Figure 3.3: V's Map
G: you have to go + in a s- in a squiggle like that (laughs ( —) squiggle) erm +
S: so + am I + on the west side or the east side I'm on the west side of the mountains
presumably? + the bottom
G: you're + just below the mountain actually
S: right I'm just going
G: approximately right in the middle but what you're trying to do is head towards
+ the west
S: right
G: you're trying to go past the mountain+ and ++ it's necessary to zigzag + erm
++ four times + if I can put it that way + erm
S: now what + which way do I veer now
G: right + so so you come to a point then + you suddenly zig down + and zag up
+ if I can put it that way (hah!)
S: OK + so it's
G: four times + right? ++ so that you're going from + about approximately the
middle of the diagram up + north 4- west + to to the + just beyond the bottom
of the mountains +
S: OK so + I (—) do I veer + to the
G: You're veering off to your right + northwest
S: yeah + I know + the erm + the zigzag
G: Yeah + the zigzag is going in that direction + yeah
S: But which way does it start?
G: Oh
S: The edge (of the) west + versus the east
G: Oh I see which way you mean + sorry + it veers + actually southwest + to start
with
S: yes
G: the first 4- do you understand?
S: uhum
G: Right 4- so it's + down up + down up 4 down up 4- down + and its going up
4 the last one you should be just below 4 you know 4- below the mountains
+ coming out beyond the mountains + right? + do you have + er a bridge
crossing Big River
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Figure 3.4: S's Map
This monumental effort yields the results given in figure 3.4.
According to the Principle of Parsimony, the ontology setting which is chosen by an agent
will partly depend on how the agent determines value for effort. An agent will choose low
risk ontology if she believes that the amount of effort involved is "worthwhile" because it will
lead to a sufficiently better completion of the task. In the dialogue extracts just given, it is
possible that G had decided that it was necessary to keep closer to the path than N thought
necessary, for whatever reason. It is also possible that N realised that to explain that section
of the route accurately within the precision attempted by agent G would mean resorting to
inches and angles, which would be a formidable undertaking. In any case, the agents weigh
value against effort in choosing their ontology settings. This is made clear in dialogues where
the participants discover that a description will take more effort than they originally thought.
For instance, in the following dialogue the agents abandon a task plan for one of lower quality:
MAP 10
L: ah right + erm + oh yes + er + I have a crashed plane marked here + can I +
check this + my crashed plane is ABOVE + it's in the BASE of the quadrant
+ top right hand imaginary quadrant of the + erm + picture + yes er + that
SOUNDS too high for me +
K: er
L: + because my cacti + my cacti + are about + oh + I would say + about two
inches at the moment or one and a half inches below the 4- imaginary horizontal
+ er you know the half way line or the vertical dimension of this + er + piece
of paper
Iv: mm + where we fouled up + I think was + when we + calculated from the
mountain
L: OK + mm + yes + so I should shift up my cacti a little
K: OK
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L: does does this MATTER really or can we just sort of
K: I- I doubt if they're worried
L: hha!
K: yes
L: OK we'll just ? so + we both have a crashed plane and it's just above the
imaginary horizontal
K: OK + yeah + if you divide the whole page + the whole map + horizontally in
half
L: mhm hm
K: your crashed plan is about + an inch above +
L: yeah
K: er the base of your cactuses is about an inch below that
L: yeah + OK + wa- we're near enough
This example shows that as the agents realise how much effort is involved in a particular task
plan, they may decide to abandon it for an easier (or harder) one by making the ontology simpler
(or more complex). In fact, as we shall see in section 4.1.4, this behaviour is an example of a
particular strategy for recovering from failures in the dialogue which we term "omission". The
ontology parameter is implemented in the JAM system using a simple measure for determining
the "complexity" of each of the possible task plans, as described in section 5.12.1. Then high
risk agents prefer less complex task plans than low risk agents.
3.2.1.2 Partner Modelling
A Partner Modelling parameter controls whether or not the agent uses a model of the partner
when constructing descriptions. This parameter does not control whether or not the agent
builds a model of the partner in the first place; that is controlled by the difference parameter.
We did not find examples in the corpus of agents deliberately referring to concepts which they
know their partners do not share. In effect, this entails that low risk difference strategies tend
to make very high risk partner modelling strategies unprofitable. Since the bulk of the effort
goes into modelling the partner, it would be unreasonable to build the model and then not
use it. Therefore, the important factor in recognising whether a strategy is low or high risk
is how the agent uses concepts which may or may not be known to the partner. In low risk
postures, the agent rates more highly those descriptions which refer to concepts thought to be
mutually known than those for which no such information is available. For example, consider
the following extract:
MAP 10
G: have you got a graveyard
R: yes over to the
G: over to the left about three inches from the volcano
R: yes I have on the same line +
G: yes and just left up the graveyard have you a ruined village
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R: no I haven't
G: well OK never mind ++
[... intervening dialogue with no mention of the ruined village]
R: yeah OK and then you are going to turn due west basically for about one inch
again heading towards the graveyard
G: ok about one inch
R: for about one to one and a half inches now what you are going to do is make a
big curve
G: mmh hhm
R: right round the graveyard keeping about one quarter inch +++ away from the
graveyard as you do a big curve and you end up coming out of the graveyard
around the other + side of the graveyard heading south east ++ is that clear
Here low risk difference makes G ask whether or not R understands references to the objects,
and low risk partner modelling makes G construct a description of the route through that
section which does not refer to the missing ruined village. At least, it seems reasonable that
G is putting special effort into constructing such a description; without reference to a partner
model, a more usual description of that section of the route is given in the following extract:
MAP 10
V: head south for one and a half inches just at the side of the volcano then ++ two
inches to the east - to the west sorry ++ then curve up round the graveyard if
you have got it - up round the north side of the graveyard and down between
the graveyard and the village ++ yeah
This, then, is the corresponding high risk partner modelling strategy, where the agent is not
concerned about a model of the partner, thereby using less effort, at least in the short term.
In the JAM system, the partner modelling parameter is implemented simply with reference to
an agent's belief about its partner's beliefs. Agents with low risk settings for partner modelling
prefer descriptions which, all other things being equal, only refer to objects which they are sure
the partner has, while high risk agents do not distinguish between objects which they know the
partner has and those about which they are uncertain whether or not the partner has them.
More details about the JAM implementation of this parameter can be found in section 5.12.1.
3.2.1.3 Ontological Resolution
Ontological Resolution determines whether or not explainees ask explainers about concepts that
are closely related to the concept that is being explained. It usually improves the explanation if
the explainee either asks the explainer if related concepts are relevant, or suggests hypothetical
ways in which they might be relevant and asks the explainer to accept or reject them. However,
this takes more effort than simply accepting the explainer's explanation as it is. In this domain,
since the basic concepts are things like objects and routes, concepts can be-related either by
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semantics (i.e., having the same label or semantically related labels) or by location. There are
three versions of low risk ontological resolution for this domain. The first, and most general, is
mentioning any objects which look crucial to some description that the partner has given but
weren't included in the description. Agent M uses this version in the following extract when
hearing a route description:
MAP 6
H: The start is just to the right of the antelope, and first go straight up due north,
if this is facing north.
M: Mhm.
H: And then, curves round to go under what I've got marked as desert, which
presumably is your sand dunes.
M: <So,/
H: It goes
M: do I go round the stone pillars?>
H: Yes7
In this extract agent M uses spatial reasoning to come up with a hypothetical description of
the route and check the description with agent H.
Another low risk strategy, which requires the agent only to have knowledge about when con¬
cepts are somehow related to each other, has the agent ask how related concepts fit into the
explanation, as in the following example when K mentions the hills:
MAP 5
C: Now what you want to do is loop round the crocodiles crossing the river as you
go round.
K: Right, then do you mean loop north of them or loop south of them?
C: Er, north, about half an inch away from them.
K: OK, if I do that, as I cross the river I come into hills.
K then leaves C to deduce how the hills fit into the description of the route.
Another version of low risk ontological resolution, possible only in domains like the map task
where the number of concepts is not only finite but small, is used in just one of the human
dialogues. It involves mentioning every concept which the partner has not mentioned to make
sure that none of the remaining ones are important, as in the following extract:
MAP 1
[after finishing the route]
B: right because I don't have that and what about other things on your map any
woods old temples hills do they come into this route
A: hills woods pyramid no old temple
B: so I should be there and the old well and the plane crash is the only thing that




This in some ways is the opposite of the very low risk difference strategy, where the agents
establish all possible concepts before starting the route description. Low risk difference and
ontological resolution are the only ways in which A can get a model of B's map; A must either
explicitly build a model of B's map, or B must offer information about the differences between
the two maps. Although there are three versions of low risk ontological resolution, there is
only one version for high risk. High risk agents ignore objects on their own maps which are not
mentioned by the partner. Thus low risk ontological resolution takes more effort, at least in the
short run, than the high risk setting. The ontological resolution parameter is not implemented
in the JAM system. In order to be used effectively, it requires at least one of the agents to be
able to handle spatial reasoning, and that is beyond the scope of this research.
3.2.2 Discourse Planning Parameters
Discourse planning parameters control the way that discourse is organised once an agent already
knows what task plan she will use. There are two discourse planning parameters: difference and
coherence. The task plan only expresses very vaguely what should transpire in the discourse by
specifying what the core of the explanation should be. The difference parameter fills in details
about optional utterances which could be added to that core explanation which might cut
down the total amount of effort spent on the explanation. After the difference parameter has
specified what the different parts of the discourse should be, the coherence parameter affects
their ordering in the resulting text.
3.2.2.1 Difference
Difference controls the amount of difference that participants assume there is between their
own model of the domain and the partner's model. If an explanation will contain the first
reference in the dialogue to some concept in the domain2, it can sometimes save effort to make
sure that the partner understands that concept before beginning the explanation. For instance,
consider the following beginning segments of dialogues:
MAP 9; High Risk Difference
N: Start in the south east corner and go north west past the palm beach and around
the swamp
MAP 9; Low Risk Difference
2 Although in the map domain the difference parameteraffects only first references to objects, in more complex
domains that involved longer dialogues, it might affect subsequent references if the agent forgot whether or not
the partner knows about the object. Forgetting by either agent complicates the partner model considerably




M: erm if you look to the right of or up from the start
B: mmh
M: erm there's a palm beach do you have that?
In the first extract, N assumes that the partner will have both the palm beach and the swamp.
He uses definite descriptions to refer to these objects, and he does not ask the partner first
whether or not the objects appear on the map. In the second extract, M makes no such
assumptions, and so must ask B whether or not they share the palm beach. M also uses an
indefinite referring expression, "a palm beach", to indicate that she does not assume that B
will understand the expression as a unique reference, or, indeed, as a reference at all. In most
of the dialogues, where agents adopt low risk difference settings, they also adopt indefinite
referring expressions for objects until their partners have indicated that they understand the
references. However, it is also possible to use definite referring expressions for the same use, as
in the following extract:
MAP 10; Low Risk Difference wilh Definite Referring Expressions
K: right you have the start marked
L: yes mmm
K: alright d'you have the volcano marked?
L: yes
For the purposes of choosing a difference setting, the type of referring expression is not im¬
portant; it's just that some difference settings rule out either definite or indefinite expressions.
Agents with a high risk difference strategy must use definite referring expressions, since they
assume that their partners will understand a particular reference. Agents with a low risk dif¬
ference strategy may use either definite or indefinite referring expressions, as long as on their
own maps and in the current focus the referring expressions denote unique objects. Difference
only determines whether or not the agent assumes the partner knows about an object for each
object on the map. However, our discussion of the parameter has left open the question of
where in the dialogue the agent asks about the objects. In the preceding examples, agents
chose possible descriptions of the route segment first and then built models of their partners
for the appropriate objects. If agents think that there will be many differences on the maps,
they may decide instead to build a model of the partner which contains all the objects they
can foresee they might use before choosing route descriptions. In the last extract, this was in
fact what agent K was doing; K and L discussed every object on both maps except for the cave
and then closed that part of the dialogue with
MAP 10
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K: I think + that we can + start now
L: fine
Since the cave is the only object nowhere near the route, the cave is the only object which is
not discussed. In runs with other agents, variations on the same technique are used where the
agents establish every object on the maps or every object on one of the maps. Any of these
techniques involves a very low risk difference setting, since the agents assume that their choices
of route descriptions will be significantly improved by having detailed models of their partners.
Such low risk difference strategies are not currently implemented in the JAM system. A
simple version of the difference parameter is implemented which makes low risk agents ask
their partners whether or not they have any objects in a description they intend to use if the
objects have not been discussed before. Then if the partner gives a negative response, the
agent can clarify the reference or abandon the current discourse plan, depending on which
requires less future effort. The JAM system also only allows the difference parameter to affect
first references for map objects rather than for concepts generally. For instance, in the map
dialogues agents might need to discuss the meanings of concepts such as "make a horizontal
line" or "go around the route", but such discussions are not allowed in the simulation. Details
about the JAM implementation of the difference parameter can be found in section 5.12.2.
3.2.2.2 Coherence
The Coherence parameter controls how carefully the participant orders explanations. The low
risk setting uses some method for deciding how to order ideas once they have been considered
essential to the explanation. The high risk setting is based on just saying things in whatever
order the agent thinks of them, whether that is the best organisation for the utterances or not.
In domains where agents have quite a bit to say before they expect feedback from the partner,
or where putting utterances together is tricky, a low risk setting can be expected to improve the
resulting text substantially. Current work in text generation (for instance, schemas [McK85],
Rhetorical Structure Theory [MT87], and focus trees [MC88]) addresses ways of building such
low risk strategies. However, in the map task domain it seems likely that the order in which
agents think of things to say is usually the same as the best order in which to say them,
and so expending extra effort on ordering the information does not generally lead to better
performance. Route giving agents in the map task seem to think of the route as if they were
following it from start to finish, and then organise their explanations chronologically. We found
no dialogues in the corpus where the route giver described segments of the route in anything but
chronological order. There were cases where, in the description of a single segment, the route
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giver described a specific position on the map and then asked the route follower to connect that
position with the end of the route so far, in effect describing the single segment backwards.
For example, consider the following extract for the volcano map:
MAP 10
K: + now + we have (a) difficult part + erm +++ find + the mountains in the
bottom right hand part
L: yes
K: of the sheet +++ find + the leftmost point of the mountains that are defined??
L: yes mhm
K: OK at about one half inch to the left of that point
L: hmh
K: put a dot
L: mhm
K: and + connect that dot with + where you ended up to the right of the waterhole
+
L: er + right ++ have done
It seems likely that K used this technique because the segment's shape was simple, but its end
point was hard to find. Using a nonchronological description in this domain appears to be
highly marked, and forced agent K into explicitly articulating the current context by using the
phrases "find" and "connect that dot".
The coherence parameter seems important in text generation as a whole, but does not play a
large role in the map task. Therefore it is not implemented in the JAM system.
3.2.3 Utterance Realisation Parameters
This set of parameters controls planning of the discourse at a level after choosing a task plan
and organising the discourse have already been done. They control realisation of the utterances;
in the human corpus, that includes things like word choice, but in the JAM system, where the
agents use an artificial language and can't misunderstand concepts like "around" or "between",
the choices to be made are much simpler. They have to do with synchronising focus and context
between the two agents. For each parameter affecting the explainer, there is one affecting the
explainee. This happens because these parameters have to do with tactical generation, and for
each aspect of tactical generation, there must also be some aspect of understanding by which
the explainee decodes the message. For the purposes of this research, we will define context as
the current set of intentions (that which answers the question "what are the agents doing?")
and focus as the set of concepts which the agents use in the discussion. The parameters handle
synchronising changes in context and focus where they occur.
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3.2.3.1 Context
In the map task, there are two basic contexts: the agents can be working on drawing a segment
of the route or locating some object. Additionally, there are a few higher level contexts, like
working on establishing every object on the map or working on drawing the entire route.
These higher level goals are always composed of a series of the two kinds of lower level goals.
Therefore changes in context are fairly simple to track, and the only mistakes come in thinking
one is supposed to be drawing instead of looking or vice versa. There are two parameters
related to context changes: context articulation for the explainer, and context resolution for
the explainee. They handle making sure context changes are unambiguous and disambiguating
context changes, respectively.
3.2.3.2 Context Articulation
There are two ways in which explainers can be "careful" to articulate context changes. The
first is to include meta-comments, or utterances which involve not the task itself but how the
task is to be approached, in the dialogue whenever they are not sure the partner will be able
to figure out what the current context is, as in the following extract:
MAP 6
M: Right. You have got to
H: Yes ~~
M: direct me. Erm, from looking at the maps before... On my map, just to see if
there are any substantial differences,
H: Mhin
M: or how similar they are, there's a river...
H: Yeah-
Here M is very careful to tell H exactly what his current intentions are. It is harder to give
high risk examples. Agents often fail to declare their intentions, but it is not possible to prove
that they did not consider doing so and decide that it was unnecessary. However, the following
extract, repeated from section 3.2.2.2, includes one of the most difficult contexts available in
the domain, so the explainer involved can be considered high risk for not articulating it:
MAP 10
K: + now + we have (a) difficult part + erm +++ find + the mountains in the
bottom right hand part
L: yes
Iv: of the sheet +++ find + the leftmost point of the mountains that are defined
L: yes mhm
K: OK at about one half inch to the left of that point
L: hmh
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K: put a dot
L: mhm
K: and + connect that dot with + where you ended up to the right of the waterhole
+
L: er + right ++ have done
The context in this case is drawing a segment of the route backwards, and, despite L's affir¬
mation, he did not understand that he should draw anything on the paper. One supposes that
K expected L to be able to follow the context change because K warned L that "now we have
a difficult part" and used the word "connect" for the first time. This brings us to the second
technique for articulating context changes. In the map domain, context meta-comments tend
to be found only with higher level context changes. More basic context changes are signaled by
adopting different language for each of the different contexts. Agents who use this technique
reserve specific words for use when they have specific intentions, in effect redefining the words
more narrowly for the purposes of the dialogue. The words "draw" and "go" usually signal the
route drawing context, while the words "look" and "find" signal the intention of locating an
object. Once explainers have chosen words and had them understood by their explainees, they
tend to use the same ones again.3 In more complex domains (e.g., in math texts), explainers
explicitly make such definitions for intentions that occur frequently, and use meta-comments
for less frequent intentions. Although it may seem that such word choices come naturally to
explainees, and therefore don't count as low risk strategies because they involve little or no
extra effort, there are examples in the corpus of dialogues where the route follower's choice of
action verbs seems to confuse the route follower about the current context:
MAP 9
R: Ok you are going to come about one inch below that palm beach
G: um um
R: + and ++ you are not quite horizontal you are taking a slight curve up towards
um the swamp ++ not obviously going into it
G: well sorry I have not got a swamp
R: you have not got a swamp?
G: no
R: OK
G: start again from the palm beach
R: from the palm beach alright, have you got trees drawn on your palm beach
G: yes
R: alright
G: so I am to leave the palm beach eh
R: I am going to draw the swamp for you first
G: ok
R: ok um um if you go about two inches across from the top of the tallest tree in
the palm beach
G: so I go to the palm beach
3Simon Garrod has some ideas about why this is the case; see section 9.2 for details.
9>I B}
R: no don't draw the route just now I am just showing you where the swamp is
sorry
R uses words inconsistently; for instance, R uses the word "draw" first for one basic context
and then the other. R also uses several words for the same context, forcing G to decode the
context using semantics each time rather than simply matching the word with the same context
indicated in the past. Examples like this one indicate that there really is extra effort involved
in making good word choices which some agents are either unable or unwilling to expend.
Since the JAM system uses an artificial language that only includes one word for each of
the basic contexts, word choice strategies for context articulation are not implemented. The
simulated agents can only choose whether or not to explicitly tell their partners what their
current intentions are using meta-comments. Details about this limited implementation can be
found in section 5.12.3.
3.2.3.3 Context Resolution
Context Resolution is a parameter used by explainees to determine the partner's current context
if it is ambiguous. As for all disambiguation, there are four basic options available: the explainee
can guess a context and take no further action, the explainee can guess a context and indicate
what she thinks the current context is to the explainer, the explainee can indicate to the
explainer that there is a problem (either generally or specifically concerning context), or the
explainee can list all the possible contexts and ask the explainer to choose one. The third and
fourth options are never used in the corpus for context resolution, although they are used to
resolve other ambiguities. Since the first option leaves no evidence for outside observers, it is
impossible to tell whether explainees have used it or whether they have simply failed to notice
the ambiguity. Evidence for the second option is found in the corpus, although explainees tend
to indicate their context choice indirectly, as in one part of the high risk context articulation
extract, reprinted here:
MAP 9
R: ok um um if you go about two inches across from the top of the tallest tree in
the palm beach
G: so I go to the palm beach
There are no examples in the corpus of explainees beginning a discussion of their context
choices, for instance, by asking the partner "do you mean that I should draw?" It seems likely
that because context choices in this domain are so simple, agents feel enough confidence about
their choices that indirect references to them are sufficient.
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No context resolution strategies are implemented in the JAM system because the artificial
language leaves no facilities for agents to utter statements which leave the context in doubt.
3.2.3.4 Focus
Focus changes in the map task are more complicated than context changes. There are two
common lines along which focus can be expected to change during the course of the dialogue.
Agents may use some idea of what is in focus spatially to refer to objects near the current
section of the route or near objects under discussion. This is the usual way of introducing
new objects, since the map task naturally involves spatial clusters of objects. Changes of focus
along these lines tend not to require any special signaling on the part of the explainer, since
the first place an explainee looks for an object to match a referring expression, if such an
object is not in focus, is the spatially neighbouring objects to the objects in focus. Objects
also may potentially be brought into focus by being semantically related to objects that are
in the current focus. For instance, if a "wood" is in current focus, then all other "woods"
are likely to be brought into focus, and if the "swamp" is in current focus, then "crocodiles"
may be brought into focus naturally. This kind of focus movement is useful because these
objects are exactly those which are likely to be misunderstood in the current discourse, and so
mentioning the semantically related objects can be a low risk strategy for making sure that the
agents agree on the current focus. In fact, Shadbolt ([Sha84], pg. 355) claims that the route
follower is more likely to change focus to include semantically related objects than the route
giver, because the route follower often has no idea where the route is going and therefore has
fewer spatial clues. Agents sometimes signal focus changes of this type, since they introduce
ambiguity and therefore are inherently tricky. Low risk agents always signal focus shifts which
are unexpected, such as long distance movement on the map to centre on an object which
is not semantically related to an object in the current focus, since such shifts are potentially
confusing for the explainee.
Shadbolt includes as one of his parameters one that handles focusing; in high risk, agents move
focus however they please and do not explain their focus shifts to their partners, and in low
risk, agents change focus as little as possible and check their current focus against the partner
often. The current work uses two parameters to handle focus whereas Shadbolt uses only one.
The part of his parameter which makes low risk agents move focus minimally is part of our
coherence parameter in the discourse planning stage, since it involves how the different things
which must be said are ordered. McCoy and Cheng's [MC88] focus rules could be used to
implement this, although the JAM system currently does not implement this parameter. The
other part of Shadbolt's parameter, providing clues to the partner about focus shifts which
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are hard to follow and continually checking that the partner has the right focus, belongs to
the utterance realisation stage of the planner. This part of his parameter, which is also not
implemented, may involve adding some meta-comments to the discourse, but it mostly involves
changing the way that references to particular objects are realised.
3.2.3.5 Focus Articulation
Once agents have decided to change their focus in a particular way, communicative posture
determines whether they assume that the partner will be able to follow the focus change or
whether they do something to indicate the shift to the partner. The high risk strategy for focus
articulation says to assume that the partner will be able to follow, and so high risk agents do
not include any explicit focus information. In the low risk strategy, agents provide explicit
focus information for their partners both for all focus shifts which might be hard to follow and
also at some other times, simply as a check. Sometimes the focus shifts are signaled by meta-
comments in the same way that context changes are, but more often focus shifts are signaled
by adding some kind of modifier to the referring expression for the object involved in the shift
which specifies how the focus should be changed. Here we consider the focus information to be
a meta-comment if the information applies to a series of objects, as in the following example:
MAP 6
M: And above the river there I have five landmarks, erm, a picket fence on the left...
We consider other examples, which include only one object, to modify individual referring
expressions, even if they may serve the purpose of changing the partner's focus permanently.
However, the distinction fades if one allows compound objects (e.g., "the area above the river")
into the ontology, and so we will not differentiate between the two ways of realising low risk
focus articulation in the remaining examples.
Simple focus shifts to include spatially nearby objects are almost never explicitly signaled; since
this kind of focus shift is the most prevalent, agents can expect their partners to follow them.
Focus shifts which involve large jumps on the layout of the map are sometimes signaled, as in
the following example, where H uses low risk focus articulation:
MAP 8
H: Then, a few inches below, directly below the caverns I have a cactus, sticking
out in the middle of nowhere. Then, going back up to where the lighthouse is
again, erm, in the opposite corner to that, if you like, the left ... top left hand
corner is a ruined arch
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This is an example of where the explainer, H, uses the area of the map to explain the focus
shift. Another technique is using movement along the x or y axis:
MAP 10
K: The best relation I can describe it is that the finish point is level with what I
have as a dead tree in the other corner of my map.
However they choose to explain the new focus set, low risk agents indicate to their partners
that an unusual shift is taking place. On the other hand, high risk agents choose not to indicate
large jumps in focus. In the following example, the stone pillars have been discussed by these
agents earlier in the same dialogue, although in an entirely different part of the discourse:
MAP 6
M: Sand dunes in the middle, s-... and stone pillars on the right
H: right
[...approximately eleven turns of dialogue]
M: And then near the bottom of the page, er, an oxbow lake.
H: Yeah. Does that have a picket fence above it?
M: No it doesn't.
H: No it doesn't. Right OK, er, do you ... did you say you had stone pillars
M: No stone pillars.
H: somewhere? No stone pillars.
M: Oh, erm, I have stone pillars in the top of the map, the top right hand side.
H: Right.
Here H's intention is to use the stone pillars as an anchor to get back to the top of the map,
since she has objects in that region which they have not yet discussed. Here, her high risk
focus articulation strategy leads to M having to repair the dialogue by changing his focus and
(through low risk focus resolution, as it will be defined in section 3.2.3.6) telling her of the
change he has made.
The focus articulation parameter is not implemented in the JAM system. A simple version of
it could be installed by enriching the map representation with some notion of map regions and
x and y coordinates, and using them to articulate difficult shifts in the low risk agents.
3.2.3.6 Focus Resolution
Focus Resolution, like the other explainee parameters which occur in pairs with parameters
for the explainer, allows the explainee to ask the explainer if there is a focus shift which has
not been signaled but which the explainee does not understand. There are no examples in the
corpus of low risk agents directly asking about the current focus with questions like "Are you
in the middle of the map?" or "What part of the map do you mean?" Instead, explainees
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tend to tell their partners what they are using as the current focus, so that their partners can
correct them if necessary. We've already seen one example of this at the end of the "stone
pillars" example in section 3.2.3.5. In other cases, sometimes the explainee mentions a possible
focus change:
MAP 10
K: erm + do you have the desert above the dead tree
L: Not + my my + ??? + my desert's in the top half of the picture ++ stony desert
In any case, the purpose of a low risk focus resolution strategy is to force the explainer to
disclose the current focus. Agents with high risk focus resolution strategies choose the most
likely option when they find a focus shift is ambiguous.
The focus resolution parameter is not implemented in the JAM system.
3.2.3.7 Specification
Once the agent assumes that the partner shares a particular focus set, the agent must construct
a referring expression for the object. Specification controls the number of properties given to
disambiguate new concepts (e.g., objects in this domain). Agents using high risk specification
strategies use whatever expressions they think of first to refer to concepts; low risk strategies
involve spending more effort to build referring expressions suited to the current partner. The
best referring expression depends on the objects which are known to the partner. A low risk
referring expression should both uniquely pick out the concept from the concepts in focus both
uniquely and minimally; that is, it should not contain any components that are unnecessary in
uniquely denoting the object. The low risk strategy requires uniqueness so that the hearer of
the expression won't have to disambiguate the expression. It requires some kind of minimality
because, as Reiter shows [Rei90], overly specific referring expressions can confuse the hearer
by causing false implicatures. However, the problem of finding a unique expression which
is truly minimal is NP-hard; A more relaxed definition of minimality, for the purposes of
implementing a low risk strategy, could be defined with respect to a mechanism like Dale's
[Dal88] "discriminatory power" with a heuristic ordering on the kinds of properties to determine
which ones are added to the description first, which is the approach taken by Reiter and Dale
[RDng]. The specification parameter is not as important in this domain as it is in other domains,
since agents can refer to most objects using their printed labels. That means that there isn't
the same element of word choice in this domain as in many others; objects really only have one
major description.4 The labels usually denote the objects uniquely and minimally within the
4There are cases where agents deliberately choose not to use the labels, as in one agent's calling the palm
beach "wee palm trees", as they appear in the map symbol. These variations are beyond the scope of this
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current focus set unless the agents choose to talk about objects that are semantically related.
This parameter is not implemented in the JAM system.
3.2.3.8 Description Resolution
Description Resolution, working opposite specification, controls the way that agents find the
referents of descriptions. In low risk posture, explainees might ask for clarification of ambiguous
descriptions. In medium risk posture, explainees might use an algorithm like Goodman's
[G0086] to determine the most likely referents. In a high risk posture, explainees might use
the first object they find fulfilling the description. This parameter is not implemented in the
JAM system.
3.2.4 Meta-Planning Parameter: Plan Commitment
So far the set of parameters has included controls for making decisions in the task planning,
discourse planning, and utterance realisation stages of the dialogue. However, there is a stage of
planning more abstract than any of these which controls decisions about how planning should
continue. This stage controls decisions about whether it is best to continue with the same plan
or abandon the current plan for a new one. There is only one parameter at this stage, which
uses a direct evaluation of the current plan and possible alternatives in order to decide how
to proceed; the different options are fully discussed in the sections on repair and replanning.
Plan Commitment, which is related to Shadbolt's decentering, controls how easily the plans are
abandoned for alternatives as the system learns more about the partner's knowledge. Pollack et
al. [PIB87] give an architecture for resource-bounded agents where plans are filtered out based
on whether they are compatible with current intentions and plans. If the predicted success of
an incompatible plan exceeds predicted success of the current plan by more than the setting of
a threshold parameter, then the old plan is abandoned. Agents with low thresholds are "bold",
and agents with high thresholds are "cautious". Replanning in the JAM system fits this model,
and plan commitment is changed by varying the threshold. It is not possible to prove that
particular agents are low or high risk with respect to plan commitment, since the routines
which agents use for evaluating plans are not visible to outside observers. Examples of agents
both repairing and replanning are found in the appropriate sections; these show that sometimes
agents choose to repair and sometimes they choose to replan, but they do not explain why.
research, since they appear to be due to secondary goals like being friendly or amusing. There is more scope
for choice in the unlabelled objects, but these occur so infrequently that agents don't need to build special
expressions to pick them out from the other objects.
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In our analysis, changing plans "boldly" is a high risk move simply because the model of the
partner with respect to the new plan is likely to be less developed and it's easy for the explainer
to confuse the explainee by suddenly changing strategies.
The plan commitment parameter is implemented in the JAM system by means of a switch
which changes the amount of improvement a replan must make on the current plan before it
is adopted. Fuller details of the implementation can be found in section 5.12.4.
3.3 Extension to Other Domains
Although all of the examples which we gave in section 3.2 were from the map task domain, our
analysis extends more generally to interactive, collaborative problem solving. In this section,
we give examples of behaviours due to some of the communicative posture parameters in two
other domains. The first is the assembly of a toy water pump; the examples which we use
are excerpted from examples given in Goodman [G0086]. The second is the explanation of
electronic circuit diagrams, with examples excerpted from Cawsey [Caw89a], Neither of the
papers from which we excerpt the examples involve the kind of analysis that we present here.
Although we do not cover all of the parameters, the intention is to convince the reader that
the analysis transfers as a whole.
We mentioned in section 3.2.1 that the concepts of the electronic circuit domain are the different
parts of a circuit and different ways of explaining a circuit's function, such as the "water flowing
through a pipe" view or the description using Ohm's law. The ontology parameter governs the
detail of an explanation by controlling how many and which of these concepts the explainer uses.
For instance, an agent who explains a circuit using both styles of description and mentions all
of the components would be using low risk ontology. An explainee who asks the explainer about
parts of circuit after the explainer seems to have finished uses low risk ontological resolution,
as in the following extract, where E stands for "expert" and N stands for "novice":
E: In this circuit we have an output whose voltage depends on the amount of light
falling on the LDR and the more light falls on here the more it will conduct so
the higher the voltage will be here.
N: What does LDR stand for?
E: Light dependent resistor.
N: What's this bit?
E: That bit's a variable resistor so you can change how the output level varies with
the resistance of the LDR.
Ontology works similarly for the water pump task, although it is possible that there is a
smaller range of ontologies which are sensible to use. Since it's clear that the goal of having the
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information is to be able to assembly the water pump, agents tend to use all of the pieces and
describe them in terms of physical connectivity. However, it would still be possible to vary the
level of one's ontological risk in the water pump assembly. For instance, in a low risk setting
one might describe subassemblies of several pieces, and especially their functions, since in the
long run that might make it easier to assemble the entire pump. Alternatively, high risk agents
might not describe all of the physical connections, assuming that some of them are easy to
make even without descriptions.
The difference parameter doesn't really enter into the water pump domain, since the agents
are told that they have exactly the same parts and none of the agents have assembled the
water pump before. However, it plays an important role in the circuit diagram domain, since
different experts may make radically different decisions about what novices know. As in the
map task domain, high risk agents make assumptions about their partners' knowledge which
may turn out to be incorrect:
E: These components here, you might consider them as being both resistors. Two
variable resistors. I can write down a relation for resistance...
N: You'll have to tell me what a resistor is.
Alternatively, low risk agents ask their partners about their knowledge when they are unsure
how to proceed:
E: OK, do you remember anything about transistors?
As in the map task dialogues, if an agent, once he or she has collected information about
its partner's knowledge, ignores that information, the agent must have a high risk partner
modelling setting. In this case, the expert subsequently explains transistors, so he or she must
have used the partner model which was constructed, and thus has a low risk partner modelling
setting.
Since one would ordinarily expect the water pump explainers to describe the assembly in an
order which could be followed in order to put the pump together even if it takes extra effort
to construct such an ordering, we can consider the following face-to-face extract, where the
explainer gets the ordering wrong, to exhibit high risk coherence:
E: now take the cap base thing and screw it onto the bottom ooops, un-undo the
plas- no the clear plastic thing that I told you to put on sorry. And place the
little red thing in there first, it fits loosely in there.
Of course, the speaker doesn't intend to be this incoherent; but if he or she had been more
careful about planning what to say, the correction would not have been necessary. It is more
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difficult for us (as non-experts in electronic circuitry) to assess what makes a coherent expla¬
nation of a circuit diagram, although it is clear that some explanations are more orderly than
others.
Context articulation and resolution operate in both the circuit diagrams and water pump
assembly. For instance, low risk context articulation leads to the following meta-comments in
a circuit diagram explanation:
E: What I'm going to do is to get you to explain this last circuit to me. Before I
do that I better say briefly what a comparator is.
A meta-comment analogous to the first of these two might be realised in the water pump
assembly as, for instance, "Now we're going to put together the main body of the pump".
High risk context articulation, as in the map task domain, involves not being explicit about
the context of the current section of the dialogue. In high risk cases, then, a partner using
low risk context resolution can ask what the current context is and a partner using high risk
context resolution can guess or use the first one that comes to mind.
It is difficult to assess focus articulation and resolution in either of the two domains. In the
electronic circuit dialogues, the agents often use deixis, which isn't recorded in the transcripts.
Thus it is impossible to tell just on the basis of the transcripts what focus information is being
conveyed explicitly and what is left to be inferred. In the water pump domain, either the
agents can use deixis (as in the face-to-face trials) or else they don't know where in the visual
field each of the parts is on the partner's table, making all objects which have not yet been
mentioned in equal focus. However, given access to more information about the trials in which
deixis is possible, we could ascribe high or low risk focus articulation and resolution settings to
the agents by taking into account whether or not the agents explain and ask about awkward
focus shifts.
The specification parameter shows up clearly in the non-face-to-face trials of the water pump
domain. For instance, one low risk agent uses "clear plastic elbow joint" (excerpt 1) to describe
the same piece as what a higher risk agent means by the "clear little attachment" (excerpt 5).
The second description is ambiguous since it could mean the pump's stand. Since each of the
assembly pieces has a number of distinguishing features, there are many choices for how to
describe them and how much detail to use. Description resolution works analogously. There
isn't as much scope for different specification settings in the electronic circuit domain because
agents can be unambiguous by pointing, and, as for the focusing parameters, it is unclear where
an agent is being ambiguous and where the verbal description is supplemented by non-verbal
information.
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Finally, since, as we shall see in section 4.3, repair and replanning both apply more generally
than just to the map task domain, the plan commitment parameter transfers with them in
order to control in what circumstances an agent is predisposed to replan rather than repair.
We have argued in this section that the communicative posture parameters apply in two do¬
mains (the explanation of electronic circuit diagrams and the assembly of a toy water pump)
which are quite different from the map task domain. We hypothesise that the analysis applies
generally in domains in which agents must collaborate interactively in order to solve a problem,
since it is these domains in which agents must decide how it is most efficient to bring together
information which is not known to any one agent. Special circumstances in specific situations
may make certain parameters not apply (for instance, the difference parameter does not apply
in the water pump domain because the agents know exactly what objects their partners have),
but in general the analysis transfers to other domains.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we have given a number of parameters along which human participants in the
map task vary their strategies, and classified the different possible strategies as low or high
risk, depending on whether the strategy involves expending extra effort initially in order to
form a careful plan or whether the strategy uses less effort in the first instance and relies on
recovery strategies in case of plan failure. This analysis expands upon Shadbolt's analysis of
communicative posture parameters by taking the role of the explainee into more serious consid¬
eration. It also divides the parameters into subsets according to the part of the agent's planning
which they affect and makes the parameters more independent of each other so that they are
more amenable to control in a working system. Ideas about future work on the communicative
posture parameters are given in section 9.2. Details about the implementation of the ontology,
partner modelling, difference, context articulation, and plan commitment parameters are given
in section 5.12. This chapter provides a theoretical basis for the behaviours produced by the
JAM system and for the strategies which high risk agents in the human corpus use in order to




We saw in the last chapter that there are a number of parameters with which agents can
decide either to include information explicitly in a task-oriented dialogue, expending effort to
do so, or to assume that the partner will be able to infer the missing information, saving effort
in the short term but taking the risk of having to put further effort into recovering from a
misunderstanding later on. We have also hypothesised that agents make these choices in such
a way as to minimise the total amount of effort that they think they will have to spend on the
task. Our treatment of the dialogues so far suffices for both low risk dialogues and high risk
dialogues where, fortuitously, the agents understand each other. This chapter analyses what
happens in the remaining dialogues, where high risk communicative postures lead to some kind
of confusion. The missing element is a set of strategies which the agents can employ to recover
from misunderstandings. This chapter gives a set of such strategies, which, following Moore
[Moo90], we call "recovery strategies". The analysis given in this chapter will be used as the
basis for the implementation of a number of recovery strategies in the JAM system.
The recovery strategies divide into two sets. Section 4.1 discusses recovery strategies which
are specific to tasks which involve communication (i.e., multi-agent domains where the agents
cooperate to reach a goal). These strategies fall out of the need for the agents to coordinate
their planning processes, and so they are not useful for more traditional single agent planning
domains. Section 4.2 discusses strategies which are applicable in any system which must be
able to recover from plan failure. Section 4.3 argues that the recovery strategies operate more
generally than just in the map task domain by giving examples from two other task-oriented
dialogue domains. There are nine recovery strategies in all; figure 4.1 lists them and indicates
which ones figure prominently in the map task and which ones are implemented in the JAM
system at least in some restricted form.
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Figure 4.1: The Recovery Strategies
Strategy In Map Task? Implemented?
Cooperative Strategies
Goal Adoption yes yes









This chapter only analyses the recovery strategies in isolation; a discussion of the implementa¬
tions and of how both past systems and our own agents decide which recovery strategy to use
is deferred to chapter 7.
4.1 Communicative Recovery Strategies
The recovery strategies discussed in this section apply in domains in which agents must com¬
municate in order to cooperatively reach a goal. Communication is usually defined in linguistic
terms; for instance, as in Grice's definition of non-natural meaning, as given by Levinson
[Lev83]:
S [the speaker] meant-nn z by uttering U [an utterance] if and only if
(i) S intended U to cause some effect z in recipient H [the hearer]
(ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognising that intention (i).
In the map task, all communication fits this definition because it is linguistic; there is a partition
dividing the two agents which precludes communication by gestures or by observation of actions.
However, in general, the recovery strategies described in this section are not restricted to
linguistic communication. Each of them involves an attempt to coordinate the dialogue in
some way which prevents or recovers from a breakdown of the dialogue. The first two, goal
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adoption and ceding control to the partner, make the dialogue run more smoothly by controlling
who takes the initiative of planning the dialogue. Finally, elaboration and omission, which are
used to agree upon the level of detail provided and required in any explanations in the dialogue,
are used to recover from failures due to the agents have differing notions of success for the task.
4.1.1 Goal Adoption
Goal adoption is a technique by which an agent may indirectly further recovery from a problem
in the dialogue by deciding to have as one of her own goals some goal which she recognises
the partner as having. Typically such recognition occurs as a result of a dialogue move that
the partner has made, and we can describe it intuitively as having the agent "step into the
shoes" of the partner and guess what the partner might be doing. Once goal adoption has
occurred, then the adopting agent may initiate a recovery strategy to achieve that goal. This
is especially useful if the agent can explain to the partner some reason why the partner's
initial plan or subsequent attempts at recovery have failed, or if the agent has some other extra
information which will make her attempts at recovery more likely to succeed than the partner's.
For instance, in our domain, the route giver might have the goal of telling the follower where
the swamp is, and the follower might be able to discern this from the description "the swamp
is beneath the mountains" even if the follower doesn't understand the description. In this case,
even if the follower doesn't have the goal of locating the swamp it makes more sense for her
to point out the exact difficulty rather than making the route giver guess what is wrong. It is
also common for agents to adopt each other's goals even when plan failure has not occurred
just as a way of being cooperative and of being careful about the course of the dialogue.
Since we can not be sure that an agent has adopted the partner's goal in an attempt to recover
from a plan failure unless she subsequently uses one of the direct recovery strategies, we can
not provide any examples here, but goal adoption will play a role in several examples of other
recovery strategies. Quite often it is perfectly possible for the agents to complete the dialogue
without using goal adoption at all. An agent who does not goal adopt completes whatever
dialogue games are initiated by the partner, answering questions and, in effect, nodding or
looking puzzled to the partner's statements, but never expends any effort to tell the other
agent what has gone wrong or to suggest alternate plans. This happens especially when the
agent has goals of her own which she considers to be more important. We might consider such
a participant uncooperative, even though she strictly follows the rules of the game; she simply
nevers initiates dialogue that does not serve her own interests. Since the high level goals of the
participants in the map task are shared, it is usually in their interests to adopt each other's
goals unless they know a better way to fulfill a higher level goal than the one proposed. More
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generally, once an agent is committed to participating in a dialogue, she will tend to goal adopt,
since such a strategy usually requires less effort and time in the long run. However, exceptions
do occur, especially where the partner requests significant amounts of effort or where the agent
is otherwise disinclined to be cooperative. Therefore we include goal adoption as a recovery
strategy that may be used at the agent's discretion, preparatory to employing some other
strategy to actively achieve the goal. A limited version of goal adoption is implemented in the
JAM system; the implementation is described in section 7.2.5.
4.1.2 Ceding Control to the Partner
In order to make the dialogue coordination smoother, agents may suspend planning and recov¬
ery strategies and allow the partner to control the course of the dialogue. We call this "ceding
control to the partner". Task-oriented dialogue is more efficient if the agents concentrate on
one goal at a time, and so cooperative agents often allow their partners to keep controlling a
dialogue if things are going well. Ceding control to the partner may be used as a strategy at
any point in the dialogue, but it is especially useful during a recovery, since it is inefficient
for an agent to begin recovery for some goal if the partner is already working on a plausible
recovery of that goal, and so agents may cede to the partner in this case. The main exception
occurs when an agent has some information which is unknown to the other agent and which
makes her believe that the recovery will fail. Another time that agents do not cede to each
other is when both have a secondary (and perhaps unconscious) goal to be "dominant" in some
sense, and therefore to control the course of the dialogue. In cases where an agent does not
have time to determine what problem occurred before the partner attempts a recovery, it may
not be possible to tell the difference between an agent which adopts the partner's goals but
then cedes control and an agent that does not adopt the partner's goals.
Although it is difficult to tell where an agent has decided to cede the turn and where her
partner has just happened to take control first, it is clear when both agents have decided not
to cede the turn. For example, in the following extract, agent G seems determined to continue
describing the route, while agent F wants to explore the area more thoroughly first:
MAP 11
G: <Draw the line across/
F: I have a cactus. Do you have a cactus?>
G: No. <Draw/
F: Do you have a r-... Sorry. 0K.>
G: Draw across to the right and up, round the imaginary obstacle which is halfway
between the diamond mine and the edge of the page.
In this example the agents disagree about how to pursue the initial planning for this section of
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the route, but in general it is possible for agents to disagree about any of the possible ways of
continuing from the current point in the dialogue. Of course, one agent ordinarily eventually
cedes control, as F does here; it would be unusual for the agents to talk simultaneously for any
length of time. Ceding control is not implemented in the JAM system.
4.1.3 Elaboration
Elaboration is a task-oriented dialogue recovery strategy which is applicable whenever an agent
gives an explanation which is not adequately detailed. This kind of failure occurs frequently in
the map task dialogues, seemingly because the task is difficult enough that the route giver has
trouble imagining how much information the follower must have in order to be able to draw
the route on the paper. This may come about as the result of a mismatch in the participants'
expectations, as in the following example:
MAP 7
K: Right, so you're at the coastline now, having circled the pagoda.
C: Mhm.
K: And you want to hug the coastline, going further north.
C: <Am I inside the coastline /
K: Oh sorry, yes,
C: or outside?
K: Inside the coast, yeah. >
C: Inside.
K: I just assumed that we weren't sailing or anything.
C: Right.
Here, agent K assumed that even though he did not include the information explicitly, agent
C would stay on dry land. This example seems to be a straightforward case of the two agents
not totally agreeing on what the task is; K is role-playing, whereas C views the task as drawing
on a piece of paper. In other cases, even if the agents view the task similarly, the route giver
simply does not give enough information to draw the route:
MAP 1
C: now let it's as it's again as if you were encircling something but I think there's
nothing on either of our maps to encircle
M: well I've got an east lake or I can go round the side
C: well you want to still stay above the east lake and do a loop
M: clockwise or anticlockwise
C: clockwise and there's nothing there's nothing in that loop it's a small loop erm
it would be about an inch and a half height at its maximum
M: so I go down I've got to go I've got to go
C: and up again
M: down and up with an inch and a half diameter and it's a circle
C: no it's a loop it's it's erm
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M: do I go more
C: more oval
M: right with with the
C: but then I'll tell you don't do anything yet you do know the shape that you're
gonna get with the loop
M: yes , sort of a pear shape
C: a thin loop exactly exactly
M: but a loop that goes from north to south or east to west
C: that goes from east to west
M: fine
In this case it seems unlikely that C thought that M would be able to use her directions on the
first try; she thinks that a high risk posture with plenty of interaction during the recovery is
the most efficient way to complete this part of the task. In other cases the route giver may be
too overloaded to realise that the missing information is necessary, may think that the partner
will be able to infer it, or may simply have a non-exacting definition of success for the task.
There are also cases in which the route giver gives a reasonable amount of information about
the route, but the follower asks for clarification just to "slow down" the dialogue and force
the giver to adopt a lower risk communicative posture. This tends to happen early in the
dialogue, when the agents are deciding on the style of the interaction. For instance, consider
the following initial extract of a dialogue:
MAP 11
C: OK. Do you have a diamond mine?
D: Yep.
C: If you go from the start
D: Mhm.




C: just as you get to the bottom of the diamond mine, stop.
D: Straight down, Chris?
C: Yeah!
D: Ok. Ok, now.
C: Move right across the page.
D: Underneath the words "diamond mine"?
C: Yeah!
In this extract, D is clearly trying to get C to go into more detail about the route. For
instance, although in the absence of other directions he could easily have inferred that he
should go "straight down", he chose to force C to make that part of the instruction explicit.
Technically we will class this move as a request for elaboration, although D may have more
global goals in mind than fully understanding this one section of the route.
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In all of the examples so far, the elaboration has been requested by the route follower. However,
we do not wish to rule out cases where an agent elaborates spontaneously, as in the following
extract:
MAP 11
G: Do you have an outlaws' hideout?
F: Yep. It's above me.
G: OK, well, you go up towards it but draw just beneath the words "outlaws'
hideout".
F: OK.
G: Is that right over in the right hand side?
F: Yep.
G: OK.
Probably in this case agent G was not satisfied that agent F meant that he understood what
to do just on the basis of F's first "OK" response. Explaining why agent G elaborates in this
case requires some notion of differing degrees of evidence for a belief, as in Clark and Schaefer's
[CS89] work.
To summarise, elaboration is a recovery strategy that is appropriate whenever one agent gives
an explanation which is less detailed than the partner requires. This mismatch can be due to
a number of factors, including an inaccurate model of the partner, too high a cognitive load,
or disagreement about what it means to succeed in the task. In any of these cases, elaboration
involves providing more detail in the explanation, either by answering specific points that the
partner has raised or by spontaneously offering extra information.
4.1.4 Omission
In all of the cases of recovery by elaboration, one agent gave an explanation which was less
detailed than her partner required. It is also possible for the agent to give too much detail.
Recovery by omission involves ignoring part of the explanation. We do not include as omission
the case where an agent finds the given detail superfluous because she is more expert than the
speaker thought; in this case, recovery is not necessary, since the explanation was understood
even if it was inefficient. Instead, we consider omission to be a viable option when the second
agent decides she can finish the task successfully without having the extra information. It is
not always possible to tell from the dialogue transcripts whether an agent has omitted some
part of an explanation. However, quite often the agents discuss whether or not the omission is
reasonable, as in the following dialogue:
MAP 10
... much discussion about the positions of two cacti...
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K: OK + now going back to the first cactus
L: yeah
K: directly above that cactus you have a crashed plane +
L: ah right + erm + oh yes + er + I have a crashed plane marked here + can I +
check this + my crashed plane is ABOVE + it's in the BASE of the quadrant
+ top right hand imaginary quadrant of the + erm + picture + yes er + that
SOUNDS too high for me +
K: er
L: + because my cacti + my cacti + are about + oh + I would say + about two
inches at the moment or one and a half inches below the + imaginary horizontal
+ er you know the half way line or the vertical dimension of this + er + piece
of paper
K: mm + where we fouled up + I think was + when we + calculated from the
mountain
L: OK + mm 4- yes + so I should shift up my cacti a little
K: OK
L: does does this MATTER really or can we just sort of
K: I, I doubt if they're worried
L: hha!
K: yes
L: OK we'll just ? so + we both have a crashed plane and it's just above the
imaginary horizontal
K: OK + yeah + if you divide the whole page + the whole map + horizontally in
half
L: mhm hm
K: your crashed plane is about + an inch above +
L: yeah
K: er the base of your cactuses is about an inch below that
L: yeah + OK + wa- we're near enough
In this extract it appears that the participants' notion of success changes as they discover the
task is really harder than they thought. This happens in several of the dialogues, especially
if the agents discover that they haven't ended up in the right spot but they aren't sure where
they went wrong, as in the following example:
MAP 1
M: you see I don't know where I'm meant to be ending up ok I'll just do what I
think you want me to do
C: the point that you want to be at now ok ought to be about two and a half inches
from the left margin
M: well I'm nowhere near that erm I'm sort of just above the west lake anyway
C: but have you done that banana curve yet
M: yeah
C: and what point are you at now
M: well I'm pretty much below the banana tree by about three inches erm but I'm
you know I'm near I'm far nearer the middle of the page
C: well never mind I mean
M: I've died but go on
However, there are also more localised cases of omission, where it seems likely that the agents
could have cleared up the problem without too much difficulty:
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MAP 4
K: so you've come in a sort of backward S shape you see it now
H: well I don't see the backward S shape but never mind
K: but you've gone round the top of round rocks and up the top and round the side
of apache camp yes
H: yeah
Here, even though H did not totally understand K's explanation, she thinks that what she has
drawn suffices. Any case where an agent gives information which is not understood and which
the partner ignores counts as recovery by omission in our analysis.
4.2 General Purpose Strategies
All of the strategies presented in the last section were specific to tasks in which two or more
agents collaborate. The strategies presented in this section apply more generally to any system
which interleaves planning and execution and receives feedback from the real world about the
success of its plans. Two of these strategies, repetition and ignoring the problem, involve
little effort on the part of the system but yield correspondingly poor results. The remaining
strategies, repair, replanning, and reinstantiation, which are also discussed by Moore [Moo90],
involve more effort but are more likely to solve the problem.
4.2.1 Repetition
Repetition as a recovery strategy simply involves repeating the action which has failed to
produce the desired result. For instance, an agent who is attempting to open an door might
turn the handle and push, but fail for some undiagnosed reason. A perfectly reasonable thing
to do next would be exactly the same actions again. The effects of real world actions are
unpredictable enough that it is quite often worthwhile not to consider whether one's plan is
incorrect or whether a precondition (such as unlocking the door) has not been fulfilled until
one has tried the original action several times. This is especially true in cases where taking
the action is not likely to make one's position any worse by, for instance, damaging the objects
involved. Repetition is not very sensible in our domain because by and large people do not
understand utterances about simple concepts better if they hear them several times. We found
no straightforward instances of repetition in the map task dialogues.
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4.2.2 Ignoring the Problem
Another recovery strategy is simply to ignore the problem and hope that it will go away. For
instance, if one is building a bookcase and sees that one hasn't nailed a piece on quite straight,
one might decide not to do any recovery, but hope that the tolerance for error in the rest of the
operation will be enough that the failure won't matter. Ignoring the problem doesn't usually
lead to discernible effects on behaviour, and so it is hard to recognise when another agent has
chosen this strategy unless one can reason that the other agent must know that the problem
exists. Omission is a form of ignoring the problem which only occurs in communicative tasks,
since it involves ignoring some detail given in an explanation which is difficult to process or
which seems to contradict other more important information. However, omission only applies
as a strategy for one particular form of plan failure, whereas ignoring the problem is applicable
whenever the failure doesn't make it impossible to continue with execution of the plan. We
can't give examples from the human corpus of ignoring the problem in the more general sense
because agents don't usually say anything about what they have decided to ignore. Ignoring
the problem and ceding the turn can look very similar in the surface level dialogue, but they
are distinguished by what happens next after the strategy is chosen. If an agent decides to
ignore the problem rather than ceding the turn to the partner in the hopes that the partner
will initiate recovery, then the agent will continue with the next part of the plan immediately.
Ignoring the problem is not implemented in the JAM system.
4.2.3 Repair
"Repair", following Moore [Moo90], designates any attempt to correct a plan after it has been
partly or fully executed by examining the prerequisites of the plan and planning for those
which were incorrectly assumed to be fulfilled before the plan's execution was begun. Repair
is a particularly important recovery technique in the map task domain. Many of the high risk
communicative posture settings involve presupposing a piece of information in the dialogue,
and so the dialogue can be recovered by presenting the information belatedly. Since, as we
shall see in chapter 7, these communicative posture parameters are handled using optional
prerequisites to the planning operators, recovering from them in this way involves repair.
The definition we have given for repair is very low level, since it involves examining the prereq¬
uisites to the plan. In this analysis, we assume that knowledge which plays an auxiliary role in
the dialogue (e.g., knowledge about the current focus or about objects on the map which must
be shared between the agents before the route can be described) is framed in the natural way
as plan prerequisites. We classify as repair any recovery which involves belatedly presenting
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knowledge that was presupposed when the plan was executed.
The most usual kind of repair present in the human dialogues involves wrongly presupposed
knowledge about the existence of an object on the map. For instance, consider the following
dialogue extract:
MAP 5
K: Past the volcano and, erm, di-... north of Fast-Flowing River and not at the
picket fence.
C: Where's the fast-flowing river?
K: Oh, there's a river on my map. Never mind.
C: Whereabouts is that ?
K: Well, the river is south of the picket fence, mountain and pillars, and there are
crocodiles marked above the river. Erm, if you've got the same starting point
as me, then the river actually divides the whole page.
C: Oh fine, I've got the river.
In this dialogue, C adopts K's goal for C to understand the main description and then requests
the repair specifically. The two agents decide to go along with the repair after initial hesitation
on the part of K. If C had chosen not to adopt K's goal, C would have only said "Huh?" and
let K proceed with the recovery. Repair initiated by the explainee may be signaled either by a
question, as in the extract, or by a statement (such as another agent's "I don't have a well"),
as long as the explainee requests presupposed information. We classify any attempt to clear up
a presupposition as repair, no matter who initiates the recovery or who diagnoses the problem.
This example was due to a high risk difference posture. Of course, other high risk postures,
for instance, high risk context articulation, can also lead to repairs:
MAP 9
R: I am going to draw the swamp for you first
G: ok
R: ok um um if you go about two inches across from the top of the tallest tree in
the palm beach
G: so I go to the palm beach
R: no don't draw the route just now I am just showing you where the swamp is
sorry
G: oh OK
Despite R's telling G the current context before beginning this part of the explanation, G
misunderstands and thinks that the current task is to locate the route rather than the swamp.
This is probably due to R's rather odd choice of words in his descriptions; he uses the words
"draw" and "go" to locate objects, and phrases like "you are going to come about one inch
below that palm beach" for the route. R detects the failure and explicitly tells G the context; as
the dialogue progresses, R adopts clearer terminology as a precaution. The implementation of
repair in the JAM system is restricted to recovering from erroneous presuppositions about the
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existence of objects on the map, since these are the only presuppositions which JAM encodes.
This encoding is described in section 5.7. Another limitation of the implementation is that
agents can only use very simple, predetermined descriptions of map objects, which makes the
repairs which they suggest less varied than those which occur in the human corpus. This
limitation affects descriptions of the route and map objects for other purposes as well (such as
planning what to say in the first place), and is discussed more fully more fully in section 5.1.
4.2.4 Replanning
Again following Moore, we define replanning to be recovery in which the agent abandons the
current plan for some goal and begins work on a new plan for it. Replanning can be done for
either low level goals or high level ones (in which case, all of the subgoals of the replanned goal
which arise only in the current plan are abandoned). In the following example, very shallow
replanning is performed:
MAP 12
1G: Right. Start from the sandy shore,
IF: OK.
2G: moving down... straight down.
2F: How far?
3G: Down as far as the bottom of the well.
3F: I don't have a well.
4G: Ah. Right, eh. Move down, eh, vertically down about a quarter of the way
down the page. Move to the right in... Do you have local residence?
4F:TdoT
5G: Right, well, move up and round and above them.
5F: OK.
In 2F, the route follower starts an elaboration recovery which fails because he doesn't under¬
stand the extra detail. In 3F, he signals that failure. 3F can be seen as a request for a repair,
since F tells G exactly where the failure is; however, G chooses to replan instead in 4G. Neither
agent mentions the well in the remainder of the dialogue.
It is also possible for an agent to replan very early in a plan's execution, even before the main
description has occurred:
MAP 9
57M: you cross it ++ erm + and you + do you have a wood + on that + near
there + near my + other side of the bridge
57B: <erm + I have a wood + erm + on the far left /
58M: no not that one
58B: hand side of my map no >
66M: OK + just below the delta there is a wood but you don't have it ■
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66B: yeah I don't have it there
67M: yeah + so what you + you have to do is do another semicircle + erm + going
right from the bridge and then returning back + the semi-circle would be about
one inch in diameter
Here, it seems likely that M already had a plan in mind that involved the wood and chose to
replan using a different description rather than explain to B where the wood was. Because
she used a low risk difference posture to check the reference for the wood ahead of time, her
estimate of the effort involved in each of the possible plans changed enough that the plan
which didn't involve the wood became more viable. In this extract, not much work had to be
abandoned when replanning was chosen; all of the intervening dialogue had to do with the part
of the route before the wood. In other cases, much more effort is at stake:
MAP 10
IK: +++ now + skirt fairly closely at about one eighth or one quarter inch down
1L: mhm
2K: the left hand side of the graveyard
2L: mhm
3K: until you come to a line which is the extension of the baseline of the + actual
gravestones
3L: right
4K: now + there's a fairly straight + descent + from that point at about a forty-
five degree line + down + to the right + it goes er + approximately two inches
leaving you about er + oh + about one inch three quarters of an inch away from
the old temple
4L: er +-1- from the top bottom or + what of the old temple
5K: its only the bottom of the ??
5L: OK
6K: ++ yeah + I'm sorry erm + now + you should -f darn + OK lets start again
with the graveyard
... a replanned description with the same basic content but more interactive...
11L: OK + but er I mean this brings me into close proximity to my Buddhist temple
+ I'm just wondering whether it's above below or +
12K: er
12L: what
13K: + er + this leave you about a half inch from ? + topmost part of the temple
13L: OK
14K: which is to your right
14L: OK right below the elephant
15K: yes + right
Here K decides to replan rather than elaborate based on L's question in 4L, giving a more in¬
teractive description, presumably because he thinks that the recovery will be more complicated
than L does. Unfortunately, L has exactly the same problem with the second description.
In the examples, replanning has been tried as the first recovery strategy after a recognised
failure. However, replanning can occur at any time when the agent decides that another plan
74
would be better, even if no problem has yet become evident, or if another recovery strategy
has already been tried. The choice depends only on the current estimate of the amount of
effort that remains to reach the goal given each of the possible ways of continuing the dialogue.
Information about how replanning is implemented and about how a replan in chosen in the
JAM system is given in chapter 7.
4.2.5 Reinstantiation
In Moore's terminology, "reinstantiation" is an attempt to correct a plan by changing the values
of the variables in the plan (for instance, by replacing a bent nail which led to a plan failure
with a straight one) and running it again, and "replanning" involves replacing the current plan
with a totally new plan for the same goal. Using Moore's definitions, there is at least a sense
in which reinstantiation and replanning are equivalent operations. As long as there is only
a finite set of possible instantiations for any variable in the plan, any reinstantiation can be
rewritten as replanning by creating a possible plan for each possible instantiation. Conversely,
it is always possible to express the replanning of a goal as reinstantiation if one creates a
new variable whose constraints indicate that it can only be bound to one of the possible
plans. Depending on how the system is implemented, it may not even make a difference to
the planner's performance which way the planning operators are written. However, intuitively
there is a difference between the kind of information which is expressed in variables and that
which is expressed as complete plans which involves the amount of commitment to the choice
of domain objects. As in the "nail" example, variables should be reserved for domain objects
which are, in some sense, trivial, whereas complete plans should have a more substantial
nature. Then we can differentiate between reinstantiation as a fairly simple recovery strategy
and replanning as a more drastic measure (although, as we shall see in chapter 7, this does
not imply that we will wish to apply reinstantiation before replanning whenever possible).
We therefore accept Moore's definitions of reinstantiation and replanning, with the proviso
that the plan operators be formulated so that variables only refer to easily replaceable domain
objects. There are no easily replaceable objects in the map domain, and so reinstantiation
as defined here does not occur. Unfortunately, JAM plan operators, as discussed in section
5.7, use variables more generally to refer to, for instance, entire descriptions of the location
of an object. We consider reinstantiating these variables to be a form of replanning, and
so our implementation of replanning uses a combination of standard replanning and variable
reinstantiation. This point is discussed further in section 7.2.3.
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4.3 Extension to Other Domains
In this section, we argue that the recovery strategies which we have discussed with respect to
the map task also apply in other domains. We have already argued that the general purpose
recovery strategies apply in non-collaborative domains, primarily by reference to the task of
building a bookcase. It remains for us to argue that both the communicative and the general
strategies apply in other interactive, collaborative domains. For this purpose, we give examples
from the water pump assembly and the electronic circuit domain, both ofwhich were introduced
in section 3.3. As in that section, we do not cover all of the strategies but our intention is to
convince the reader that our analysis of recovery strategies transfers as a whole.
Goal adoption and ceding control to the partner apply in any domains where two or more agents
have the same general aims but may have different ways of fulfilling the common goal. For
instance, suppose that in the electronic circuit domain, the novice, unbeknownst to the expert,
knows something about Ohm's law. Both agents have the goal that the novice understand the
circuit. If the expert begins by explaining the circuit in a new way, then the novice may adopt
the expert's goal and try to learn that way of understanding the circuit. Alternatively, if the
novice interrupts the expert, the expert may cede control to the novice and eventually learn
that the most efficient course of action is to replan and use Ohm's law for the explanation.
There is less possibility for goal adoption and ceding control in the water pump assembly
because the experiment is set up so that one agent has all of the relevant knowledge and the
other has none, although situations where non-face-to-face agents must correct an assembly
which the explainee has put together incorrectly may involve either of the strategies.
Elaboration can occur in either of the domains, since the explainer may provide an explanation
which is not detailed enough. For instance, in Goodman's first excerpt the explainee asks for
more information about one part of the water pump assembly:
E: And put it [the clear plastic elbow joint] over the bottom opening, too.
N: Okay.
E: Okay. Now, take the-
N: Which end am I supposed to put it over? Do you know?
In one of the circuit examples, it takes the novice two tries to extract an adequately elaborate
explanation of how one part of the circuit works, since the expert stops after explaining the
individual components and the overall circuit function but not how the bits go together to
provide the function:
N: Does it matter where these things are?
E: Yes, if you switch them round it will work the other way round, and the voltage
will go down as the light increases.
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N: Why?
E: Because, the ratio, the output will vary between 0 and 9V in proportion to the
ratio of the two resistances, so the bigger the resistance here, the further it will
be away from OV.
Examples of the omission strategy work similarly to the examples of elaboration; in either
domain, if an explanation is so detailed that it is confusing, agents may use omit part of the
detail.
The repetition strategy tends not to occur in these domains for the same reason that it tends
not to occur in the map task dialogues; adults seldom think that (barring channel problems)
repeating the same utterance will make the hearer any more likely to understand. However,
agents do sometimes ignore the problem in these domains. As in the map task domain, ignoring
a problem in the explanation of circuit diagrams usually only involves ignoring some bit of
information that has been exchanged, and can be classified as omission. Other kinds of ignoring
the problem occur in the water pump assembly, since one can imagine putting the water pump
together incorrectly and never rectifying the mistake. In Goodman's first excerpt, at one point
the explainee twists one piece to force it onto the wrong piece. Goodman describes this effort
by saying that "people do not always give up when a speaker's description isn't perfect (or
isn't readily assimilable for them)", but that "they try to plow ahead anyway" (page 275). If
this is the case, then these agents are ignoring the problem.
Repair occurs in the electronic circuit domain where the expert has a high risk difference setting;
for instance, in the example from section 3.3, the novice initiates a repair:
E: These components here, you might consider them as being both resistors. Two
variable resistors. I can write down a relation for resistance...
N: You'll have to tell me what a resistor is.
Replanning also occurs in the circuit domain:
E: That bit's a variable resistor so you can change how the output level varies with
the resistance of the LDR.
N: Say that again.
E: Well, this is a potential divider here, so the potential here will be between zero
and 9V in proportion to the resistance of these two things.
The novice may or may not have been asking the expert to repeat exactly the same explanation;
if the novice was, then it was a request for the repetition recovery strategy, which the expert
ignored.
We have argued in this section that the recovery strategies apply in two further domains,
the explanation of electronic circuit diagrams and the assembly of a toy water pump, which
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are quite different from the map task domain. These examples are intended to convince the
reader that the recovery strategies operate more widely in domains which involve collaborative,
interactive problem solving.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we have given a number of different strategies that agents can use to recover
from problems that arise in the dialogue. Some of the strategies are only useful in domains
with more than one agent, while others are useful for any system which must recover from plan
failures. In addition to defining the strategies, we have also given examples of them from the
map task corpus, where such examples exist. These strategies provide a partial answer to the
question of what a high risk agent can do when her plan fails. Implementations of some of the
recovery strategies and an architecture which allows the agent to choose flexibly among them




This chapter describes aspects of the JAM system which are essential to understanding how
the system operates but which do not in themselves make substantial contributions to the state
of the art. Although this chapter does not describe any novel aspects of the system except how
communicative posture is implemented, it contains important information about aspects of the
system which limit its function, and thus provides the context in which the system output
given in remaining chapters should be interpreted. Since our agents can not use the same kind
of visual maps that were used in gathering the human corpus, section 5.1 explains exactly
what sort of domain knowledge our agents do use. Section 5.2 describes the databases from
which the agents receive their information about the domain. Section 5.3 describes the form of
goals used in the simulation; section 5.4 describes the use of dialogue games and the language
which JAM agents use for communicating with each other as well as how that language is
transformed into something vaguely resembling English for the human observer. Section 5.5
describes how plans are represented and how they are executed incrementally so that they
also contain a record of the past dialogue. Section 5.6 explains the planning language which
JAM agents use and section 5.7 gives their planning operators. Section 5.8 gives the method
by which JAM agents use the plan operators to plan. Section 5.9 describes how agents keep
track of the cost or effort of the current plan so that they can minimise it and thus adhere to
the Principle or Parsimony. Section 5.10 explains how the top level of the system controls the
dialogue by swapping between the two agents involved and discusses the limitations of such
an approach. Section 5.11 gives an outline of what each agent does whenever it is given the
chance to "speak"; more details are provided in sections 6.4.3 and 7.4. Section 5.12 describes
how communicative posture is implemented. Finally, section 5.13 summarises the implications
of the JAM system's implementation for the human behaviours that it will be able to simulate.
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Many of the aspects of the system described in this chapter can be considered to be limitations
on the system's operation because the rather simple methods which have been implemented
unnecessarily constrain the agents' behaviour. However, the implementations described suffice
for the purposes of demonstrating that communicative posture and recovery strategies can
be incorporated into a working system. The parts of the JAM system which form major
contributions, the belief model and the layered architecture, are described in chapter 6 and 7,
respectively.
5.1 The Domain Knowledge Representation
JAM agents have a very simple representation for their maps. All of the JAM dialogues are
about the same pair ofmaps (map 9 of appendix A), although any map described in the correct
format could be used. Since human agents don't ordinarily describe the route in one piece,
the route must be divided into explainable sections; the route on map 9 is rigidly divided into
four sections for the purposes of the simulation.1 JAM agents represent the map in terms of
concepts which occur in the map domain. Throughout this thesis, concept names will be
given in small capital letters. Concepts come in four basic types:
Map Objects are features which appear on at least one of the two maps. In the agent's internal
"language of thought", the names of map objects end in digits. Where possible the
names are constructed in order to make them easy for the human observer to recognise;
for example, some of the route follower's map objects are castle-0, wood-0, and wood-
1. Occasionally an agent may have to represent a map object which is not on its own
map, but which appears on the partner's; in this case the agent will create some unique
name for the new object such as Tll4.
Route Objects are the entire route and its four sections. These objects can be identified by
their special names, which are route, section-one, section-two, section-three,
and SECTION-FOUR.
Descriptors are concepts which express relative directions such as "left" and "down". The
system has available to it a fixed set of descriptors and agents recognise them because they
have special reserved names which resemble their English translations. Each descriptor
has an arity associated with it, which defines the number of map objects which it must
take in order to produce a description. For instance, some of the descriptors used in the
1This division does not constitute a major restriction for the simulation. It would not be difficult to allow
the route to be divided into an arbitrary number of segments if a procedure for doing so were available.
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current system are between/2, left-of/1, above/1, and to/1.
Propositions are concepts which describe either the path of one of the sections of the route
or the location of a map object. They can be identified because they are lists where
the first element is the keyword 'describes, the second is the name of a map object
or one of the sections of the route, and the third is a description. Descriptions are
built up out of descriptors and map objects. A description is simply a list in which
the first element is a descriptor, the length of the list is the descriptor's arity plus one,
and the remaining elements are map objects. For example, two common propositions
are (describes section-one (between palm-beach-0 swamp-0)) and (describes
swamp-0 (right-of palm-beach-O)).
The use of concepts within the agent's "mind" is a good way of representing the maps, because it
allows the agent to think in terms of getting map and route objects to be shared with its partner
by using the dialogue to share with the partner propositions which describe the concepts.
However, the way in which the agents derive this representation is too simplistic to do anything
but provide rigid descriptions for each of the map and route concepts. Rather than having a
representation which reflects the way the map is laid out graphically and reasoning from it
to produce descriptions for the dialogue, JAM agents are initialised with a preprogrammed
set of descriptions for each of the objects with which they are familiar, and they can not
use any descriptions but these. For instance, route givers know exactly three descriptions
for the concept section-one: (around swamp-0), (left-of palm-beach-O) (between
palm-beach-0 swamp-0). Thus there are only three distinct propositions which a route giver
can construct when it wishes to convey the path of the first section to a route follower. The
descriptions for other map and route objects are similarly restrictive. Agents can not do
even the most simple kinds of spatial reasoning in order to construct new descriptions; such an
extension would be interesting but is left to further work. In addition, agents are automatically
assumed to know what each of the descriptors means in any context, and thus, for instance,
the agents can not have a dialogue about what it means to go "between" the palm beach and
the swamp as long as they understand the locations of both of the map objects.
As a result of this representation for the map, the only distinction that JAM agents can make
about their knowledge of a concept has to do with whether or not they know and understand
the components of at least one proposition which describes the concept. Thus JAM agents can
not distinguish among whether an agent has superficial knowledge, vivid knowledge or expert
knowledge of a concept, as these degrees of acquaintance were defined in section 2.5.2. JAM
agents only two degrees of acquaintance, "vividness" and "awareness". They define an agent
to hold a concept vivid if the agent knows at least one proposition describing, the concept and
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holds vivid the map objects used in the description, and an agent to be aware of the concept
otherwise; JAM agents do not distinguish among agents that are unaware of a concept and
those that are aware of a concept but do not hold it vivid.
The map representation described in this section seriously restricts the simulation because it
restricts the communicative posture parameters and recovery strategies which can be imple¬
mented. Ontological resolution relies on an agent using spatial reasoning in order to determine
what map objects are relevant to a description and have been omitted. Focus articulation and
resolution also rely on spatial reasoning to some extent, as does the aspect of specification
and description resolution which involves knowing when a description is unambiguous. The
elaboration and omission strategies rely on an agent being able to disagree about the meaning
of descriptors like "around" and "left". However, the current representation suffices for the
purposes of this thesis, and any limitations introduced by it are not inherent in the system
but could be improved with further work. In addition, there are other communicative posture
parameters and recovery strategies described in chapters 3 and 4 which could be implemented
without changing the current representation.
5.2 The Map Databases
In the last section we explained that each agent has a preprogrammed set of descriptions for
each of its map and route objects, with which it is initialised before a dialogue begins. These
descriptions are read in from an ordinary database. The database contains one entry for every
map or route object and descriptor, keyed on the agent's internal names for them. Each
database entry includes a simple referring expression for the concept (as we shall define in
section 5.4), information about whether the object is known to the partner, not known to the
partner, or uncertain, such as would be evident to human participants from the experimental
setup,2 and, if the concept is not a descriptor, the set of descriptions of it. In addition,
each entry contains information about how to place the concept into a network of concepts
representing the domain which will be introduced in section 6.4.2.
5.3 Goals
Just as in other planners, JAM agents decide upon actions by having goals. JAM goals have
three parts: the type of the goal (which is always "know", since JAM agents only desire to
2The route objects are marked as being vivid to the route giver but not the route follower. The map objects
are marked as being uncertain. Descriptors are marked as being vivid to both agents.
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exchange knowledge with the partner), the agent for whom the knowledge is desired (which can
be either the agent itself or the partner), and the concept involved. Throughout this thesis,
goals will be represented as lists and given in small capital letters, as in the goal (know john
route). Any concept can be a part of a goal. In addition, templates which unify with possible
concept names can be part of a goal structure. In this case, fulfilling the goal constructed by
instantiating the template in any way permitted by the language of the domain representation
counts as fulfilling the goal itself. For instance, the goal (know john (describes section-
one ?S)) is fulfilled if john gets to know any one of the permissible descriptions of the first
section of the route.
5.4 Communication and Dialogue Games
JAM dialogue agents communicate by placing "messages" in each other's mailboxes which are
identified as particular moves in a "dialogue game". Each message contains the name of the
sender, the "type" or game, the role of the sending agent (initiator of the game or responder),
the concept involved in the move, and a unique identifier which the agents use to know which
moves link together to form a single game. We have reviewed several possible approaches to
dialogue games in section 2.2; JAM's most closely resemble Houghton's "interaction frames",
since, as we shall explain in chapter 6, they specify belief updates which can be made as a result
of hearing particular moves in the dialogue. The JAM system defines the following dialogue
games. In the notation given, the first subscript indicates whether the move is an initiation (I),
response (R), or feedback (F), and the second subscript, where it exists, indicates whether the
move is in some sense "positive" (P) or "negative" (N). Phrases in italics give English glosses
of some of the moves.
INFORM Tell the partner the proposition in the proposition slot of the initiating message.
This game has two moves: the initial informing move and a "positive" or "negative" reply
from the partner:
Ij - initiate an INFORM game
Irp — reply positively to an INFORM initiation (ok)
Irn ~ reply negatively to an INFORM initiation (I don't understand)
WH-ASK Ask the partner a wh-question (i.e., ask the partner to tell you a proposition which
unifies with the form given in the proposition slot of the initiating message). This game
has either two or three moves. The game always begins with the initiating wh-question:
Wj - initiate a WH-ASK game
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If the partner knows an answer to the question, then there are two subsequent moves: a
"positive" reply (the answer) and feedback which is "positive" if the agent understands
the reply and "negative" otherwise:
Wrp - reply positively to a WH-ASK initiation
Wfp ~ feedback positively to a WH-ASK positive reply (ok)
Wfn ~ feedback negatively to a WH-ASK positive reply (7 don't understand)
If the partner does not know the answer to the initiating wh-question, then there is only
one subsequent move: a "negative" reply which indicates that the partner does not know
any propositions which answer the question:
Wrn ~ reply negatively to a WH-ASK initiation (7 don't know)
YES-NO Ask the partner whether or not it understands the concept given in the proposition
slot of the initiating message. This game is really only a restricted version of what we
would consider to be a yes-no question in natural dialogue, since JAM agents never need
to ask such questions except to establish information about their partners' knowledge.
This game has two moves: the initiating question and the answer, which is "positive" if
the partner understands the concept in question and "negative" otherwise:
Yj - initiate a YES-NO game (do you have the X?)
Yrp - reply positively to a YES-NO initiation (yes)
Yrn ~ reply negatively to a YES-NO initiation (no)
OPEN Open a dialogue about the concept named in the proposition slot of the initiating
message. This serves to inform the partner about the current context. This game has
two moves: the initiating statement and a reply which is "positive" if the responding
agent agrees to enter the dialogue about the concept and "negative" otherwise:
0/ - initiate an OPEN game (7 want to talk about the X)
Orp - reply positively to an OPEN initiation (ok)
Orn3 - reply negatively to an OPEN initiation (7 don't want to talk about it)
CLOSE Tell the partner that you believe that the concept named in the proposition slot of
the initiating message is mutually understood. This game has two moves: the initiating
statement and a reply which is "positive" if the partner agrees that the concept is mu¬
tually understood and "negative" otherwise. Closing and opening games do not occur
symmetrically in the dialogues because agents use them for different reasons. Closing
games are used after recoveries in order to coordinate the agents' knowledge.
3No agents in the current version of the JAM system ever choose to make the Orr move.
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Cj - initiate an CLOSE game
Crp - reply positively to an CLOSE initiation (J agree)
Crn ~ reply negatively to an CLOSE initiation (I disagree)
This set of dialogue games differs from Houghton's set of interaction frames in a number of
ways. We split his frame for "finding something out" into two parts, one for yes-no questions
and the other for wh-questions. This is a useful division because in our analysis, wh-questions
initiate games which contain three moves instead of the two in a yes-no game. Our set does
not distinguish between "making something known" and "getting something done" by com¬
municating a need to the partner, since we consider the latter to be a subset of the former
and because the nature of the map task does not make it fruitful to divide them. However, we
have found it useful to distinguish opening and closing games from the more general informing
games because they are used under very specific circumstances.
Propositions in the messages which convey dialogues moves are expressed in the same basic
language as the agents use for planning, with one difference: agents substitute referring expres¬
sions for the internal names in the proposition before they send the message. For simplicity,
in the current version of the JAM system, agents already have one referring expression for
each concept for which they have an internal name, and if two agents begin the task with the
same concept (albeit with different internal names), they use the same referring expression.
When an agent hears the partner refer to a novel concept, then the agent simply creates a
unique internal name for the concept and adopts the referring expression which was used by
the partner. This ensures that agents can not disagree about referring expressions, which,
although it is clearly unrealistic, is necessary because the agents can not use spatial reasoning
to disambiguate expressions. Improving the use of referring expressions is left to further work.
Referring expressions in the current system occur between double quotation marks and are the
labels given on the maps or some obvious other form. For instance, the referring expression for
what one agent knows as palm-beach-0 is "palm beach". Key words in the concept naming
language (such as describes) are used directly in the communication language. Then if an
agent plans to inform the partner of what it thinks of in its concept naming language as the
proposition (describes palm-beach-0 (right-of swamp-0)), it will use the communication
language proposition (describes "palm beach" ("right of" "swamp")).
For notational convenience, when we need to specify which agent is making a dialogue move we
will prefix the name of the agent to the move, separated by a colon, and when we need to specify
which concept (or proposition) is central to the move, we will append the internal name of the
concept, from the perspective of the agent whose process we are explaining, in parentheses.
Therefore, from B's perspective, the move A : //((describes section-one (between palm-
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beach-0 t114))) is a move by agent A to initiate an inform game concerning a particular
description of what agent B knows as section-one (the first section of the route). This notation
specifies the name of the concept in the agent's internal language; in some cases, for ease of
exposition we will specify the name of the concept in the language of communication instead.
We should stress that in this thesis, we intend dialogue moves to convey the speaker's intention
but to make no claims about the surface level form of the utterance. For instance, the move
A : //((describes section-one (between palm-beach-0 swamp-0))) could be realised as
"The first section of the route goes between the palm beach and the swamp", "Did you know
that the first section of the route goes between the palm beach and the swamp?", or even, in
the appropriate context, "Go between the palm beach and the swamp." We would not even
wish to claim that all dialogue moves are conveyed linguistically; for instance, the Irp move
might be conveyed by the phrase "ok", but also by "uh hhh", a grunt, and, in domains which
allow face-to-face contact, a nod, gesture, variation in eye contact, or the like. In particular
Irn and Wfn moves are sometimes realised in human dialogue by no action at all. We also
want to allow for the possibility that dialogue moves may be elided in certain contexts. For
instance, we would want to represent the dialogue extract
A: Go around the swamp.
B: Where's the swamp?
as consisting of three moves: A : //, B : Irn, and B : W/. However, agent B leaves A to
infer the Irn move from the fact that B has asked A a question about knowledge which A
has presupposed. We might also think of this situation as one in which B realises two dialogue
moves by means of a single surface level utterance, since B's utterance is what allows A to infer
the move which is not directly realised. In any case, we claim that even though our dialogue
move analysis may seem cumbersome, the dialogue games map very flexibly onto surface level
behaviours and really do account for the constructions which are used in the human dialogues.
Finally, we must issue a caveat about the form which the output of the JAM system takes.
The agents actually communicate as described above, but a more readable form of output can
be included in traces of the system. For instance, the following is a fairly common move in the
examples in chapter 8:
mary makes an inform(i) move mary says to john: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp"))
The JAM system produces the "translations" which are given in italics only for the benefit
of human readers. Because the translations are not used for any other purpose, the system
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uses extremely unsophisticated templates to construct them and only ensures that they are
readable, not that there are grammatically correct. In addition, none of the flexible mapping
techniques described earlier in this section are used. Generating reasonable pseudo-natural
language output and making the agents understand it is beyond the scope of this research.
5.5 Plans
As is usually the case with hierarchical planners, an agent's plan is represented as a tree. In
the JAM system, the top level goal of the agent is at the top of the tree. Any node which
is not a leaf node contains a goal, and the children of that node constitute a plan for the
goal. Leaf nodes may be either goals, in which case they are ones for which a plan has not yet
been formulated or which are satisfied trivially, or games to be executed. The JAM system
interleaves planning and execution in the usual way (as in, for instance, Ambros-Ingerson
[AI86]) by moving a pointer through the plan, expanding goals nodes, and executing games
in a depth first, left to right manner; we shall term this pointer the currency pointer. Thus
the plan tree serves both as a plan and a model of the past discourse; all nodes which are
visited before the node on which the currency pointer rests except its ancestors are part of the
dialogue history, the current node and its ancestors are currently under consideration, and the
nodes yet to be visited are the future plan. We defer discussion of how an agent adds nodes to
the plan to section 5.8. The JAM system marks each plan node with a "status" that indicates
what has been done so far with the node. Nodes which contain dialogue games can have the
following statuses:
Unexecuted: None of the game's moves have been made yet.
Initiated: The initiating move has been made, but no further moves.
Replied: The responding move has been made, but the game still requires a feedback move.
In the current system, this status can only occur for nodes containing WH-ASK games,
since all other games only require two moves.
Executed: All of the game's moves have been made.
Nodes which contain goals can have the following statuses:
Unplanned: No plan has yet been formulated for the goal. This can only be true if the node
is a leaf node.
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Open: The goal has children which constitute a plan for it, but the goal has not yet been
satisfied. In this case, the currency pointer is on the node or on one of the descendants
of the node, and either the plan has not been completely executed and may not be
completely formulated yet, or the plan has been completely executed and has failed.
Abandoned: The goal has been abandoned because one of its ancestors has been replanned.
Succeeded: The goal has been satisfied. The currency pointer will be somewhere after the goal
in the plan. A goal may be satisfied without all of its children being satisfied or executed
if some plan of the partner's has brought about the goal or if some of its descendant goals
have been abandoned due to replanning.
These statuses are updated as the dialogue progresses. Given these node status definitions, the
system does not actually need the currency pointer because it can be found by following down
a chain of open goals from the top of the tree to either an unplanned goal or an incompleted
game. Therefore it is kept purely as an efficiency measure.
Throughout this thesis, trees will be drawn by reflecting the depth of node using indentation.
For instance, figure 5.1 contains an example of a plan tree part way through a dialogue between
two agents named anne and andrew, from anne's perspective. Anne's top level goal is (know
andrew route), and that goal has four children, one corresponding for each of the four
sections of the route. The currency pointer rests on the unexecuted inform game.
Agents must keep their currency pointers up to date as the dialogue progresses. In the JAM
system, agents consider updating their pointer between every decision in the dialogue of what
to do (that is, each time they decide whether to plan, execute, or use one of the recovery
strategies next). Agents have three rules for updating their pointers, and they apply all three
rules in any order until the pointer does not move:
1. If the status of the current node is 'succeeded, 'abandoned, or 'executed, then the agent
moves the currency pointer to rest on that node's parent.
2. If the current node is a goal node which the agent believes is now fulfilled, and if there
are no children of the node which are unfinished games (i.e. every child of the node is
either a goal or a game with status 'executed), then the agent moves the currency pointer
to rest on that node's parent.
3. If the current node has a child which is not yet finished (i.e., a goal with status 'unplanned
or 'open or a game with status 'unexecuted4), then the agent moves the currency pointer
to rest on the leftmost child of the node which is not yet finished.
4 The case where the child is a game with status 'initiated, or 'replied does not arise.
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Figure 5.1: A Plan Tree
open: (know andrew route)
succeeded: (know andrew section-one)
abandoned: (know andrew (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)))




succeeded: (know andrew (describes section-one
(left-of palm-beach-0)))
executed: (26 inform anne andrew
(describes section-one (left-of palm-beach-O))
ok ?var39)
open: (know andrew section-two)
open: (know andrew (describes section-two
(between waterfall-0 cliffs-O)))




unplanned: (know andrew section-three)
unplanned: (know andrew section-four)
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These three rules keep the currency pointer on the first unfinished node in a depth-first, left-
to-right traversal of the plan.
So far, we have omitted discussion of how an agent incorporates its partner's actions into its
dialogue history and plan. The partner's responses to games initiated by the agent are simply
stored in the games, since rules one and two entail that the currency pointer remains on a game
until it is completely executed. If the partner initiates a dialogue game, then the agent pushes
it as a child of the current node, unless the current node is a game itself, in which case the
agent will push it as the next sibling of the current node in order to preserve the requirement
that games must only occur on leaf nodes.5 This reflects the fact JAM agents rather single
mindedly assume that any games initiated by the partner are relevant to the current goal, since
the currency pointer update rules require that game to be completed before the current goal
can be considered to be completed. As with most of the details in this chapter, we do not
assume that this is the best way to record the dialogue history and control traversal of the
plan, but it is a way which is simple to implement and which suffices for the current purpose.
5.6 The Planning Language
The JAM domain plan operators have the same basic features as plan operators in a traditional
hierarchical planner, in that they have effects, operations, prerequisites, and constraints. The
effect is a goal which will ordinarily be brought about by an application of the operator. The
operations are the goals which must be satisfied or games which must be executed in order
to apply the operator, and the prerequisites are conditions which must be satisfied before
the operations can be begun. These are the standard definitions for these parts of a plan
operator. There is less accord about the role of constraints in the literature; in the JAM
system, constraints are conditions which must hold in order for the operator to be applied, and
if they are not already fulfilled when the agent is planning then the agent will not try to satisfy
them by taking preliminary actions. This makes the constraints different from prerequisites,
since prerequisites are conditions on which the agent will work in order to bring them about.
The JAM system allows for two kinds of constraints: nonrelaxable ones must be satisfied under
any condition, and relaxable ones can be ignored if there is no other plan operator which has the
desired effect. In addition to these standard components of a plan operator, the JAM system
adds a replanning flag which indicates whether or not agents should consider replanning goals
which have been satisfied using the operator.
5This requirement exists because the children of a node are considered to be a plan for that node, and it
does not make sense to have plans for executable nodes.
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In the JAM system, the effect of an operator must be a goal and the operations must be a
list, of which every element must be either a goal or a game. Constraints and prerequisites are
more complex because they have their own internal structures.
5.6.1 Constraints
Each domain plan operator has an ordered list of nonrelaxable constraints which must be
satisfied in order for the operator to be applied, and another ordered list of relaxable constraints
which should be satisfied. Operators for which not all of the relaxable constraints are satisfied
are only used if there are no other planning options. When an agent comes to determine whether
or not the constraints are satisfied, it works through the constraints one by one, starting
with the nonrelaxable ones, building up lists of possible variable bindings which satisfy the
constraints. The constraints themselves are represented simply as lists and come in a number
of different types, which are identified by the constraint's first element:
Set: For each possible binding, extend it so that the variable given as the second element of
the list is set to the value of the arbitrary lisp expression constructed by instantiating the
third element of the list with the possible binding. For instance, for any existing binding
the constraint (set ?I (new-frame-id))) will add for ?I the value of the expression
(new-frame-id), which is a unique reference number. This type of constraint does not
check whether or not the variable has already been set in the possible binding.
Type: For each possible binding, if the variable given as the second element of the list is not
already bound, extend the binding so that the variable is set to any object of the type
given. In the current system, the only allowable type is 'agent, and the possible values of
this type are the two agents involved in the dialogue. For instance, if the variable ?F is
not already set in any of the possible bindings, the constraint (type-OF ?F agent) will
double the number of possible bindings by creating two new bindings for each old one,
one with ?F set to one of the agents and one with ?F set to the other.
Belief: In this type of constraint, the second element of the list must be a variable which
is already bound to an agent and the third element of the list must be a complete or
incomplete proposition (that is, one in which there may be unbound variables). If the
proposition is complete, then the constraint eliminates any of the possible bindings for
which the agent running the constraint does not believe that the named agent believes
the instantiated proposition. If not all of the variables in the proposition are bound,
then the constraint creates a new list of possible bindings which extends the old bindings
in such a way as to set any unbound variables to values which the agent running the
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constraint believes makes the proposition true for the named agent. For instance, if john
is running a constraint set, and in all possible bindings so far ?G is set to mary, ?S is
set to section-one, and ?D is not set, and if john believes that mary believes both
(describes section-one (left-of palm-beach-O)) and (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 t114)), then the constraint (believes ?G (describes ?S
?D)) doubles the number of possible bindings by extending each one in two ways: one so
that ?D is set to (left-of palm-beach-O), and the other so that ?D is set to (between
palm-beach-0 tll4).
Arbitrary: In this type of constraint, the result of instantiating the entire constraint with a
possible binding constructs an arbitrary lisp expression. The constraint eliminates any
bindings which do not satisfy that lisp expression. For instance, the constraint (not
(equal ?F ?G)) eliminates all possible bindings in which ?F is set to the same value as
?G.
Of course, this is not a very sophisticated constraint language, and it is not as powerful as, for
instance, Stefik's way of dealing with constraints [Ste80], but it suffices for the current purpose.
An example of our constraints in operation is given in section 5.8.
5.6.2 Prerequisites
A prerequisite has two parts: the applies-test and the content. The applies-test is a form
which, when instantiated by one of the possible bindings given by the constraints, yields a
lisp lambda expression of one variable. The prerequisite is said to apply if applying that
lambda expression to the planning agent's communicative posture (a structured object) returns
t. For instance, a prerequisite with the applies-test (lambda (params) (low-risk? (cp-
difference params))) applies if and only if the agent has a low risk difference setting. As
we shall explain in section 5.12, the applies-tests in the current system are used primarily for
selecting and deselecting prerequisites on the basis of communicative posture. For prerequisites
which are universal, the lambda expression returns t no matter what. The content of a
prerequisite can be a goal, a game, or a "forall" form. If it is a goal or game and the applies-
test returns t, then that goal or game is a prerequisite of the plan operator's operations. Forall
forms are used to expand out a number of prerequisites from one template. Forall forms are
lists where the first element is the token 'forall, the second element is a variable, the third
element is the token 'in, the fourth element is a form which, when instantiated with one of the
bindings given by the constraints, yields an arbitrary lisp form which returns a set of objects,
and the fifth element is a goal or game. If the applies-test of the prerequisite returns t, then the
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variable is set to each element in the given set of objects in turn, and a goal or game is returned
for each one. For instance, if ?D is set to (describes section-one (between palm-beach-
0 swamp-0))) and ?F is set to john in one possible binding, the forall form (forall ?N in
(objects-in-prop '?D) (know ?F ?N)))) will return two prerequisite goals, (know john
palm-beach-O) and (know john swamp-0).
5.7 The Planning Operators
The JAM system uses the following planning operators. The names by which we shall denote
the operators are given in bold face throughout the thesis.
Route: To get some agent to know the route on the map, get some other agent to describe all
the sections of it in order.










Know-one: To get to know whether or not some agent knows some concept, ask that agent
yes or no.
Effect: (know ?F ?S)














Know-two: To get the self to know a concept, get the self to know some description of the
concept.
Effect: (know ?F ?S)












(and (low-risk? (cp-context-artic params))
(equal ?G *partner*)))
Content: (open ?K ?F ?G ?S)
Replannable?: t
Know-three: To get the partner to know a concept, get the partner to know some description
of the concept.
Effect: (know ?F ?S)





(not (equal ?G ?F)),
(equal ?F *partner*),









(and (low-risk? (cp-context-artic params))
(equal ?F *partner*)))
Content: (open ?J ?G ?F ?S)
Replannable?: t
Know-description-one: To get an agent to know some description of a concept, get some
agent to tell the agent a description of the concept.
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Effect: (know ?F (describes ?0 ?D))









Applies-test: (lambda (params) (low-risk? (cp-difference params)))
Content: (forall ?N in (objects-in-prop '?D) (know ?F ?N))
Replannable?: t
Know-description-two: To get to know some description of a concept, get the agent to ask
another agent to describe the concept.
Effect: (know ?F (describes ?0 ?D))























Nested-know-one: To get the partner to know that the self has a concept, close the conver¬
sation about the concept.
Effect: (know ?G (know ?F ?P))
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Nested-know-two: To get to know that the partner has a concept, close the conversation
about the concept.
Effect: (know ?G (know ?F ?P))










5.8 How the Plan Operators are Used
The domain plan operators given in the last section are primarily used the JAM system for
planning, although, as we shall see in chapter 7, they are also used for replanning, repair, and
goal adoption. In this section we explain how the planning works in order to demonstrate what
constitutes a plan and how one is built.
Suppose that an agent, mary, has her currency pointer resting on a node which contains the
unplanned goal (know john section-one). The first thing mary does in her planning is
look through her list of plan operators for those in which the effect unifies with her goal, and
keep track of the necessary bindings. In this case, there are three possibilities; know-one,
know-two, and know-three, all three with the bindings ((?F john) (?S section-one)). Next
mary will work through the nonrelaxable constraints of each plan operator in turn, building
up the bindings and possibly eliminating some of the operators from consideration.
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We will only work through the constraints of the know-three operator here; the other two
operators work similarly. First, the constraint (describable? '?S) is checked by instantiating
it to (describable? 'section-one). This is true, because objects are describable if and only
if the planning language allows them in "describes" forms such as (describes section-one
(left-of palm-beach-O)); that is, if they are a map object (an object whose internal name
ends with a digit) or one of the four sections of the route. Next, the constraint (type-of
?F agent) gets instantiated to (type-of John agent), which is true. Then the constraint
(type-OF ?G agent) splits the existing set of bindings into two, since ?G can be instantiated
two ways: ((?G john) (?F john) (?S section-one)), and ((?G mary) (?F john) (?S section-
one)). The next constraint, (not (equal ?G ?F)), immediately knocks out the former set
of bindings. Then the constraint (equal ?F ""partner*) is true for the one remaining set
of bindings because mary is planning and ?F is set to john. The next constraint, (believes
?G (describes ?S ?D)), extends the one remaining set of bindings for each description which
mary believes to hold about section-one, giving three possible binding sets:
1. ((?G mary) (?F john) (?S section-one) (?D (left-of palm-beach-O)))
2. ((?G mary) (?F john) (?S section-one) (?D (between palm-beach-O swamp-0)))
3. ((?G mary) (?F john) (?S section-one) (?D (around swamp-0)))
Finally, the constraint (set ?J (new-frame-id)) adds to each possible set of bindings a value
for ?J which is a new reference number for a game which might be constructed in the operator's
prerequisite.
At this point, mary has found three sets of bindings which satisfy all of the operators nonrelax-
able constraints; next she tries the relaxable ones. In this case there is only one, (unknown-
to-partner? (cnode-state (cnode-with-name '?S (agent-concepts ?G)))), which is
satisfied because mary believes that john does not already know the concept section-one.6
Running the constraints of the other two plan operators eliminates them from consideration,
and thus mary has three possible plans for her goal of (know john section-one), one cor¬
responding to each set of bindings. If at this point mary had no possible plans, she would
reinvestigate each of the plan operators, this time ignoring the relaxable constraints. Since
mary has more than one possible plan, she uses her task planning communicative posture
settings to choose one of them. This mechanism is described in section 5.12.1.
Once mary has chosen a particular set of bindings to use, she will construct a list of goals
and games which must be added to her plan. She does this first by examining the operator's
6Admittedly, the code for this arbitrary lisp constraint is opaque and we require a better interface to
information about lack of belief than is afforded by the current arrangement.
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prerequisites in the way explained in section 5.6.2. Suppose that mary chooses the set of
bindings ((?G mary) (?F john) (?S section-one) (?D (between palm-beach-0 swamp-0)) (?J
t4)). Assuming that mary has a low risk context articulation setting, she will construct one
prerequisite, the game (open t4 mary john section-one), which, when executed, will cause
her to make the move Oj(section-one). Then she will construct the operator's operation
by instantiating it to be (know john (describes section-one (between palm-beach-0
swamp-0))). This means that her plan for the goal has two parts, the OPEN game and the
knowledge goal. Mary can adopt this plan by pushing these two parts onto her plan tree as
children of the goal (know john section-one).
5.9 How Current Plan Costs are Maintained
The Principle of Parsimony which governs an agent's actions entails that agents always try
to use the least cost plan which will lead to a satisfactory solution. This requires agents to
be able to estimate the relative costs of their plans and the various alternatives. This section
explains how agents keep track of the cost of the current plan as steps are added, changed,
and executed. These costs are then used by the agent as part of the information they need
in order to decide which alterations to a plan will complete the task most cost effectively. An
explanation of how agents evaluate possible ways of continuing from the current point in a plan
is deferred to section 7.3.
The cost of each node in an agent's plan tree is recorded on that node and updated as the plan
is changed. The cost of a node which has been successfully completed or a game, whether or
not it is complete, is zero. The cost of an unplanned goal is one (unless the same goal appears
elsewhere on the tree with a higher cost, in which case the cost of the unplanned goal is that
higher cost). The cost of an open goal (e.g., one that is planned but not yet fulfilled) is one
plus the costs of its children plus the costs of any prior goals on the plan tree for knowledge
of map objects which are mentioned by the open goal but not mentioned by its children. This
last cost helps to make sure that the agent doesn't unintentionally underestimate the cost of
a goal by "forgetting" that it has had trouble establishing an object mentioned by the goal at
some earlier stage in its planning. The cost of an abandoned goal is not defined, since the costs
only measure the current plan plus possible alternatives.7
7 If the agent were to be able to consider reinstating abandoned goals, then the costing routines would need
to keep track of their costs. This does not seem difficult but has been relegated to further work.
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5.10 The Top Level Control Structure
The JAM system uses a very simple top level control structure which is borrowed from Power's
thesis work [Pow74], Control rests initially with a chair program whose function is to set up the
initial conditions for the dialogue and then call the agents alternately. The top level call must
name two agents, one with the route on its map and one without, and must designate one of
those agents to "start the dialogue". The system does not allow the agents to have completely
freely mixed initiative dialogues; such dialogues make modelling the discourse and planning
more complicated because agents must try to match their own plans to their partners and
eliminate any parts that overlap. This is an interesting research problem in its own right but is
beyond the scope of this thesis since it is unnecessary for a simulation of the map task. For the
most part, in the human dialogues one of the agents controls the course of the dialogue while
the other provides responses, interrupting only when he or she can initiate recovery from a
failure. Correspondingly, in JAM dialogues, one agent always has the top level goal of getting
either itself or the partner to know how to get around the route, and its partner only ever
initiates games in order to begin a recovery.
The chair program uses the following algorithm:
1. Initialise the agents involved in the current dialogue by reading in the maps using the
method described in section 5.2.
2. Send whichever agent is to "start the dialogue" a message containing the goal (know
route-follower route). Either agent can be sent this message, which instructs it to
initialise its plan in such a way that it can begin the dialogue.
3. "Wake up" the agent who is to "start the dialogue".
4. "Wake up" the other agent.
5. Go to step 3.
Of course, this process does not terminate; modelling closing dialogues is left to further work.
The closing dialogues in the current corpus are not very natural because of the way in which
the data is collected and the fact that participants are not told what to do when they have
finished the task.
Although this model is a very artificial one, it is not as limited as it may first appear. For
instance, if we allow for the flexible mapping between intention and surface level behaviour
that was discussed in section 5.4, the behaviour produced by this model fits the main features
of the turn-taking process described by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson [SSJ78] and reviewed
in section 2.2.2. That is, if we allow "ok" responses in informing games and "ok" feedback
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in wh-question games to be realised at surface level by nods, certain kinds of eye contact, or
nothing at all, then these moves can be considered in the turn-taking model to simply indicate
transition-relevance places (TRPs) at which the partner did not make an utterance and the
original speaker continued its turn using rule 1(c), which allows it to continue as long as no
other agent self-selects. This means that one turn may span several "awakenings", as long as
the partner has no substantial contribution to make to the conversation. If we were to expand
the control structure to allow three or more agents, then the order in which the agents were
awakened would create an unfair disadvantage that is not introduced in the turn-taking rules
for all but the first agent awakened at each TRP. In this case, the first agent awakened would
always be the "first starter" if it wished to speak, followed by the second agent awakened, and so
on. However, this is not a problem for two-agent dialogue, since rule 1(b) takes precedence over
rule 1(c); that is, the partner always has the right to interrupt and take control at every TRP.
Thus for two-agent dialogue, as long as we make the assumption about the flexible mapping
between dialogue games and surface level behaviour, even this simple control structure fits the
turn-taking model.8 This entails that for our purposes the fact that the chair program does
not allow the agents to "think" simultaneously is not a major liability.
5.11 The Control for an Agent
In the last section, we explained how a chair program alternately "wakes up" one agent and
then the other during the course of a dialogue. This section gives a very high level algorithm
for what each agent does when it is awakened. We will return to this algorithm in sections
6.4.3 and 7.4 in order to fill in the missing details.
Steps 1 to 5 The agent reads and interprets the messages in its mailbox. At the start of
the dialogue, the agent who is to start the dialogue will find one message in its mailbox
which contains the goal (know route-follower route); it interprets this message
by running an initialisation procedure that gives the agent that as a top level goal.
Otherwise, the messages in the mailbox (if any) will be ordinary communications from the
partner in the language given in section 5.4, and the agent will interpret them by adding
the associated dialogue games (if the messages are initiating moves) to the discourse
model or modifying games in progress (if the messages are responses or feedback moves)
and updating its beliefs in line with having received the messages.
8Whether or not one agrees with the turn-taking model is anothermatter. The existence of channel conflicts
seems to suggest that agents may not always recognise the partner's right to take over the turn or at least that
they may not always notice a "first starter". Our choice of control structure is the main reason that we can not
simulate channel failure.
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Steps 6 to 9 The agent decides what action(s) to take during its turn, sends the appropriate
message(s) to the partner, and updates its beliefs in line with having sent the messages.
Of course, the mechanisms by which an agent updates its beliefs and decides which actions to
take are two of the major contributions of this research; the former is described in chapter 6
and the latter in chapter 7.
5.12 How Communicative Posture is Implemented
This section explains how each of the communicative posture parameters is implemented in the
JAM system. The current version of the system only implements a representative sample of
the parameters given in chapter 3: from task planning, the ontology and partner modelling pa¬
rameters; from discourse planning, difference; from utterance realisation, context articulation;
and the meta-planning parameter, plan commitment.
5.12.1 Implementing the Task Planning Parameters
There are two task planning parameters, ontology and partner modelling, which are imple¬
mented in the JAM system. The human versions of these parameters are described in section
3.2.1. In the JAM system, each agent uses these parameters to narrow down the set of possible
plans and replans to the one of each which it believes to be most suitable. Then the agent
will look at the best options put forward by each of the ways of continuing from the current
situation (planning, replanning, repair, goal adoption, and communicating) and decide upon
one of them based on cost. We have already described how the agent estimates the cost of
the current plan in section 5.9; the way in which the agent estimates the costs of each of the
possible continuations is given in section 7.3.
To understand how the ontology parameter operates it is important to remember that the
Principle of Parsimony requires an agent's actions not just to be as efficient as possible, but
also to suffice for the agent's current purposes. Because the map task leaves open the question
of how accurately the route follower must draw the route, different human agents will choose
different levels of detail for their explanations. These differences are not simply cost based,
since some agents believe that less detail is necessary than other agents do, depending on how
they have interpreted the task instructions. Our implementation of the ontology parameter
models this difference in personality; low risk agents prefer more detailed explanations than do
high risk agents. However, it is likely that estimated costs should affect an agent's choice of
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amount of detail, especially since an agent may believe that it is more cost efficient to give a
non-detailed description and have the partner request whatever elaboration is necessary than
to give a'detailed description in the first instance. This aspect of ontological choice is not
modelled in our implementation.
The partner modelling parameter controls how closely the agent heeds its model of the partner
when it builds an explanation; high risk agents do not mind whether or not all of the map
objects are known to the partner as long as they are not definitely not known, whereas low
risk agents distinguish between knowing that the partner has an object and not having any
information about the partner's knowledge. In effect, this makes a high risk agent act as if the
partner's map is exactly like its own except where it has information to the contrary. As with
ontology, the implementation considers this to be a matter of how the agent has interpreted
the task instructions. However, also as with ontology, it is likely that costs should at least
partially determine whether or not the agent heeds a model of the partner, since it takes more
effort to use a model than to ignore it.
In the implementation, agents use the two task planning parameters to narrow down the sets
of possible plans and replans to one of each. The two task planning parameters thus determine
what propositions will be used when agents inform their partners about some part of the task.
They are also used when the agent chooses an appropriate answer to a wh-ask question so that
the answer will be chosen in exactly the same way that the agent would have used if it had
decided to inform the partner of the proposition spontaneously.
The planning and replanning strategies rate possible plans and replans in the following way.
First all plans with the effect of the current goal (or replans with the effect of any of the open
goals) are collected.9 Then the plans are assigned ratings depending on what is believed about
the map objects mentioned in them (for partner modelling) and the number of goals and games
mentioned in the list of operations of the plan (for ontology). The best plan is the one with
the highest rating. The rating for any one plan is the sum of its rating due to ontology and its
rating due to partner modelling:
The ontology rating provides a measure of the complexity of the plan; low risk ontology
settings prefer more complex plans and high risk settings prefer less complex plans. In
low risk ontology, the plan is rated
5 for each object plus
1 for each goal or game mentioned in the operations list.
9The plan matcher uses unification to determine which plans have the required effect. Two plans unify if all
of their subparts unify using the same substitutions.
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In high risk ontology, the plan is rated
—5 for each object plus
— 1 for each goal or game mentioned in the operations list.
These numbers ensure that the number of objects is always the dominant factor, since
there are never more than four goals and games in the operations list. The low risk
ratings prefer the most detailed plan. The high risk numbers are the inverses of the low
risk ratings so that the least detailed plan is rated with the highest value.
The partner modelling rating provides a measure of how well tailored the plan is to the
partner; low risk partner modelling settings prefer plans which are carefully tailored to
the partner, while high risk settings do not spend effort determining which plan is most
suitable. In low risk partner modelling, the plan is rated
.8 for each object mentioned in the operations list which is thought to be known to the
partner plus
.7 for each object about which the agent is uncertain plus
.6 for each object which is thought to be unknown to the partner.10
Objects are considered to be mentioned in the operations list if they form part of a
description in a goal or in any proposition (including responses and feedback moves) in
a game in the operations list. The relative sizes of the numbers ensure that low risk
agents prefer plans which refer to objects which are known to the partner, or at least
those which are not known to be unknown to the partner. In addition, the ratings are set
so that the contribution of the partner model to the overall task plan rating outweighs
the contribution of the number of goals and games from the ontology parameter in cases
where there are more objects than goals and games involved in the task plan. Within
a single parameter, the relative ratings are designed to reflect what we think the most
important factors should be; across the parameters, the relative ratings are designed to
allow each of the parameters to be dominant under different circumstances.
In high risk partner modeling, the agent adds
.8 for each object mentioned in the operations list which is either thought to be known
to the partner or about which the agent is uncertain plus
.6 for each object which is thought to be unknown to the partner.
10Here, knowledge is defined with "vividness" and lack of knowledge as "awareness"; these terms will be
defined in section 6.1.
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This setting has the same effect as the low risk setting, except that the high risk setting does
not differentiate between cases where the agent knows the partner has an object and those
where the agent is uncertain about the partner's knowledge.
As an example, suppose that a route giver has the current goal of (know JOHN SECTION-ONE)
and that the agent knows three descriptions for the first section: (BETWEEN palm-BEACH-0
swamp-0), (LEFT-OF palm-beach-O), and (around swamp-0). Suppose that the agent is
uncertain about the partner's knowledge of any of the map objects, as the agent would be at
the beginning of a dialogue. Furthermore, suppose that the only plan operator which the effect
that the partner knows how to get around the first section of the route is one which has one
operation, the goal of getting the partner to know one particular description of the first section
of the route.11 Then the agent will have three possible plans for the given goal, each with one
operator, and if the agent has low risk ontology and low risk partner modelling settings then
the agent will rate these plans as follows:
The plan with the operation (know john (describes section-one (between palm-beach-
0 swamp-0))):
Ontology 5 for each object mentioned (10) plus 1 for each goal or game (1) makes 11.
Modelling .8 for each object which the agent thinks is known to the partner (0) plus .7 for
each object for which the agent is uncertain about the partner's knowledge (1.4) plus .6
for each object which the agent thinks is unknown to the partner (0) makes 1.4.
Total 12.4.
The plan with the operation (know john (describes section-one (left-of palm-beach-
0))):
Ontology 5 for each object mentioned (5) plus 1 for each goal or game (1) makes 6.
Modelling .8 for each object which the agent thinks is known to the partner (0) plus .7 for
each object for which the agent is uncertain about the partner's knowledge (.7) plus .6
for each object which the agent thinks is unknown to the partner (0) makes .7.
Total 6.7.
The plan with the operation (know john (describes section-one (around swamp-0))):
11 The formed version of this plan operator is given in section 5.7 with the name know-two.
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Ontology 5 for each object mentioned (5) plus 1 for each goal or game (1) makes 6.
Modelling .8 for each object which the agent thinks is known to the partner (0) plus .7 for
each object for which the agent is uncertain about the partner's knowledge (.7) plus .6
for each object which the agent thinks is unknown to the partner (0) makes .7.
Total 6.7.
Thus an agent with low risk ontology and partner modelling settings would choose the first plan,
which has the most complex description. An agent with low risk ontology and either partner
modelling setting would choose arbitrarily between the second and third plans by selecting the
first plan with the rating 6.7 that it had evaluated. If the agent were to know that the partner
does not have the swamp on its map, then the agent would prefer the second plan, since it does
not use the swamp.
5.12.2 Implementing the Difference Parameter
In section 3.2.2.1, we explained that the difference parameter controls whether or not an agent
assumes that any map objects which have not yet been discussed are mutually known. This
affects whether or not the agent attempts to build an accurate model of the partner before
it refers to such objects in the dialogue; low risk agents will try to acquire certain knowledge
about those parts of the partner's map which are relevant to the current plan, whereas high
risk agents will not. A very low setting in the human dialogues had the agents establish certain
knowledge about every object on the map before beginning the main part of the task; this
behaviour is not implemented in the JAM system. Instead, JAM simulates the behaviour of
agents who, once they have chosen a possible description of the route or of the location of
a map object, check to make sure that the partner will understand references to the objects
involved before uttering the description. This is done by including the following prerequisite
on the know-description-one plan operator:
Applies-test: (lambda (params) (low-risk? (cp-difference params)))
Content: (forall ?N in (objects-in-prop '?D) (know ?F ?N))
This prerequisite requires that agents with low risk difference settings know that whoever is
hearing the description understands the objects which are used in it. If such an agent is planning
to tell the partner something, then if the agent isn't already sure that the partner knows the
objects involved, the prerequisite goals will force the agent to ask the partner yes-no questions
such as "do you have the palm beach?". If the partner gives a negative response, then the agent
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can either describe the location of the object or abandon its current plan. The applies-test of
the prerequisite ensures that only agents with low risk difference settings try to establish the
prerequisite knowledge; this allows high risk agents to "assume" that the knowledge is shared
and risk a plan failure. As we shall see in section 7.2.4, in such cases the prerequisite can be
used by the hearer in order to determine what repair is necessary in order to recover from the
failure.
In the JAM system the difference parameter only controls references to map objects; it is not
possible for agents not to know what descriptors such as "go up" or "to the left" mean because
of the simplistic map representation described in section 5.1. Given a more sophisticated repre¬
sentation of the domain, the difference parameter could be extended to control first references
to all new concepts introduced in the dialogue, whatever they might be. In this extension, one
might want to use some measure of each concept's complexity in order to determine exactly
how risky not having certain information about the partner's knowledge of the concept would
be and to have a number of different difference settings which take risks at different levels of
complexity.
5.12.3 Implementing the Context Articulation Parameter
In section 3.2.3.2, we explained that the context articulation parameter controls whether or not
an agent explicitly opens dialogues when it changes the current context from one part of the task
to another. In the JAM system, the context articulation parameter is implemented similarly to
the difference parameter, in that both involve prerequisites on domain plan operators which are
only activated when the agent has a low risk setting. The context articulation parameter affects
the know-two and know-three plan operators, since these are the ones by which an agent
begins planning for a new part of the task (a description of either a new section of the route or
a new map object). The prerequisites require agents with low risk context articulation settings
to initiate an OPEN dialogue game about the concept under discussion. This has the effect
of adding utterances to the dialogue which simulate the surface level behaviour of the human
dialogues, but it does not make much difference to the simulation itself. Since utterances in the
agents' communication language always contain a referring expression for the concept under
discussion, they can not be ambiguous in the way that a low risk context articulation setting
is meant to prevent. Moreover, JAM agents can't use the OPEN game to refuse to talk about
a particular concept and offer up a better plan, since they automatically return Orp ("ok")
whenever they hear an Oj move. Although this implementation does not satisfactorily reflect
what happens in the human dialogues, we include it in order to show that better versions could
still be implemented using the technique of selective prerequisites.
106
5.12.4 Implementing the Plan Commitment Parameter
The plan .commitment parameter introduced in chapter 3 controls how readily an agent decides
to replan, compared to deciding to continue the current plan (if no failure has arisen) or engage
one one of the other recovery strategies (if there has been a failure). We have hypothesised
that in the human dialogues, agents follow the Principle of Parsimony by choosing the way of
continuing from the current situation which leads to the lowest cost or effort solution to the
entire task. Thus the decision of whether or not to replan can be affected by making the costs
of replans relatively lower or higher than the costs of the other options; agents with low risk
plan commitment settings will want to penalise replanning heavily so that they tend not to
replan, while agents with high risk settings will not. In addition, agents with low risk settings
will wish to replan at the lower levels of the plan rather than higher ones, since this changes
the plan the most conservatively, while agents with high risk settings will prefer to change the
high levels of the plan. In the JAM system, the estimated cost of a replan depends on the
agent's plan commitment setting and gives these results. More information about exactly how
the costs are estimated are given in section 7.3, after we discuss exactly how replanning is
implemented.
5.13 Summary
The implementations which we have chosen for the aspects of the JAM system described in this
chapter restrict the resulting simulation of the human dialogues in a number of ways. First of
all, the overly simplistic map representation and the agents' lack of spatial reasoning abilities
entails that we will be unable to implement some communicative posture parameters (such as
ontological resolution) and some recovery strategies (such as elaboration). The fact that the
language which the agents use for communication is unambiguous with regard to what concept
is being described entails that we will only be able to implement a limited version of the context
articulation parameter and will not be able to implement context resolution at all. The style
of interaction, which alternates between the agents via a chair program, means that agents
can never have channel collisions. Finally, the requirement that only one agent may have the
initiative in the dialogue at a time means that agents can not abandon each other's dialogue
games or refuse to talk about particular concepts even if they believe it would be more efficient
to do so. However, the implementation described in this chapter suffices for the purposes of





Chapter 5 described a number of components of our agents which are necessary to support our
dialogue mechanism, but which, for the most part, are too simplistic or are not novel enough to
merit much consideration. Their descriptions have been provided primarily so that it is clear
exactly how the system works and what problems it does not solve. We could have included
a simple belief modelling mechanism among these components; however, the way in which our
agents model beliefs is interesting in its own right, besides fitting in with the theme of operating
according to the Principle of Parsimony. This chapter gives a general method for representing
beliefs in dialogue systems and then describes the exact representation used by our agents.
Traditional belief systems (e.g., [Kon86], [Lev84], [FH88]) use theorem provers on a set of
propositions and axioms in a logic of belief in order to determine how an agent's beliefs change
as it learns new information. We believe that this approach is implausible as a model of
how humans keep track of changes in belief. More specifically, we believe that the theorem
proving approach provides a mechanism which is more general than that used by people when
they work out the results of saying and hearing utterances on their beliefs. Although we can
not make any psychological claims about what agents actually do when they calculate belief
updates, the aim of our model is to provide a simulation which at least makes use of an intuitive
organisation of the agents' knowledge in order to restrict their inferences to a plausible set.
Theorem proving techniques do not take into account that humans can usually exploit both
the form of the dialogue and the structure of the domain about which they are conversing to
provide semi-automatic heuristic updating of their beliefs. There are two basic disadvantages
of the theorem proving approaches:
1. In normal processing, the theorem proving techniques are less efficient than they could
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be. Belief updates must be made by reference to the entire set of axioms and propositions
in the logic of belief, without a partitioning of the relevant aspects as is suggested in this
model. In addition, although methods have been developed for representing the effects of
"mutual belief" without computing an infinite number of belief nestings (see especially
Clark and Marshall [CM81]), the belief models for which these methods operate still do
not capture the automatic nature of most simple human belief modelling.
2. Theorem proving techniques do not exhibit the same characteristics as human belief
modelling when they are pushed through harder and harder computations. Intuitively,
humans get "stuck" at some point in the computation and presumably must switch over
to a less automatic mechanism, requiring processing overhead to change between the two
techniques. Theorem proving techniques do not exhibit this switchover point, since they
provide a uniform mechanism for the computations throughout.
Our model overcomes these disadvantages by exploiting both expectations about the dialogue
and the structure of the domain in a heuristic mechanism which models the most common
aspects of belief updating. Then the model can switch to the traditional approach, which
computes the belief updates more precisely, when the heuristic approach fails, requiring extra
effort both for the switch between the approaches and for the more complete updating. As a
result of the bipartite structure, the model preserves the Principle of Parsimony by allowing
the agent to choose a lower cost updating method which suffices for the current purpose. The
heuristic approach can be considered to be a compiled version of a theorem prover and increases
efficiency by decreasing expressive power.
Most of this chapter describes the heuristic belief mechanism, in which the agents use predic¬
tions about the immediate results of an agent uttering or hearing a conversational move to
provide simple belief updating. The analysis makes use of the dialogue games described in
chapter 5. It also makes use of an idea from intelligent tutoring systems called "degrees of ac¬
quaintance" , which allows agents to make finer distinctions about the kinds of beliefs an agent
can have about a concept than that between simply believing or not believing a proposition.
Section 6.1 explains what we mean by "degrees of acquaintance" for the purposes of the belief
model. Section 6.2 describes the way in which the belief model interfaces with the rest of the
system. Section 6.3 gives an abstract description of the model. Section 6.4 gives a simple
example of a belief representation which fits our model. Section 6.5 explains several different
extensions to the heuristic belief model which allow agents to model uncertainty about what
other agents believe. Section 6.6 discusses how the heuristic approach can be combined with
the more complete theorem proving approach. Finally, section 6.7 describes the belief repre¬
sentation which is implemented in the JAM system. There are three appendices associated
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with this chapter; appendix B examines the space requirements for our belief model, appendix
C gives details about the exact belief model used by the JAM system, and appendix D explains
how it is implemented.
6.1 Degrees of Acquaintance
Logics of belief traditionally operate in terms of "knowing" or "believing" propositions, the
meanings of which have been discussed at length elsewhere (see Halpern and Moses [HM85]
and Hadley [Had89] for two reviews). Traditionally the difference between believing something
and knowing it has been that, by definition, no one can know something which is false, while
one can believe anything at all. Since our agents, like all others, can never be sure whether or
not their information is correct, we will not distinguish between the two terms and mean by
them what is usually meant by "belief". In task-oriented dialogue, as in ITS systems, it may
be useful to represent to what degree an agent "understands" some domain concept (i.e., some
predicate, object, or proposition). How an agent brings up a concept, and even with whom it
chooses to converse, will depend on how much knowledge the agent thinks that other agents
have about the concept. There are a number of distinctions which can be made about the
degree of an agent's knowledge, and we will call the different points "degrees of acquaintance".
The first easily distinguished degree of acquaintance is unawareness. One may well wish to
distinguish concepts of which one's partner is totally unaware (as, for instance, I must be
unaware of some subfields of molecular biology, although I can not name them, and I'm sure
that my father is unaware of Godel's Theorem) since this may affect how one introduces the
concept to the partner. Unawareness doesn't really come into the map domain, but it could be
useful in tutoring domains where the agents take the roles of experts and novices. There may
even be degrees of acquaintance below unawareness, such as being mentally incapable of ever
being made aware of the concept, but such properties aren't useful in the map domain. Many
degrees of acquaintance above awareness are possible, and which ones are useful varies. Near
the bottom of the scale, one might, for instance, remember from reading Steel and Reichgelt
[SR90] that the term "brailing" has something to do with curtain ropes at a theatre, but not
know anything more about "brailing". Then this knowledge isn't really useful to anyone except
to place the term in a particular context. A higher degree of acquaintance might allow an agent
to understand some references to an object but not all of them. For example, one might know
that the Morning Star is Venus, but not that the Evening Star also is. At the top end of
the scale, one might be able to decide yes or no for whether any description picked out the
object or any instantiation were true for the predicate, and so be a total expert on that piece
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of the world. There are many different possible degrees of acquaintance which could become
important in different situations.
For the purposes of modelling communication among agents with goals, however, the most
important degrees to distinguish are between agents who know something about the task and
ones who know how to complete the task, since then one can evaluate the advice which the
agents give differently. Thus when one has a burst pipe one might place more weight on what
the plumber says than on what is said by the neighbours. It might also be useful to distinguish
between an agent who knows "enough" about the topic for current purposes and one who knows
too much, so that one can avoid getting too much advice! The condition which is relevant for
both of these degrees of acquaintance is that of understanding a concept well enough to use it in
executing plans which make use of the concept. Thus, what is important is not just how much
information is known, but whether or not the right information is known. We shall follow Steel
and Reichgelt [SR90] and call this condition "vividness". We do not provide a formal definition
of vividness for humans here, but we assume that all agents must know what it means for a
concept to be vivid to them, since otherwise they would not recognise when they understood
some plan well enough to execute it. For some domains such as the map task, what it means
for a concept to be "vivid" depends on the particular agent's notion of success. We also will
not rule out that agents may consider some concept vivid for themselves and then change their
minds based on subsequent information; that is, we do not assume that any "knowledge" is
incontrovertible. For most planning domains, degrees of acquaintance which make use of the
concept of "vividness" will play a central role in the agents' actions.
In this section, we have outlined a number of different possible distinctions that one can make
about an agent's understanding of a domain concept. Which of these are useful depends on
the particular domain and task involved. We could construct many degrees of acquaintance
for any reasonably complex concept, but for most purposes it's probably only useful to have a
rough stereotype of the other agents' knowledge. For instance, for reasons given in section 6.7,
the JAM system will make use of only two degrees of acquaintance: awareness and vividness.
Additionally, since the dialogue agents cannot do even elementary spatial reasoning, we can
make no distinction between when an agent knows something about, for instance, the location
of an object and when it knows everything about it. Cleverer agents or agents for other domains
could well use finer distinctions, and their belief representations should be built accordingly.
Our heuristic belief representation allows the designer to choose whatever granularity along
the scale of acquaintance is necessary. The system designer must make this choice before the
representation is implemented. This constraint is no more restrictive than the requirement in
logical representations for the axioms involved to code the degress of acquaintance explicitly
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before the system is run.
6.2 The Interface with the System
Before we can describe the belief model itself, we must explain what the model makes available
to a dialogue system so that it is clear what purpose the model serves and for which other
systems our model would be appropriate. The interface which is implemented in the JAM
system is not as general and elegant as that which is allowed by the belief model in the abstract.
Section 6.2.1 discusses what the abstract model allows and section 6.2.2 describes what is
actually implemented. It would not be difficult to provide an interface with the capabilities
discussed in section 6.2.1, but this is left to further work.
6.2.1 The Interface in the Abstract
There are two ways in which our abstract model is intended to communicate with a dialogue
system:
1. The belief model provides a function which, given a move in the dialogue by either agent
and a representation of the agent's beliefs before hearing or uttering that move, returns a
representation of the agent's beliefs as they would be after the move. This function keeps
the agent's beliefs in line with what has transpired in the conversation; agents could also
use it to "predict" what effect an utterance will have when they are planning what to
say. In the JAM system, agents call this function as soon as they "speak" (send another
agent a message) or "hear something" (read a message from their mailbox), although
this is not required by the belief model. This model does require belief updating to
be done only as a result of some utterance and using one invocation of the updating
function. This implies that the agent always determines all of the changes in its beliefs
in "one go" and that these beliefs never change between utterances. Of course, this is an
idealisation of the human case, but this is a general failing of belief models and not just
of this particular model. Appelt [App85] (page 28) states that although human agents
clearly are not logically omniscient, it is not unreasonable to model them as if they are
since in practice they usually make all of the inferences which affect the current plan. We
leave it to future work to determine a way to cut off the belief updating which is done
immediately and resume what is necessary to planning as it is needed, but we believe
that the way in which this model works makes such future work simpler than it would
be using a theorem proving approach.
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Of course, it is possible for systems to need to update their beliefs based on information
from sources other than utterances. For instance, a system might want to take visual
data into account. Although we will not have anything to say about such endeavours in
this thesis, we do believe that it is possible to integrate such information in this belief
model by formulating visual data as the world informing the agent, experiments as the
agent questioning the world, and so forth.
2. The belief model allows the system to ask it what the agent believes. The dialogue
system needs this information so that it can decide what action to take next, whether
that involves planning a new game in the dialogue or responding to a game which is
already in progress. The belief model allows any query about the state of a particular
concept (such as "is the swamp vivid for me?" or "what degree of acquaintance do I have
with the swamp?"), including those which involve nested beliefs (such as "do I believe
that John has the concept of the swamp vivid?" or "what degree of acquaintance do
I believe John has with the swamp?" or even "for whom do I believe the swamp is
vivid?"). It also allows queries about all beliefs that match a given pattern (for instance,
"give me all of the descriptions which I believe hold about the swamp" or "give me all of
the descriptions which I believe that John believes hold about the swamp"). As one case
of this, it allows yes/no queries similar to these but with all of the information filled in
(such as "do I believe that the swamp is to the left of the palm beach?"). However, like
most models, this model does not allow mutual belief to be checked by the most intuitive
definition (i.e., that Mary believes X and believes that John believes X and believes that
John believes Mary believes X and so on, ad finitum). All requests must always specify
either the level of nesting being checked or an upper bound on the levels of nesting to
be checked, or else this model (or any other belief model lacking the capability to reason
meta-theoretically about its beliefs) would need to do an infinite amount of checking
on successively higher and higher levels before returning the answer. Allowing requests
which check over a number of nesting levels can be useful for implementing "heuristic"
mutual belief checks which terminate after a set number of nesting levels.
Our belief model admits an interface which seems no more or less restrictive than those of
other models, and so we would expect it to be useful for dialogue systems in general and not
just for our own.
6.2.2 The Implemented Interface
The interface to the belief model which is implemented in the JAM system is less general
than the one specified in the last section, primarily because the current belief model was
developed after the rest of the JAM system had already been implemented. The first function
of the interface, which returns a representation of an agent's beliefs after hearing or uttering
a dialogue move, works as we have suggested in the last section. The second function, which
allows the agent to ask itself queries about what it believes, provides a subset of the queries
allowed by the abstract interface. It currently contains a set of routines which for any given
concept returns a yes or no answer to the questions:
• Is the concept vivid for me?
• Do I think that the concept is vivid for the partner?
• Do I think that the concept is not vivid for the partner?
• Am I uncertain about whether or not the concept is vivid for the partner?
• Do I think that the partner thinks that the concept is vivid for me?
• Do I think that the partner thinks that the concept is not vivid for me?
• Do I think that the partner thinks that I am uncertain about whether or not the concept
is vivid for the partner?
In addition, for the special case of knowing descriptions of concepts (for instance, knowing that
"to the left of the palm beach" is a description of the swamp), the system provides a routine
which will answer questions such as
• What descriptions do I believe hold about the X?
• What descriptions do I believe that the partner believes hold about the X?
• What descriptions do I believe that the partner believes I believe hold about the X?
and so on, plus yes/no questions about particular descriptions such as the following:
• Do I believe that the swamp is to the left of the palm beach?
• Do I believe that the partner believes the swamp is to the left of the palm beach?
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These queries do not allow the system to generalise over agents (asking, for instance, "for whom
do I believe the swamp is vivid?") or to abstract over a number of nesting levels at the same
time. However, they suffice for the current purposes of the JAM system, and it would not be
difficult to provide an implementation of the interface which is specified for the abstract model.
6.3 An Abstract Description of the Belief Model
Theorem proving methods for updating beliefs during the course of a dialogue use axioms about
the effect of hearing a particular type of utterance. For the belief updates that we wish to model,
two such axioms might be "if you are aware of X and some agent tells you a proposition about
X and you have no reason not to believe the proposition, then believe it. Furthermore, if you
understand the proposition and it contains "enough" information ("enough" varying depending
on the situation), then mark X as vivid for yourself." In such a system, beliefs about how the
agent stands in relation to X, how the agent thinks John stands in relation to X, and so on, are
all represented separately. So are beliefs about how the agent thinks John stands in relation
to X and how the agent thinks Mary stands in relation to X. Moreover, although no agent will
believe that John is only aware of X and also that X is vivid for John, the agent has no way
of using one piece of information to check both. Now, although a reasonable theorem prover
will have some way of ordering the facts which it uses in order to constrain search, one natural
organisation might provide one structural unit which contains all of the agent's information
about the concept X. Rather than representing the truth or falsity of facts in a knowledge base,
this belief model represents the "state" of the agent's beliefs concerning each of the agent's
concepts.
Each agent uses state designations to mark everything it thinks about a particular concept. For
instance, an agent might have concept X tagged with a state which means that X is vivid for
the agent, the agent thinks X is vivid for Mary, and the agent thinks John is unaware of X. The
number and meaning of the states depends on the number of agents involved in the dialogue,
the number of degrees of acquaintance which the agent is to distinguish, and the number of
nesting levels which the agent is to compute without falling back into a more complete model of
belief. The human designer must determine ahead how many states the agent should represent,
and therefore how much reasoning the belief model can do in the semi-automatic mode.
Once the meaning and designation of the states has been determined, the changes in belief
that come about as the result of hearing or saying a dialogue move about a particular concept
can be represented as state transitions. So, for instance, hearing the initiation of an informing
game about concept X when X is in a particular state (say state one) will always cause X to
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be in another state (say state three). This reduces belief updating for that particular concept
to locating the concept in the agent's memory, reading off the state number, looking up the
appropriate transition given that state and the dialogue move, and storing the new state. In
addition, if the domain is represented as a network of related concepts, then belief updates for
the entire domain can be computed by propagating them through the network. This mechanism
can be considered to be a compiled version of a theorem proving model of belief.
After belief updates are computed in this manner, determining what the agent thinks about a
particular concept involves reading the state of the concept and working through the agent's
key to the state numberings to find out what that state means.
This mechanism assumes that the system designer knows ahead how many agents will be in
the dialogue, how many degrees of acquaintance are needed for the domain, and how many
levels of nested belief will be required. The first two of these are reasonable assumptions for
HCI systems. Section 6.6 will discuss a way of weakening the third assumption by adding a
method for dealing with nesting levels which are not represented within the state mechanism.
6.4 An Example Belief Representation
This section describes a belief model for an agent that wishes to distinguish three degrees of
acquaintance (unaware, aware, and vivid) and to use two dialogue games (INFORM and WH-
ASK, as defined in section 5.4. The state transition mechanism will keep track of beliefs of
agent A in a dialogue with agent B up to one level of nesting (that is, representing both what
A thinks and what A thinks B thinks about each concept).
6.4.1 Exploiting the Regularities of Dialogue
Given the requirements of the example, and stressing that no agent can represent a concept of
which it is itself unaware, there are six possible states in which any concept C can stand:1
1. A is aware of C and thinks that B is unaware of C
2. A is aware of C and thinks that B is aware of C
3. A is aware of C and thinks that B has a vivid understanding of C
4. A has a vivid understanding of C and thinks that B is unaware of C
1 We assume that an agent has a particular degree of acquaintance with respect to C if and only if it knows
that it does, and so we do not include states such as "A is aware of C and thinks that A has a vivid understanding
of C and thinks that B is aware of C". Most models of belief make a similar assumption. This is not necessary
to our argument, but it does affect our space calculations for the model.
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5. A has a vivid understanding of C and thinks that B is aware of C
6. A has a vivid understanding of C and thinks that B has a vivid understanding of C
Then the effects which agent A believes the allowable dialogue moves have on the belief state
for that particular concept C can be expressed in the transition network shown in figure 6.1,
by letting A be E (the self) and B be II (the partner). For example, if agent A is in state four
Figure 6.1: A Six State Transition Network for Agent E
concerning concept C (i.e., C is vivid for A and A thinks that B is unaware of C) and agent
B makes the dialogue move //(C), then agent A will follow the arc labelled II : 7/ from state
four and end up with concept C in state six (i.e., C is vivid for A and A thinks that C is also
vivid for B). The state network in effect "compiles out" the rules which agents would use to
understand a dialogue into a very efficient form which works for a predetermined subset of the
possible ways in which the rules apply.
The agent's choice of an arc to follow in the state transition network is entirely deterministic,
although there are some cases in which there are two arcs with the same label from the same
state in the network (e.g., the two arcs from state one labelled II : //, one leading to state
three and the other to state six). This only occurs on moves by the partner which introduce
propositions about concepts, such as II : 7/ and II : Wrp, and the arcs always go to states
three and six. In these cases, the agent can always decide which arc to take because the
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difference between the two resulting states always depends on the agent's understanding of the
proposition involved. If the agent "understands" the proposition (i.e., if the agent has vivid
all of the concepts which combine to form the proposition), then it will take the arc to state
six; otherwise, it will take the arc to state three. In general, if the agent understands the
proposition, then it will move into a state which represents that it knows the concept which
the proposition describes, and if does not understand the proposition, it will move into a state
which represents that it does not know the relevant concept.
Another interesting feature of the state transition network is that it must allow the partner to
initiate any game from any state in the network, even if there is no reason for the partner to
initiate the game from that state. For instance, the network gives a transition from states in
which the partner has a concept vivid for games in which the partner asks about that concept.
We require these arcs just in case the agent is wrong about what the partner knows; without
them, the agent would simply fail to understand dialogue about any concepts for which it
started with the wrong beliefs about the partner's knowledge. Another way of implementing
the same behaviour would have been to invoke a special procedure whenever the agent needs a
missing state transition which corrects the agent's belief about the partner's belief in a plausible
way and then searches the transition network again. In either case, these special cases could
be marked in such a way that the number of times that the agent had changed its mind about
the partner's belief about each concept could be counted; this information might be useful
in deciding upon future actions, including in deciding to change one's communicative posture
settings. We leave to future work further consideration of this extension.
In this representation, whenever a concept is in state six the agent will act as if that concept is
mutually understood by the two agents unless further information indicates otherwise, either
causing a change in the concept's state or making the agent reason to further levels of nesting
using a technique such as that described in section 6.6. Our concern in using this representation
is not simply to provide a representation that is tractable; Clark and Marshall [CM81] have
shown that it is possible to handle the effects of "mutual belief' without infinitely many
nesting levels. Instead, we are concerned about providing an implementation which is efficient
for the inferences that agents typically make during dialogue. This is a benefit for HCI systems
generally. Moreover, as we shall see in section 6.8, a side effect of the way in which we structure
our model is that it more accurately reflects human processing than do previous belief models.
Since mutual knowledge is the goal of most task-oriented dialogue, and since it is represented
in this model by a state in a transition network in which agents make dialogue moves in order
to traverse arcs, it should be possible to plan the dialogue using this same mechanism by
reasoning backwards from (in this case) state six to the current state of the concept under
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discussion. It is beyond the scope of this research to consider this possibility further, and so
we use traditional A.I. planning techniques instead, as described in chapter 7.
6.4.2 Exploiting the Structure of the Domain
The mechanism we have described so far only gives the changes in belief regarding the concept
which is central to the utterance. We still need some way of updating beliefs about concepts
which are related to the central concept of the utterance. Work in user modelling has developed
many common sense rules for reasoning about another agent's knowledge (for instance, see Kass
[Kas88]) such as the following:
1. If the agent believes that another agent has vivid knowledge of P, then the agent believes
that for some way of dividing P, the other agent has vivid knowledge of all the subparts
of P.
2. If the agent believes that another agent has vivid knowledge of all the subparts of P for
some way of dividing P, then the agent believes that the other agent has vivid knowledge
of P.
There are five such rules which are used by the JAM system; they are listed in section 6.7.
So far, we have reduced the problem of representing changes in belief from a theorem proving
application with many axioms to one with just a few combined with a state transition network.
This reduction is made possible by exploiting the regularities of changes in belief that come
abut during the course of a dialogue. The problem can be further reduced to following state
transitions and propagating activation through a network if we also exploit the structure of the
domain.
Consider the changes in belief that come about as the result of hearing a particular utterance.
Primarily, the belief state of the concept which is central to that utterance changes. In addition,
rules like the ones we have given may change the belief states of related concepts. However,
coding these rules as axioms in a theorem prover which operate over the entire space of concepts
in the domain entails that the search for secondary effects may be costly. This is because such a
representation does not show clearly which concepts are related to each other. Many domains,
such as the map task domain and expert system domains like that of mineral exploration
encoded in PROSPECTOR [DGH79], have a very clear structure by which concepts can be
placed in a network of AND and OR nodes. A fragment of a concept network representing the
route follower's knowledge before the beginning of a map task dialogue with the same maps
as are used by the computer agents in the JAM system is given in figure 6.2. In the figure,
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Figure 6.2: Part of B's Initial Concept Network
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arrows point from a concept to its parents, and the number attached to a concept represents
its current belief state. Any nodes with names ending in digits are objects which occur on the
agent's map. For simplicity, both agents consider the route to be split into a number of sections
which must be described separately, as described in section 5.1. The nodes named route and
section-one to section-four are special map concepts which correspond to the entire route
and each of the four sections. Nodes which have names beginning with the token describes
are ones which relate the object which is described to some description of the object; we will
refer to these as description nodes. Propositional "glue" nodes, labelled "(PROP)", simply
indicate that in order to know the parent, which is always a description node, in addition to
knowing the other children, one must also know how these children fit together to make up the
description. Note that, since B's concept network is divided into two halves, agent B does not
yet know how the objects on the map relate to the route. The goal of the dialogue is, in effect,
to establish how the two halves are connected.
The domain structure provides a more efficient implementation of the inference rules for belief
updating. For instance, the two inference rules given so far simply mean that for any agent,
an AND node is vivid if and only if all of the node's children are vivid. Although the effects of
these rules might be quite costly to calculate if the structure of the domain were not used, the
rules can be implemented neatly as propagation of discrete functions up and down an AND/OR
tree. The technique extends easily to networks of AND and OR nodes as long as propagation
along a path a network is only continued if a change has been made to the current node, cutting
off the infinite traversal of cycles. The rules which the JAM system uses for propagating beliefs
are given in section 6.7; details about the implementation of these rules is given in appendix
D.
6.4.3 The Agent's Algorithm upon Awakening
In section 5.11, we gave the algorithm which each dialogue agent follows when it is awakened
by the chair program of the JAM system, but we omitted details about how agents compute
changes in their beliefs. The mechanism with these details included is implemented as the
procedure sketched below:
1. The agent retrieves the first message from its mailbox. There are only two possible kinds
of messages. One is the "start" message from the chair, which triggers an independent
initialisation procedure that gives the agent a top level goal to fulfill and skips straight to
step 6. The other is an ordinary communication from the partner in the language given
in section 5.4.
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2. The agent adds any new concepts and connections suggested by the propositional content
of the message. If the central concept of the message is unknown to the agent (i.e., if the
agent can't decode the given referring expression to any known concept), then the agent
adds a new concept for it with a state that indicates that the concept is not vivid for
the agent but it is for the partner.2 Then if the message is one that gives propositional
content (the initiation of an informing game or a positive response in a wh-question
game), the content is analysed and added to the concept network. This is done by going
through each of the referring expressions in the proposition in turn, finding the denoted
concept or creating a new one with a state that indicates that the concept is not vivid
for the agent but that it is for the partner. In addition, if the proposition is a novel one,
a description node is created (with a state that indicates that the concept is not vivid
for the agent but that it is for the partner) which has as its children all of the concepts
of the proposition plus a propositional "glue" node whose role is to remember in what
order the concepts slot together in order to form the proposition. The description node
is necessary to keep all of the different descriptions of a concept in different branches
of the tree, thus maintaining a strict AND/OR structure. Propositional "glue" nodes
are always created as being vivid for both agents, since we assume that once an agent
has heard a proposition it understands how the subconcepts of it fit together even if it
does not understand those subconcepts themselves. Finally, a connection is added into
the concept network to make the new description node a child of the message's main
concept.
3. Next, the agent interprets the main force of the partner's move by computing the change
in belief about the central concept.3 It reads the state of the central concept and then
looks in its state transition network for all arcs leaving that state which are labelled with
partner's move. In most cases there will only be one, in which case the agent simply stores
the state which that arc goes into as the new state of the central concept. However, in
2This state is intuitively incorrect in some cases; for instance, if the partner asks "Where is the lake?", then
one would expect the partner not to know where the lake is. This case doesn't occur in the map task, since in
order for the partner to ask about the lake it must at least be on the agent's map, and therefore the agent will
already have a concept for it in the network. However, even in other domains this discrepancy is unimportant
from the point of view of the agent's behaviour because it is corrected immediately in the next step. It is left
to further work to determine a better way of inserting new concepts into the network.
3 In general, the centred concept is the concept about which the agent is trying to elicit or give information.
In the JAM system, the central concept of any move which is part of an opening, closing, informing or yes/no
game is that concept which is named by the entire content of the initiating move of the game. For instance, in
a yes/no game such as "Do you have the swamp?", the central concept is the concept about which information
is sought (the SWAMP). In an informing game, the centred concept is the description about which the initiator is
attempting to be informative. Wh-ask games are a specied case, since only an incomplete concept is aveulablefor
matching until a positive response is made, if at all. In the JAM system, the central concept of a wh-ask geune
starts out as the concept for which information is requested in the initiating move (which is named after the
keyword "describes" in the move's content), and, if a positive response is given, changes to the entire description
given in that positive response halfway through the game. It would be possible to avoid this situation if wh-ask
initiating moves were reformulated as games which request the partner to initiate an informing game in the
next move.
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some cases (Wrp and 7/ moves) there are two arcs. In this case, the difference between
the two final states is in whether or not the concept will be vivid for the agent itself,
and- the agent can decide between them by determining whether or not it "understands"
the propositional content presented in the message; that is, whether or not it had to add
any new concepts which are not vivid for it. When the agent has determined the ending
state, it stores it as the new state for the central concept. In addition, then the concept
which represents the propositional "glue" for that description is marked as vivid for both
agents.
4. Now the agent must propagate the change in belief from the central concept to related
concepts. This is done by applying a set of rules of the form "if a concept has changed
state to state X and [other conditions], then change the state of all {children, parents)
of that concept to state Y". Details of the rules used by the JAM system are given in
section 6.7; how they are implemented is described in appendix D. At this point, the
agent will have determined all of the consequences of the partner's move.
5. If there are still messages in the agent's mailbox, then it returns to step 1. Otherwise it
moves ahead to the next step.
6. At this point, the agent must determine its next move, possibly using queries to itself
about what it believes. The way in which the agent plans its actions is described in
chapter 7; at the end of this step, the agent may have planned one move and sent it to
the partner's mailbox. If it has planned and executed a move, then it goes on to the next
step; otherwise, it has nothing to say and returns control to the partner.
7. Next the agent must determine how the main force of having made its move affects its
beliefs about what the partner believes and what the partner believes it believes. This is
done in the same way as in step 3, although the move has been made by the agent itself.
8. The agent must determine how its beliefs about any concepts related to the central
concept of its move change. This is done in the same way as in step 4.
9. Now the agent returns to step 6 to plan subsequent moves in the dialogue.
In the JAM system, the agents have a top level procedure which encodes this algorithm and
which is called whenever they are awakened by the chair program. More information about
how the state transition network and belief propagation are done is given in appendix D. The
concept network for the agent's knowledge prior to the dialogue is built from a simple database,
as explained in section 5.2, using roughly the same procedure as step 2 but with stored initial
states for the concepts. The transition network is implemented entirely by hand, although
123
there is no reason why it should not be compiled from a logical representation; this is left to
further work.
6.4.4 A Worked Example
This section gives a worked example in the map task domain of keeping track of belief changes
using the six state transition network given in section 6.4.1. We will return to this example
again in sections 7.5 and 8.3. Here, we analyse the belief changes from agent tom's perspective
in the following dialogue extract, annotated with the English gloss provided by the JAM system:
(talk ""carol* *tom*)
carol makes an inform(i) move
with content (describes "first
section" ("between" "palm
beach" "swamp"))
torn makes an inform(r) move
with content not-ok
torn makes a wh-ask(i) move
with content (describes
"swamp" ?var356)




torn makes a wh-ask(f) move
with content ok
(talk *carol* *tom*)
carol says to torn: the first section of
the route goes between the palm
beach and the swamp,
torn says to carol: i do not
understand,
torn says to carol: where is the
swamp?
carol says to torn: the swamp is
between the waterfall and the palm
beach,
torn says to carol: ok.













The parts of both carol's and tom's maps which are relevant to this dialogue fragment are
shown in figure 6.3.
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When torn is first awakened by the chair program, he has the A : Ij message in its mailbox. He
retrieves that message and adds the new concepts and connections suggested by that message's
propositional content. He already has the concept to which he can refer as the "first section"
and which he knows as section-one. He also already has the concepts "between" and "palm
beach" (which it knows as between and palm-beach-O, respectively). However, he has no
concept to which he can refer as the "swamp", so he creates a new one (which he gives some
unique name such as t114) with a state indicating that the concept is not vivid for him but that
it is for carol. Then he creates a description node (which he knows as (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 t114))) with a state that indicates that the concept is not vivid
for him but that it is for carol. Furthermore, he makes the new description node have as its
parent section-one and as its children between, palm-beach-O, t114, and a newly created
propositional "glue" node, with a state that records that it is vivid for both carol and torn,
which indicates how the concepts get connected to build the description. This new description
node is the central concept of the informing game, since it corresponds to what carol is trying
to be informative about.
Next, torn computes his changes in belief from hearing the utterance. He first looks up the
current state of the central concept of the move, (describes section-one (between palm-
beach-0 tll4))), (state 3, which means that he does not have the concept vivid but thinks
that carol does) and then looks for arcs from state 3 labelled with the move that carol made in
the transition network (n : I/, which has n because carol, the partner, made the move and 1/
because that was the move given in the message). There are two arcs, one leading to state 3 and
the other to state 6. In cases like this one, the agent must choose one of the two arcs depending
on whether or not the agent "understands" the description of the concept (i.e., whether or not
all of the concepts which combine to make up the description are vivid for the agent). Here,
the description is not vivid because concept t114 is not vivid, and so torn follows the arc to
state 3 and stores state 3 as the new state of the concept section-one. In addition, since this
was a move that introduced propositional content, he marks the propositional "glue" node as
vivid for both carol and torn. In this case this behaviour is redundant because the node already
has this state, but in cases where the node is not newly created (that is, where torn already
knows the associated description) and the associated description has not been mentioned in
the dialogue the state of the node may change.
Then torn considers propagating the changes in belief through the network beginning at the
central concept under discussion, the description node. Since this node has become vivid for
carol and it is an AND node, it marks all children of the node as vivid for carol. This change
only affects the concept palm-beach-0, changing its state to indicate that the concept is vivid
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for both carol and torn. No other rules fire, and so the propagation ends.
Using an external mechanism, tom's dialogue planner then decides to close the game with
the move B : Irn to indicate that the INFORM was not understood. To determine the
consequences of his action, he follows the arc from the current state of the description node,
(state 3) labelled £ : Irn and discovers (since the arc also ends in state 3) that there are no
changes to make, and thus also no propagation of the changes.4 Then, again using an external
mechanism, torn decides to initiate a new game with the move B : Wi("swamp" (since it wants
to understand carol's original utterance) and executes that move. The central concept of the
move is til4, since that is the concept about which torn seeks information. To assess the effect
of the utterance, torn follows the arc labelled £ : Wj from state 3 (the state of t114), and
discovers that the arc ends in state 3. Therefore he stores that the swamp concept is now in
state 3, with no change. The external mechanism does not come up with any more dialogue
moves to make, so torn returns control to the chair program.
When torn is next awakened, his mailbox contains the answering move A : Wrp. He interprets
this move using exactly the same technique he used to interpret carol's previous Ij move
and changes the central concept of the game to be the new description node he knows as
(describes t114 (between waterfall-0 palm-beach-O)), since carol's reply has made
this new information available. He then determines the changes in his own beliefs due to
hearing the current utterance. He discovers that the new description node is in state 3 and
so looks for the arc in the transition network which starts at state 3 and is labelled n : Wrp.
In this case, again there is a choice; there are arcs ending up in states 3 and 6, which torn
can choose between depending on whether or not the concepts which combine to make up the
given description of the swamp are vivid to him. In this case, since the necessary concepts
(between, waterfall-O, palm-beach-O, and the propositional "glue" node) are vivid for
torn, he follows the arc to state 6 and stores the new state in the til4 concept. This new state
indicates both that the concept is vivid for torn and that torn thinks that the concept is vivid
for carol. Because there has been a change in the state of a concept, torn must propagate the
change through the concept network. He traces all of the pointers up out of the T114 node; in
this case there is only one, leading to a node describing section-one. Because this description
node is an AND node, and because all pointers going out of the node lead to nodes which are
vivid to torn, he marks the description node as vivid. Then he traces all the pointers out of
the description node, in this case the one pointer leading to the node section-one. Since the
node section-one is an OR node, and since there is one child of the node which is now vivid,
torn marks section-one as vivid to himself. Then he follows the pointers out of section-one
4 This does not imply that the move was uninformative; it only means that torn can not represent the changes
in belief without resorting to further levels of nesting.
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to find the route node, but since this node is an AND node and still has children which are not
vivid, the propagation stops. None of the other propagation rules fire, and so the propagation
ends.
After propagating the belief changes, torn decides according to the external mechanism to make
the move B : Wfp ■ He follows the appropriate arc in the transition network to find no change
to the belief states. At this point, as one would expect, the concepts SECTION-ONE and T114
are vivid for torn, and torn thinks that they are also vivid for carol. Part of tom's concept
network after this section of the dialogue is given in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Part of Tom's Concept Network After the Dialogue
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6.5 Modelling Uncertainty
It is rarely the case in dialogue that agents already know what partners know about before they
start. Therefore agents need to have ways of representing that they are not sure what degree
of acquaintance another agent has with a particular concept. This section looks at several
different ways that agents can represent their uncertainty about other agent's beliefs within
the state transition network representation. There are two basic possibilities: one can simplify
the situation by only considering what moves one would make from the relevant certain states,
or one can represent uncertainty explicitly, by providing states which mean that the agent is
uncertain. The former is the more efficient method, but it is not appropriate in all cases, and
specifically, not for systems which will want to explicitly ask their partners questions about
their beliefs to clear up any uncertainty before proceeding.
6.5.1 Explicitly Representing only Certain States
It is possible to deal with uncertainty by having the system pretend that it is in whichever
certain state will provide the most beneficial behaviour. For instance, a generally low risk agent
may decide that it is best to always act as if any object is not vivid for the partner unless the
agent is sure that it is; in this case, the agent might use a single state to represent awareness
and uncertainty. High risk agents might take the opposite approach, in effect behaving as if any
concept is vivid for the partner unless it has explicit information to the contrary. Whichever
choice is made, representing uncertainty by associating it with a particular certain state uses the
least number of states, and therefore requires the least space. To be exact, let n be the number
of nesting levels, a be the number of agents, and g be the number of degrees of acquaintance,
and let Sc represent number of states needed if only certain states are represented, then5
5C = gn+1(a-l)i"(n+1\
If we assume that the typical two-agent HCI application might need to encode four degrees of
acquaintance and three levels of nesting, we require 256 states. Any system which uses this
kind of representation needs to have some way of choosing the most beneficial certain state to
consider when uncertainty arises. However, this choice may not be as complicated as it seems
at first. Participating in any dialogue about a concept is likely to bring the participants to
certain knowledge about each other's belief states by the second move anyway, and so choosing
a particular certain state in the first instance is not likely to change the course of the dialogue
except in the short term. In systems with small state transition networks, the most beneficial
5Explanations of all equations in this chapter can be found in appendix B.
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choice of a certain state might be the one that keeps open the highest number of moves. For
systems with just two degrees of acquaintance, as in the JAM system, the best certain state to
choose would be that in which one pretends that every other agent has the opposite awareness
of the concept than oneself. That is, agents should assume if a concept is vivid for them then
the other agents are only aware of it, and that if they are only aware of a concept then all the
other agents have it vivid. This makes it possible for an agent to inform or ask other agents
about the concept freely. In general, however, it will not always be possible to keep open all
possible moves by choosing just one certain state from which to operate, since the agent might
be uncertain between two states for which the set of allowable moves from one is not a subset
of the allowable moves from the other. On the other hand, this restriction might be reasonable
given that many agents have limited time or memory and will want to cut down the number of
choices that they have to make about what to do next. After all, dialogue is exactly the kind
of endeavour where risky behaviour is not just allowed but is favoured for efficiency reasons.
One of the major disadvantages of this approach from a representational point of view is that
there is no way for the agent to indicate that it is not certain about its knowledge. Once
it has chosen a particular certain state to use behaviourally, it "believes" that it is in that
certain state and, as usual, allows for the fact that it may be wrong about the partner's
knowledge. Agents can also handle uncertainty in a way that only requires them to explicitly
represent certain states by always keeping and manipulating a set of the states among which
they cannot distinguish with respect to the concept. This has the advantage that it is a truer
representation of what the agent believes about the world, and allows the agent to answer
correctly questions about its own beliefs. It also allows a simple implementation of the technique
which we specifically could not get with the last approach; we can allow any of the moves which
can be taken from any of the certain states in the set by considering the union of allowable moves
from all the states in the set. This might lead to some unfruitful exchanges in the dialogue,
but at least it will not block any useful ones. It seems reasonable that where there are not very
many possible moves, agents might well employ this kind of technique. Furthermore, when
allowing all possible moves is undesirable we can order these moves or eliminate some of them
with the same type of technique needed for the last approach. These advantages are gained at
the expense of the extra overhead needed to keep track of the sets and compute unions rather
than keeping track of single states. However, dialogue about a particular concept tends to
clear up uncertainty rather than create it, so in most dialogues this extra overhead should be
acceptably small.
As we have mentioned, sometimes just being in an uncertain state causes an agent to make
a move which is not allowed from any of the certain states among which the agent cannot
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distinguish. For instance, exchanges like the following first mention of the graveyard are quite
common in the human corpus:
MAP 10
G: have you got a graveyard?
R: yes
This game, which gives A certain information about B's knowledge, was only possible because
A was uncertain in the first place. This exchange cannot arise if agents simply act as if
they are in a particular certain state, and so the first approach we have described is severely
limited. This game can be allowed if we use reasoning about a set of states by employing a
procedure which adds it as a possibility whenever the set is not a singleton. However, at some
point the procedure must do reasoning complex enough that it is worthwhile to compile out
its structure to make the procedure itself efficient. In this case, the uncertain belief states
should be represented explicitly as states in the transition network. The main advantage of
avoiding using states to represent uncertainty is that it minimises the number of states and
the complexity of the state transitions while probably still allowing successful completion of
the dialogue fairly efficiently. We imagine that this approach might well be useful in a working
system, although exploring it further is left to further work.
6.5.2 Explicitly Representing Uncertain States
The other main way of handling uncertainty is to create states which represent the different
ways that an agent can be uncertain. That is, we might well have a state which by itself
represents that, for instance, A is aware of C and isn't sure whether B is aware of C or has C
vivid. Of course, this is potentially explosive if one considers every possible uncertain state.
Suppose that we want to create a belief transition network for the JAM system which encodes
uncertainty by having explicit uncertain states. Our requirements are to encode beliefs for two
agents with two levels of nesting and the only acquaintance distinction being between awareness
and vividness. Then, from A's perspective, there are eight certain states for any concept C:
1. A is aware of C, A thinks B is aware of C, A thinks B thinks A is aware of C
2. A is aware of C, A thinks B is aware of C, A thinks B thinks A has C vivid
3. A is aware of C, A thinks B has C vivid, A thinks B thinks A is aware of C
4. A is aware of C, A thinks B has C vivid, A thinks B thinks A has C vivid
5. A has C vivid, A thinks B is aware of C, A thinks B thinks A is aware of C
6. A has C vivid, A thinks B is aware of C, A thinks B thinks A has C vivid
7. A has C vivid, A thinks B has C vivid, A thinks B thinks A is aware of C
8. A has C vivid, A thinks B has C vivid, A thinks B thinks A has C vivid
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Let us consider each nesting level separately. There are no possible uncertainties for zero levels
of nesting; A always thinks it knows how A stands with respect to its own concepts. For one
level of nesting, there is one possible uncertainty. A might not be sure whether B is aware of C
or has C vivid. For two levels of nesting, the number of possible uncertainties increases because
A could either be sure that B is uncertain about what A thinks, or A could be uncertain about
what B thinks A thinks. There are seven possible positions that A could have regarding what
B thinks A thinks of a concept C:
1. A thinks B thinks A is aware of C;
2. A thinks B thinks A has c vivid;
3. A thinks B is uncertain whether A is aware of C or has C vivid;
4. A can't decide between A thinks B is uncertain about what A thinks, A thinks B thinks
A is aware of C, and A thinks B thinks A has C vivid (that is, A has no idea what to
think about what B thinks A thinks);
5. A can't decide between A thinks B thinks A is aware of C and A thinks B thinks A has
C vivid;
6. A can't decide between A thinks B thinks A is aware of C and A thinks B is uncertain
about what A thinks;
7. A can't decide between A thinks B thinks A has C vivid and A thinks B is uncertain
about what A thinks.
We can consider each of the levels of nesting as independent choices. Since there are two
possibilities for zero levels of nesting, three for one level, and seven for two levels, there are
forty-two possible states of belief for any concept. This number increases very rapidly with
the number of nesting levels and a bit less quickly with the number of degrees of acquaintance.
Using the same variable names as before, then if S[/(n) represents the number of states needed
if we are to explicitly represent all possible certain and uncertain states, S[/(0) = Sc (0) = 9,
since no agent can be uncertain about its own beliefs. Furthermore, for all n > 0,
Su(n) = Su(n - l)(a - l)"f7(n),
where 17(1) = 2g — 1 and for all n > 1,
U{n) = 2C7("~1> - 1.
This gives us on the order of 109870 states for our hypothetical HCI application (g = 4, n = 3,
and a = 2), which clearly isn't practicable. We can cut down on the number of states if there
are states between which we will never wish to distinguish. For example, if an agent always
acts the same whether it is uncertain what another agent thinks it thinks or whether it thinks
that the other agent is uncertain about what it thinks, then there is no reason to distinguish
between these two states in the representation, and we can build a new state transition network
which has one state representing the disjunction of these two positions. For example, in a two
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agent system with two degrees of acquaintance and two levels of nesting, it might never be
necessary to distinguish between the four different kinds of uncertainty which can arise at the
second nesting level. In this case, we would only need eighteen states for the transition network
instead of forty-two: aware or vivid for the zeroth level, and aware, vivid, or uncertain in an
unspecified way for the first and second levels. The JAM system handles uncertainty using this
technique. In general under this choice the space requirements are only slightly worse than
those for only representing certain states. If we let SE represent the number of states needed
to represent all kinds of uncertainty at each level using only one state, then
SE = g(g + l)n(a-l)i^n+1\
This gives us 500 states for our hypothetical HCI application (g = 4, n = 3, and a — 2). Of
course, it is not always appropriate to conjoin different states. Which states can be conjoined
in the network depends on the particular domain and the complexity of the dialogue required.
However, in cases where the type of uncertainty is unimportant, it is possible that one of the
approaches which does not explicitly represent uncertain states might be appropriate and more
efficient. Representing the uncertain states explicitly allows the system designer to tailor the
allowable moves to the domain and situation, with the disadvantage that each state combination
must be considered case by case. Whether a representation using only certain states or one
that represents uncertain states explicitly should be used depends on how individualised the
moves for each uncertain state should be.
6.6 Combining the Network with a Theorem Prover
The belief state mechanism assumes that the system designer knows in advance how many
agents will be in the dialogue, how many degrees of acquaintance are needed for the domain,
and how many levels of nested belief will be required. The first two are reasonable assumptions;
the last is not. One might need to reason to depths beyond those which are ordinarily used in
conversation when, for instance, one needs to plan how to complete a task given a community of
agents with different specialties and different information about who specialises in what. Even
in the map task, agents might want to reason through several depths in order to recover from
complicated failures which involve ambiguous referring expressions. It is necessary to interface
the state mechanism to a complete theorem prover for belief exactly for those crises where we
need to reason to a depth beyond that provided for in the state mechanism. We do not consider
this to be a flaw of the state mechanism simply because the state mechanism is designed to be
quick where people are quick. There comes a point in reasoning (e.g., when one works on logical
puzzles over a certain complexity) where people have to work out their beliefs explicitly and
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encounter cognitive difficulty; we propose that at this point, the simulation should switch over
to the complete theorem prover. When we require the theorem prover, running the two systems
together will be slower than running the theorem prover separately because of the overhead
involved in switching between the two mechanisms. However, this mirrors human behaviour
where an agent gets "stuck" in a computation which is more difficult than the agent expected;
after an initial failed attempt, effort is expended simply in determining which solution methods
are appropriate. Accordingly, we have no efficiency requirement for the interface except that
the computation involved should be feasible. The remainder of this section describes a simple
interface which suffices.
Let us assume that no matter which mechanism is in use, agents immediately determine all
logical consequences of their beliefs up to the level which they have chosen to represent.6
Furthermore, assume that beliefs at level n are unaffected by beliefs at any level higher than
n.7 Let n be the number of levels of belief represented by the state mechanism. Then an
interface is possible between the state mechanism and a theorem prover which uses the state
mechanism to compute all beliefs in levels n and below.
One simple approach runs as follows: As the dialogue progresses, the agent runs the state
mechanism in the usual way, keeping a history of utterances in the dialogue. The first time that
the agent needs to run a query at a level m greater than n (for instance, during a complicated
recovery), the agent should run all the utterances through the theorem prover to level m, but
using the state mechanism wherever possible and saving a list of all consequences at levels n + 1
to m. The agent should also place a pointer to the dialogue history tagged with the value m
at the last utterance in the dialogue. Then the next time the agent needs to run a query at
a level p greater than n, it should look backwards through the dialogue history for the first
pointer it finds with a tagged value of p or greater, run the theorem prover from that point up
to level p, adding the new consequences to the old list of higher level beliefs, and place another
pointer. If the entire dialogue has been processed up to level p already, then it suffices to look
up the belief on the list.
6This is a common assumption in theorem proving approaches and is maintained in the network propagation
techniques which we have given. We use the assumption here to constrain the interface so that it is only ever
necessary to switch between the two mechanisms as a result of an utterance in the dialogue. However, it seems
likely that interfaces can also be constructed for the general case.
7That is, whenever we want to calculate beliefs at a particular level, we never have to consider the beliefs
at any higher level. A weaker version of this assumption runs as follows: Suppose that there is a function F
which takes us from levels of belief to levels of belief which indicates the highest number of levels to which we
must reason to make sine that we have covered all implications which change beliefs at the input level. Then
there is always some cutoff level after which we know that no more processing is necessary. All theorem provers
must make some version of this assumption in order to terminate, and so in read terms this isn't a restriction at
all. However, it's clean that sometimes the strong version is too restrictive; consider the case where one realises
that everyone else thinks that Labour is the best pauty to lead the country aifter the next general election, so
that one comes to believe that too. It remains for further work to consider what chamges must be made to the
interface if we choose the weaker form of the assumption.
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We have sketched this approach in order to convince the reader that such an interface is
possible; improving upon it and implementing it is left to further work.
6.7 The Belief Representation for the JAM System
The JAM system requires a belief model which can keep track of dialogues between two agents
with two degrees of acquaintance, awareness and vividness. Since in the map task agents
become aware of concepts as soon as they are mentioned in the dialogue, unawareness would
only be necessary if the agents were to build realistic first referring expressions (possibly using
"a" to refer to objects of which the partner might be unaware, and "the" along with a unique
description to refer to objects which are known to the partner). Furthermore, the agents'
representation of the map is too coarse to make finer distinctions between awareness and
vividness useful. The deepest nestings we expect our agents to encounter will be two levels,
which, as we shall see in chapter 7, are used to handle the closing coordination after recovery
from failure. It is not difficult to construct cases in which three or more levels of nesting would
be useful,8 but JAM's current plan operators do not require belief modelling beyond two levels.
We have also chosen to represent uncertain knowledge imprecisely by allowing one state at each
level of nesting to denote that the representing agent is somehow uncertain about what the
partner thinks about the concept. We made this choice because we do not require different
behaviours for the agents in the face of different kinds of uncertainty. Given these choices, the
agents have an eighteen state representation; the state transition network is given in appendix
C in tabular form.
Our agents use the following rules to propagate their beliefs through the concept network:
1. If some AND node C becomes vivid for some agent A (either the agent or the partner),
then mark every parent node of C (which is an OR node) as also vivid for A.
2. If some OR node C becomes vivid for some agent A, then for every parent node P of C
(which is an AND node), if all other children of P are also vivid for A, mark P sis also
vivid for A.
3. If some AND node C becomes vivid for the partner, then mark every child of C as also
vivid for the partner. The equivalent rule for the self is not necessary because it should
8 For instance, suppose that after a plan failure in which some agent B does not understand an utterance
because B does not have some presupposed knowledge, the partner A makes a repair and then wishes to convey
to B the fact that he or she believes that the recovery is complete. This requires A to model what A thinks B
thinks A thinks B's degree of acquaintance with the relevant concept is.
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never occur that a node becomes vivid for the self except by all of its children being vivid.
4. If some OR node C which was in an uncertain state becomes certainly not vivid for
the partner, then mark every parent node of C as also not vivid for the partner. The
equivalent rule for the self is not necessary because one can't be uncertain about one's
own state.
5. If some OR node C which was in an uncertain state becomes certainly not vivid for the
partner, then mark every child node of C as also not vivid for the partner. As with rule
four, the equivalent rule for the self is not necessary because one can't be uncertain about
one's own state.
6. If some AND node C changes so that the partner thinks that it is vivid for some agent
A, then mark every parent node P of C (which is an OR node) so that the partner thinks
P is also vivid for A.
7. If some OR node C changes so that the partner thinks that it is vivid for some agent A,
then for every parent node P of C (which is an AND node), if the partner thinks that all
other children of P are also vivid for A, then mark P so that the partner also thinks that
P is vivid for A.
8. If some AND node C changes so that the partner thinks it is vivid for some agent A,
then mark every child D of C so that the partner also thinks that D is vivid for A.
Here "marking" a concept to have a new property means changing the state of the concept
to a new state which preserves the properties of the old state for all nesting levels that are
not mentioned in the rule, but has the new property for the nesting level which is mentioned.
Of course, other rules are possible,9 and there is much scope for further work in this area.
How these rules are implemented and called is described in appendix C. These rules are
analogous to ones used by Kass [Kas88] and others in Intelligent Tutoring Systems, but our
domain structure differs sufficiently from most tutoring domains that our rules are not directly
equivalent to other existing sets. ITS domains tend to concentrate on the relationship between
concepts and instances of concepts, whereas our domain does not have this level of abstraction.
In addition, most tutoring domains do not have the same AND/OR structure which the map
domain has, since in general for most concepts the system would not wish to assume that the
student understands a concept if the student knows just one description for the concept. Our
rules are also slightly more complicated than Kass' in two ways: they must handle our explicit
representation of uncertainty, and they must allow not just for what the agent (system) thinks
9 In particular, rules four and five could be generalised to allow any move to a certainly not vivid state.
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the partner (student) knows, but also for what the agent thinks the partner thinks the agent
knows. Our rules 2 and 7 are related to Ivass' goal generalisation rule, and our rules 3 and 8 are
related to his agent rule. Kass' primary agent, expert, and direct statement rules, which affect
the agent's beliefs directly after hearing an utterance, are embodied in our belief transitions.
6.8 Conclusions
The model of belief used in the JAM system improves on previous models by
• taking advantage of the regularities of belief changes in dialogue in order to draw standard
inferences quickly and automatically, and
• taking advantage of the structure of the domain in order to perform any inferences about
belief changes by propagating them through related concepts, which greatly reduces the
amount of search which is necessary.
In taking advantage of dialogue expectations and the domain structure, the belief model loses
some of the flexibility associated with previous models. Most specifically, it must set an upper
limit on the number of nesting levels for the beliefs which it can process. This would be a
disadvantage for the model if it weren't for two facts: most dialogue can be handled with a
very limited amount of nesting, and people can't process highly nested beliefs in the same
automatic fashion as they handle ordinary conversation. We suggest that it is parsimonious
for agents to use the kind of heuristic belief model presented in this chapter in most cases,
falling back on a more complete model when the heuristic model fails. Just as with dialogue
strategies, it can be better to take a fast, high risk approach to belief updating and risk having
to expend extra effort in getting to the desired solution than to start out with the higher cost
process in the first place. Our model provides an interesting comparison with other research
developments in two ways:
• it gains efficiency in a way that is analogous to other AI systems, and
• it uses the same kind of two process model which is sometimes postulated for human
processing.
Our model is more efficient than previous models because it is able to "compile out" the
behaviour of inference rules expressed in a logic of belief which usually encode dialogue expec¬
tations and the domain structure. This work is similar in approach to systems in other domains
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which increase efficiency by decreasing expressiveness in an initial deterministic mechanism and
allowing processing to switch to a more complete mechanism if needed. One example of such
a system is Marcus' PARSIFAL [Mar80], which uses a deterministic mechanism to parse all
sentences "which people can parse without conscious difficulty" and which he claims could be
hooked up to some higher level "conscious" grammatical problem solving component to handle
garden path sentences. Another is Appelt's KAMP planner[App85], which uses "action sum¬
maries" to provide a STRIPS-like formalism to search the space of possible plans quickly but
then drops through to a more complete possible worlds axiomatisation of the domain to make
sure that the proposed plan will work. Thus our belief model is similar in approach to steps
which people have taken to gain efficiency in very different kinds of AI systems.
Besides increasing efficiency, our belief model handles quickly inferences about beliefs which
are not very deeply nested and and takes longer for ones that are, providing an interesting
comparison with human belief updating. We hypothesise that human belief updating uses the
same kind of two process model as this belief representation, and that this is true because
it is more parsimonious for humans to do so. Such a hypothesis is not new; for instance,
Clark [Cla89] suggests that there are two modes of operation for human thought - a quick,
subconscious mode which can best be modelled using parallel distributed processing, and a
slow, conscious mode which resembles models in a classical cognitivist framework. It also
seems that human belief updating requires extra processing to handle unusually difficult tasks,
and that there is some boundary point between simple, automatic calculations and harder
problems, where people may get "stuck" for a while and incur overhead if they use the simpler
approach where it is inappropriate. Our belief model is a step towards such a two mode process
and maintains the Principle of Parsimony.
Of course, our model also has its drawbacks. The most important of these is that since our belief
representations must be constructed by hand, building one is much more time-consuming than
writing a theorem proving model of belief. In addition, once the belief representation has been
constructed, it's difficult to see why it works. In section 9.5, we suggest that it would be both
useful and interesting to build a compiler which would produce one of our belief representations
from a theorem prover and some control information specifying the size of the representation
to be produced. Unless work along these lines is successful, this kind of representation will
continue to be hard to build and unmotivated. Also, despite the fact that our model is intended
to capture the kinds of restrictions which naturally occur in human belief updating, it is still
too powerful in an important way. Human agents often fail to make connections between a
belief update for some concept and a belief update for some related concept, especially if that
relationship is not very strong. Although the restrictions which have been proposed for theorem
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proving belief models address this point, our model does not. We think that "decay" on the
propagation of belief changes within the concept network is a more intuitive way of thinking
about this kind of inference failure than the ones which have been proposed for theorem provers,
but we have done no work in this area.
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Chapter 7
Recovering from Plan Failure
using a Layered Architecture
This chapter describes one approach to building an incremental planner for discourse which
interleaves planning and execution and which can use recovery strategies, such as the ones
described in chapter 4, when a failure occurs. Previous approaches to incorporating recovery
strategies in AI planners have exhibited less flexible behaviour than that which is required for
the human simulation; we have reviewed these approaches in section 2.4. Most work to date has
concentrated on one recovery strategy at a time (e.g., Peachey and McCalla [PM86]; Wilkins
[Wil88]), eliminating the need to determine which of a number of strategies to apply. Moore's
work [Moo90] allows repair, reinstantiation, and replanning, but her system is not general
enough to generate the behaviour observed in the human dialogues. Her system requires the
strategies to be applied in a particular ordering until one of them succeeds; human agents
are able to choose an appropriate recovery strategy more flexibly than working through a set
list. In addition, Moore's replanning capability always tries to replan bottom level goals before
top level ones, while human agents can choose any unsatisfied goal for replanning. Finally,
the structure of her system requires that recovery strategies be accessible only when a plan
failure is evident. Human agents occasionally replan even when no failure has occurred. These
discrepancies occur because her system has a very rigid way of deciding what to do next in all
situations. This chapter suggests that a more appropriate way to choose the next action is based
on the estimated amount of effort that remains to complete the task using each of the different
applicable options next. In addition, rather than having a number of different procedures for
recovering from plan failures which can be called into action under set conditions, this chapter
suggests that in order to simulate the flexible behaviour observed in the human corpus, these
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procedures should be recast as possible ways of continuing from the current point in a plan
and that they should all be considered at every choice point. The system could then use its
cost estimates to always make the best choice of what to do whenever it is confronted with a
choice at all, and could even choose to, for instance, replan if no failure has occurred but if the
initial cost estimate for the current plan has turned out to be inaccurate.
This chapter goes on to describe the plan revision aspects of the JAM system, which are
able to choose a recovery strategy more flexibly than Moore's system by evaluating possible
continuations from the current point in the dialogue. Modelled on Stefik's MOLGEN planner
[Ste81] but adapted for a domain that must interleave planning and execution, it integrates the
recovery strategies as meta-planning operators which manipulate the lower level plans. Then a
higher level operator can choose sets of recovery strategies to adopt at particular times, and yet
another level can vary the way in which these sets are chosen. This system has the advantages
that it is easy to change the way in which recovery strategies are employed and that repair and
replanning, as well as the other recovery strategies and normal planning and communication,
have the same status in the system.
7.1 Where Moore's Approach Fails
Johanna Moore describes in her thesis [Moo90] a planner for text generation which can repair,
reinstantiate, and replan if necessary. Her planner reacts to the dialogue partner by allowing
text plans which have failed to be corrected before the next piece of text is generated. Her
system chooses a recovery strategy to apply according to a strict ordering. If any repair is
possible then it is done. If not, then every reinstantiation is tried. Otherwise, replanning
is used as a last resort, starting with the lowest level open goal and working upwards. This
heuristic works well in domains where adopting a totally different plan for a goal is "expensive",
either because the first steps of a plan involve the greatest part of the effort and repairs are likely
to work, or because changes in plans can confuse the coordination among agents. However,
this heuristic is too rigid for some planning situations. Consider a system for assembling a
bookcase that knows about nails and wood screws. Suppose that the system attempts nailing
two pieces together first, since that's easier than using wood screws, but that it accidentally
bends the nail. By Moore's heuristic, the planner will continue using the nailing plan until
there are no nails left. After a number of failed attempts, a more rational agent might conclude
that for some reason unknown to it the nailing plan costs more than the effort of drilling the
hole and putting in the wood screw. Certainly some time before the planner tries its hundredth
nail, it ought to switch to the wood screw plan. This evaluation can be accentuated if the nail
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holes threaten to ruin the wood. This example shows that a planning system which can both
reinstantiate and replan must have flexible enough control that it can choose between the two
options sensibly. A similar argument can be constructed which shows that there is no way to
choose ahead of time to always try repair either before or after reinstantiation or replanning.
Moore's heuristic is too rigid to account for some of the recovery decisions which agents make
in the human corpus. Consider the following initial segment of a dialogue:
1G: Right. Start from the sandy shore,
IF: OK.
2G: moving down... straight down.
2F: How far?
3G: Down as far as the bottom of the well.
3F: I don't have a well.
4G: Ah. Right, eh. Move down, eh, vertically down about a quarter of the way
down the page. Move to the right in ... Do you have local residence?
4F: I do.
5G: Right, well, move up and round and above them.
...[with no further mention of the well]
In this dialogue, it would be possible for G to repair the plan by telling F where the well
is. However, G chooses instead to replan and give F a totally different description of this
section of the route, presumably because G thinks it will take less effort to complete the goal
of getting around this section of the route by starting with the new plan involving the local
residence than by repairing the old plan. Although there is not enough of the human data for
any particular pair of agents to show whether or not the same agents make different choices in
different situations, it seems unlikely that any one agent always uses the same ordering, and
that G simply uses a different one than the one postulated by Moore.
Another problem with Moore's heuristic is that replanning and reinstantiation are always
attempted at the most specific goal that has failed. In the woodworking domain, suppose that
after reinstantiating the nail ten times, Moore's planner runs out of nails and decides to replan.
It then replans the bottom level plan of attaching the two pieces of wood together and attempts
the goal using wood screws. However, if the top level goal is to have a bookcase, under some
circumstances it might "cost" less to abandon the lower level goal completely and buy one
ready made. A more flexible replanning capability would be able to consider for what purpose
the lower level goal is being attempted and consider changing the top level plan so that the
goal is no longer necessary.
What Moore's system lacks is an estimate of the amount of effort needed to complete its goals
using each of the various methods. This estimate should depend on the current situation; for
instance, in the woodworking domain, someone who has tried nailing a bookcase together ten
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times and failed will consider the plan of nailing the bookcase together differently from someone
who is just beginning the task. Once an estimate is formed based on the current situation, it
is most rational for the system to take the option which it believes requires the least effort to
complete the task satisfactorily or which provides the best "value for effort".
However, it is not enough to simply extend Moore's system with a cost estimating function
which will choose rationally among the different recovery strategies when a plan failure has
occurred. Human agents sometimes replan even when no plan failure has occurred, and such a
system would not be able to simulate this behaviour. A preliminary version of the JAM system
extended Moore's work in such a way that it pushed repairs onto the plan whenever they were
appropriate and that the system considered replanning at every planning step. This produces
the desired cost-based surface level behaviour, but it had the effect that occasionally repairs
were pushed and then immediately abandoned. In addition, since the preliminary version
always chose a recovery strategy based exclusively on cost, it was not easy to investigate
different decisions and to simulate other behaviours in the human corpus. What is required is
a system in which the agent can choose flexibly among all of the different ways of continuing
from the current situation. The architecture which we propose in this chapter and which is
implemented in the current JAM system elevates the recovery strategies to have the same
status in the system as other ways of continuing from the current point in the dialogue and
then allows any possible continuation to be considered at any point, providing more flexible
behaviour that more closely reflects the human corpus.
7.2 How the Strategies are Implemented
Chapter 4 gave a number of different recovery strategies which are employed in the human
corpus; the JAM system will simulate three of these: replanning, repair, and adopting the
partner's goals. These three recovery strategies, together with planning and communicating
something to the partner, represent all of the different actions which a JAM agent can decide
to take during the course of a dialogue. However, before we can explain how these strategies
are combined in the overall system, we must explain how each of them is implemented. In this
section, for each strategy we describe first how the system decides whether or not the strategy
applies in the current situation and then what the system does if it decides to use the strategy;
section 7.4 explains how an agent decides which of the applicable strategies to use. Four of the
strategies, planning, replanning, repair, and adopting the partner's goals, refer to the domain
plan operators, which axiomatise what effects domain actions are expected to have. These
operators and the meaning of the language in which they are expressed is given in section 5.6.
142
Examples of each of these strategies in use are given in section 7.5.
7.2.1 Communicating
An agent can decide to communicate something to the partner if some other action which it
has taken has made it plan to initiate a dialogue game or if there is currently a dialogue game
in play in which the agent is to make the next move. An agent can recognise the first situation
as that in which its currency pointer rests on a node containing a dialogue game which has
status "uninitiated"; in this case communicating involves only retrieving the initiating move
which has been placed in the dialogue game, making it, updating its beliefs in the way given in
section 6.4.3, and marking the node as "initiated". An agent can recognise the second situation
as one in which the currency pointer rests on a node containing a dialogue game which has
status "initiated" or "replied".1 In this case, the agent must construct a suitable move, make
it, update its beliefs, and mark the node as either "executed" (if the move is the final move of
a game) or "replied" (if the game still requires the partner to make a feedback move). Agents
construct responding and feedback moves as follows:
Ir: If the agent "understands" the propositional content of the associated 7/ move, then it
responds with Irp\ otherwise it responds with Irn-
Wr: If the agent has some belief which unifies with the associated Wi move, then it finds
the belief which unifies with it which evaluates most highly according to its task plan¬
ning communicative posture settings, as given in section 5.12.1 and returns it as the
propositional content of a Wrp move. Otherwise, it responds with a Wrn move.
Wf: If the agent "understands" the propositional content of the associated Wr move, then it
responds with Wfp', otherwise it responds with Wfn-
Yr: If the agent has the concept given as the content of the associated Yj move, then it
responds with Yrp\ otherwise it responds with Yrn-
Or: The agent makes the move Orp .
Cr: If the agent holds vivid the concept given as the content of the associated C/ move, then
it responds with Crp; otherwise it responds with Crn.
1 As we shall see in section 7.4.4, JAM agents always make moves in dialogue games as early as possible and
immediately cede control to the partner if they make a move which requires a response. This ensures that any
nodes with these statuses contain games in which it is the agent itself and not the partner which is to make the
next move. This is not necessary for the system's operation, but it does simplify things somewhat. If we accept
the argument about the mapping between dialogue games and surface level behaviour given in section 5.4, then
providing an immediate response can be achieved by saying or doing nothing, and thus our requirement that
agents make dialogue moves as early as possible is not a major limitation.
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7.2.2 Planning
An agent can plan from the current situation if its currency pointer rests on a node with
status "unplanned" (i.e., a goal which has not been planned yet). It plans by looking at all of
the domain plan operators to see if any bf them match the current situation; a plan operator
matches the current situation if and only if its effect unifies with the current goal in such a
way that all of the operator's nonrelaxable constraints are satisfied (as explained in section
5.6). Of course, there may be several plan operators which apply to any one goal, and even
several instantiations of the same plan operator. In case of conflicts, agents always prefer plans
in which all of the relaxable constraints are satisfied. In addition, if an agent has several such
plans, it will choose the one which is evaluated most highly according to its task planning
communicative posture settings, as described in section 5.12.1. Once an agent has chosen the
best plan available and decided to use it, planning proceeds as follows: the agent pushes as
subnodes of the current goal node any prerequisites of the plan which apply given the agent's
communicative posture settings and the operations of the plan, and marks the current goal
node as having the status "open". It also stores the name of the operator by which the plan
was constructed in the node containing the goal for future reference. Then the agent will
naturally move to the first unfinished child of that goal (i.e., the first prerequisite of the new
plan) the next time the currency pointer is updated.
7.2.3 Replanning
An agent can consider replanning in the current situation if there is any node in its plan which
has the status "open" (i.e., is a goal which has been planned and on which the agent is currently
working, so that the goal has not yet been fulfilled, since in this case the agent might want
to consider a new plan for the unfulfilled goal). The "open" nodes of a plan are exactly those
nodes which are ancestors of the current point in the plan, since work on any nodes to the left
has been completed and work on any nodes to the right has not yet been started. Note that
these conditions do not require a plan failure to have occurred. At any one "open" node, the
agent considers whether or not there are any replans which are better than the current plan
by using almost the same technique as it used when it was planning originally. First it gathers
together all instantiations of all domain plan operators which have the desired effect, but, since
the agent has already planned for the goal at least once, it makes sure to eliminate any previous
plans from consideration.2 Then, in the same way as for initial planning, it chooses the best
2A possible replan is rejected as having been used previously if all of its operations sire already children of
the goal under consideration, regardless of ordering. The replan's prerequisites are not considered in this test.
This test suffices for the current version of the JAM system, but it is conceivable that more subtle combinations
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possibility out of those that remain.
Of course, it is perfectly possible for there to be more than one "open" node in the plan, and
thus the agent needs a way to compare replans at different locations. JAM agents use the most
straightforward method, which involves considering all of the open nodes from the top down.3
This can be considered to be a simple instance of dependency directed backtracking [CRMM87]
because of the way in which plans are structured. The only open nodes in the plan are the
ancestors of the failed node (indicated by the currency pointer), and, since nodes always serve
the purpose of furthering the goals of their parents, the set of open nodes is exactly the same
as the set of nodes which depend on the failed node. Of course, chronological backtracking
over the entire plan structure would not be sensible because any plan nodes which are to the
left of the node indicated by the currency pointer have already been completed and should not
be undone. Moore's replanning [Moo90] is equivalent to chronological backtracking over just
that part of the tree which has not yet been completed.
There is one more complication in the way that JAM agents decide upon the best replan:
domain plan operators contain a flag which, if set, marks any plans made using them not
replannable. This flag enforces that, given a decision to satisfy a goal, the system accepts that
the first plan which it adopts for the goal will always be the best way to satisfy it. Setting the
flag on any particular node to nil does not force us to complete the associated goal; as long as
some ancestor of the node was planned with an operator whose flag was not set, it is possible
that the node will be abandoned when that ancestor is replanned. It is up to the designer
of the domain plan operators to decide which operators should have the flag set and which
should not. We have included this facility since it seems likely that there are some plan choices
which human agents do not reconsider because it would cause too much cognitive effort to do
so. Such a facility might also be useful for increasing efficiency in more traditional planning
domains.
Once the system has determined the best replan to use and has decided to use it, replanning
happens as follows: the agent marks as abandoned all of the unfinished descendants of the goal
for which the agent is replanning, moves the currency pointer so that it rests on that goal, and
then pushes the new plan onto the plan tree in exactly the same way as it would if it were an
original plan. It also stores the name of the operator by which the plan was constructed in the
replanned node for future reference. Then the agent will naturally move to the first unfinished
of domain operators would require more subtle testing.
3 It might suffice, however, to stop looking once a replan is found which has a cost that is lower than the
cost of the current plan. With a good cost estimating routine, this should ensure that the first replan which is
found to be better than the current plan is also the best one, since the cost estimates are intended to reflect
the best possible complete realisation of each plan. This extension is left to further work.
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An agent can consider repair in the current situation if the currency pointer rests on a node
with the status "open". This entails that the plan must have already been completely executed
but failed, since if the plan had not been attempted then the pointer would have been on some
subnode of the goal node rather than at the goal itself, and if the plan had not failed, then
the goal node's status would have been "succeeded", not "open". Repair involves filling in
missing prerequisites to a plan after the main part of the plan has already been executed,
and so repair only applies if a plan failure has already occurred; otherwise it would always
be most cost effective to move on to the next part of the task. Unlike with replanning, JAM
agents only consider repairs for the lowest level goal that has failed; repair does not involve
abandoning any parts of the current plan, and so moving up levels in the plan tree will not
leave a failure behind. JAM agents also only consider repairing the current plan for a goal
and not previously abandoned plans. There is only one possible repair for each plan, and so
unlike planning and replanning, the agent does not need any evaluation routine to decide which
repair to make. To determine what the repair would involve, the agent retrieves the name of
the plan operator which is stored at the current goal and lists all of the prerequisites of the
operator which are goals4 as if its communicative posture settings were entirely low risk. Then
it eliminates all prerequisites on the list which were included in the plan before it was executed,
since these prerequisites will already have been satisfied. Prerequisites are considered to have
been included in the plan if they unify with a goal contained in one of the children of the
current node.
Once an agent has determined what repair will be necessary and has decided to make the repair,
it does so by pushing all of the missing prerequisites onto the plan tree as subnodes of the current
goal node. Then the agent will naturally move to the first missing prerequisite the next time
the currency pointer is updated. Note that this method of repair only suffices in domains like
simple dialogue where it is possible to make the repair by executing prerequisites after execution
of the main plan. In domains where prerequisites set up conditions which are necessary for the
plan's operations to work at all and not just for them to be more felicitous, repair will be a
more complex strategy and will perhaps involve re-executing the plan's operations.
4 This restriction only ensures that agents do not revive the prerequisite of opening the current part of the
dialogue by using an open game, as required by the low risk context articulation setting. It works because the
only prerequisites which involve dialogue games in the current system are for opening games. Clearly this is
not the correct restriction, but it suffices for the current purpose.
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7.2.5 Goal Adoption
Our implementation of goal adoption is rather less intuitive than our implementations of the
other recovery strategies. It uses a simplified version of Allen's plan recogniser [A1183], which
was reviewed in section 2.4.2. An agenlj can consider adopting one of the partner's goals in
the current situation if the currency pointer rests on a node containing a dialogue game which
the partner has just initiated or if the currency pointer rests on a goal node which the agent
has obtained by goal adoption. An agent can recognise the latter condition because the goal
adoption routine will have set a flag on the node when the goal was adopted. In either case, the
agent checks to see if goal adoption is applicable by looking for a plan which, when considered
from the partner's perspective, "explains" the partner's behaviour. It begins by enumerating
all of the possible plans it has which have an operation that unifies with the partner's goal
or dialogue game. Then it eliminates any of these plans which do not satisfy the operator's
relaxable constraints from the partner's "perspective" (that is, when the agent substitutes the
partner for itself and its beliefs about the partner's beliefs for its own beliefs in the plan which
the agent itself would use to bring about the goal). At the end of this procedure, it will have
only those plans which it thinks the partner could be using given the partner's behaviour.
Given the JAM system's current domain plan operators, there is only ever one plan identified
by this procedure; given a richer set of operators, the procedure would have to be extended to
identify one plan out of a possible set of plans. Then the partner's goal is the effect of that
plan. As a safeguard against pushing a goal as a subgoal of itself, the agent will only consider
adopting the goal if that goal is not contained in an ancestor of the current node. The opposite
situation, where the adopted goal contains itself as a descendant, can not occur given the plan
recogniser just described and the current version of the planning operators.
Once the agent has made its best guess at the partner's goal and has decided to adopt that goal,
it does so by inserting a new node containing that goal into the plan tree between the current
node (which was either a dialogue game initiated by the partner or another goal adopted from
the partner) and its parent. In addition, the agent sets a flag on the new node to indicate that
the new goal has been adopted from the partner. The JAM version of goal adoption does not
have the agent push any subsequent operations from the recognised plan onto the plan tree, so
JAM agents can not take over control of one of their partner's plans. In particular, this rules
out dialogues such as
A: The first section of the route goes to the left of the palm beach.
B: OK. Where is the second section?
because although in the JAM system B would recognise A's goal that B know how to get
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around the route, B would not initiate any parts of a plan for that goal. Simulating dialogues
such cis this one requires some method for controlling agents in which both agents can take the
initiative at the same time, which is beyond the scope of this research. However, JAM agents
can initiate repairs for failed plans which were initiated by the partner; an example of such a
dialogue is given in section 8.3.
Once a goal has been successfully adopted, the goal adoption routine works recursively from
it in order to determine why the partner might have that goal. Thus one invocation of the
goal adoption routine may add an entire chain of ancestor goals to the plan tree which explain
a single utterance of the partner's. We have chosen to implement goal adoption in this way
because it seems unlikely to us in such a simple domain as the map task that agents bother to
reason about why their partners say what they do without taking such reasoning to its logical
conclusion. However, it is a simple change to make goal adoption be controlled one step at a
time.
7.3 Estimating the Cost of a Continuation
In order for an agent to choose which strategy to apply next in any one situation according to
cost, the agent must first have a way of estimating the costs involved. JAM agents construct cost
estimates for planning, replanning, and repair; this section explains how these cost estimates
are made. JAM agents do not construct estimates for communication or goal adoption, and
so the agents must use other means for determining whether or not to apply these strategies.
The cost estimates for continuation strategies are only ordered plausibly with respect to each
other and are not intended to reflect costs in absolute terms. They are only intended to provide
relative costs for each of the possible continuations so that the least costly option can be chosen.
Once they have been used to determine the agent's next action, they are discarded and the
new planning steps which make up the continuation are added to the current plan using the
way of estimating current costs which was given in section 5.9.
The continuation strategies always provide the estimated cost to complete the entire task given
that the strategy is used next; this is to ensure that recovering at a low level in the plan is not
automatically favoured over recovering at a high level simply because the recovery takes less
effort by not finishing as much of the task. Thus the cost of each of the continuation strategies
is constructed by reference to what changes the strategy makes to the cost of the current
plan. The most desirable continuation is the one with the lowest estimated cost. Planning and
replanning at any level use the same basic procedure for constructing an estimate of the cost of
the new planning step which is added: they add up the number of operations in the plan that
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are goals. The cost of planning is estimated as the old cost of the top level goal of the entire
plan tree (in the JAM system, always the goal for some agent to know how to get around the
route) plus 1 for each goal which must be added to the tree as part of the new planning step,
plus 500 if the plan does not satisfy the relaxable constraints on the domain plan operator
used. The cost of 1 for each goal favours^plans which involve as few goals as possible. The 500
point penalty is intended to ensure that plans which satisfy the relaxable constraints are used
whenever possible, since (given the current planning operators) 500 is greater than the cost for
any unrelaxed plan will be. Similarly, the cost of a replan at any level is the old cost of the top
level goal minus the cost of the node which is being replaced (i.e., the number of goals which
would be abandoned in the replan being costed) plus 1 for each goal which must be added to
the tree as part of the replacement planning step, plus 500 if the replan does not satisfy the
relaxable constraints on the domain plan operator used, plus a threshold value for the "hidden
cost" of changing plans. For agents with high risk plan commitment settings, this threshold
is 1 plus 1.6 for each level of plan which must be abandoned, making high risk agents replan
relatively easily and prefer to replan at the highest level possible, all other things being equal.
For agents with low risk plan commitment settings, the threshold is 11 minus 1.6 for each level
of plan which must be abandoned, making low risk agents replan seldom and prefer to replan
at the lowest level possible.
The mechanism for estimating the cost of a repair is somewhat simpler. The repair is considered
to have the old cost of the top level goal plus the number of missing prerequisites that would
be pushed onto the plan plus 1 for each level from the top that the repair occurs. This
penalty embodies the principle "if things are getting complicated, they'll only get worse",
and keeps the agents from getting pushed into ever more complicated plan structures as they
repair repairs and so on. As the number of levels in the plan increases the cost of the repair
eventually overtakes the cost of a replan. This overtaking comes early for agents with high
risk plan commitment, since 1 plus 1.6 for each level to be abandoned is relatively small
compared to the number of plan levels at a typical failure, and late for agents with low risk
plan commitment, since 11 minus 1.6 for each level to be abandoned is relatively large compared
to the total number of levels. The exact numbers are designed to allow, among other things,
the comparison between the two conversations given in section 8.6, and are useful only for this
particular domain.
For an example of estimating the costs of possible continuations, suppose that two agents, doris
and fred, have just had the following part of a dialogue:
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Figure 7.1: Doris' Current Plan
open: (know fred route) <6>
open: (know fred section-one) <2>









unplanned: (know fred section-two) <1>
unplanned: (know fred section-three) <1>
unplanned: (know fred section-four) <1>
doris makes an inform(i) move doris says to fred: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp")) fred says to doris: i do not
fred makes an inform(r) move understand.
with content not-ok
Then, given the way of maintaining plan costs given in section 5.9, doris' current plan is
represented by the tree in figure 7.1, with costs given between angle brackets:
Furthermore, doris' current position in her plan is at the goal (know fred (describes
section-one (between palm-beach-0 swamp-O))). Suppose that doris has a high risk plan
commitment setting. At this point, there are four possible ways for doris to continue. She can
repair the current plan by pushing onto the tree the two prerequisites which she skipped when
she attempted the current goal ((know fred palm-beach-0) and (know fred swamp-O)),
or she can choose one of three possible replans for the goal (know fred section-one). One
of these replans uses the know-one operator (given in section 5.7) and involves asking fred
whether or not he has section-one; the other two use the know-three operator and involve
telling fred the new descriptions for section-one, (left-of palm-beach-0), and (around
swamp-O), respectively. However, doris will never construct a cost estimate for the latter, since
she uses her task planning communicative posture settings to choose just one possible replan
for each operator at each level, and the former has a better evaluation. There are no possible
replans that doris can use for her top level goal, (know fred route), because she knows of
only one way to fulfill it.
Let us construct a cost estimate for each of the possible continuations in turn. The cost of the
repair is the cost of the top level goal (6) plus the number of prerequisites that would be pushed
(2) plus the number of levels from the top at which they would be pushed (3), or 11. The cost
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of the replan using know-one is the cost of the top level goal (6) minus the cost of the current
plan for the goal to be replanned (2) plus a penalty because the plan's relaxable constraints
are not satisfied (500) plus a replanning threshold for a high risk agent replanning two levels
from the top level goal (11 plus -1.6(2)), plus the cost of the replacement plan (the number
of goals in the replacement, namely 0), or 511.8. The cost of the replan using know-three
with the description (left-of palm-beach-O) is the cost of the top level goal (6) minus the
cost of the current plan for the goal to be replanned (2) plus the constraint penalty (0) plus
a replanning threshold (11 plus -1.6(2)) plus the cost of the replacement plan (the number of
goals in the replacement, namely 1), or 12.8.
There are several improvements that could be made to the way in which cost estimates are
constructed. It would be better if the estimates for a new planning step were to take into
account the prerequisites of the plan involved and check for prior occurrences of the same goal.
For instance, if a new planning step involves the goal (know fred swamp-0), and that goal is
already known to be difficult, then the cost estimates ought to reflect that. The fact that one
communicative posture parameter, plan commitment, controls both factors of the replanning
threshold makes the system unable to generate some plausible dialogues. We will have more
to say about these dialogues in section 8.8.
7.4 The Layered Architecture
In section 2.3.3.1, we described how MOLGEN's layered architecture is structured so that
the problem of scheduling tasks in a problem solver is broken down into smaller and smaller
pieces using the problem solving techniques themselves. Stefik devised this technique because
in ordinary agenda-based problem solving, the interpreter which selects tasks to be scheduled is
hard to examine and change. The same criticism can be made of Moore's planner with respect
to the recovery strategies, since it inflexibly runs procedures which decide whether or not a
recovery strategy is appropriate at the time in which they are invoked. The criteria for deciding
are simply hard-wired into the code; this is analogous to the situation Stefik describes where the
problem solver's interpreter has domain knowledge prioritising the scheduling of tasks, but the
structure of that knowledge is difficult to examine. The layered architecture which we describe
next, however, unfolds the system's reasons for applying recovery heuristics where it does and
makes it easier to vary their application based on the current context. It also makes it easier to
add new recovery heuristics, since that entails adding new modular pieces to the architecture
rather than changing the structure of a large chunk of the code. As a side effect, where before
the two recovery heuristics that were implemented, replanning and repair, were very different
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kinds of procedures invoked under different conditions, the layered planner elevates them to be
comparable objects. The layered architecture can generate a whole range of dialogues which
a planner built like Moore's could not, simply because its flexibility allows different agents to
make different decisions about what to do next in a particular situation. This both gives a
clearer picture of why things happen when they do and makes experimentation with different
combinations of communicative posture settings and recovery strategies easier.
7.4.1 The Organisation of the Layers
Our system consists of four layers of planning operators:
The Domain Space contains what would normally be the operators in a planning
system for the domain. The mechanics of these operators have been described in detail
in section 5.7; what makes them different from normal planning operators is that instead
of being manipulated as data structures by planning routines, they work by exchanging
messages with the plan strategy (among others). The operators at this level utilise the
agent's knowledge about the domain, including knowledge about both the task and how
dialogues are conducted.
The Strategy Space contains operators corresponding to each of the possible ways
of continuing from the current point in the plan. This involves normal planning and
execution as well as all of the recovery strategies. This space is not related to MOLGEN's
strategy space, but takes its name from the term "recovery strategy".
The Mode Space controls which set of strategies are accessible to the agent and how
a strategy is chosen. The simplest modes always give the agent access to the same set
of strategies, but more complex modes can switch among sets depending on the current
situation. For many applications one possible mode would suffice; in this case, we have
several corresponding to different ways that people make strategy decisions in the human
dialogues. This space is roughly analogous to MOLGEN's strategy space since it meta-
plans the techniques used in continuing from the current point in the plan.
The Interpreter simply chooses one of the mode operators to execute. In the JAM
system, different modes correspond to different agents' ways of doing things, so the in¬
terpreter simply checks to see which agent it is for and invokes the appropriate mode.
Many systems might only need one mode (combining the mode level and the interpreter)
to bring about reasonable behaviour. Where other domains inspire more complex control
at the higher levels, the interpreter can be as complex as required and even higher levels
of the system may be added.
A diagram of the system is given in figure 7.2. This section describes in more detail the
operators we have chosen for each layer and the messages that are passed between the layers.
When we say that an operator "does" some action upon receiving a message, we mean that
the sending of that message causes a particular procedure to be executed which does the
action. Agents know which procedures to invoke because each agent has a data structure
which associates operators and message names with the name of the procedure to run when
that operator receives that message.
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Figure 7.2: The System Architecture
INTERPRETER
start
MODE: nonreactive, comprehensive, no adoption, repairing, replanning, moore
applies?, apply




DOMAIN: route, know-one, know-two, know-three, know-description-one,
know-description-two, nested-know-one, nested-know-two
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7.4.2 The Domain Space
The domain space of the planner consists of operators which involve knowledge about dialogue
and the domain. There are seven in all, and details about them are given in section 5.7. Here
we repeat the English glosses of what the plan operators do:
Route: To get some agent to know the route on the map, get some other agent to describe all
the sections of it in order.
Know-One: To get to know whether or not some agent knows some concept, ask that agent
yes or no.
Know-Two: To get the self to know a concept, get the self to know some description of the
concept.
Know-Three: To get the partner to know a concept, get the partner to know some description
of the concept.
Know-Description-One: To get an agent to know some description of a concept, get some
agent to tell the agent a description of the concept.
Know-Description-Two: To get to know some description of a concept, get the agent to ask
another agent to describe the concept.
Nested-Know-One: To get the partner to know that the self has a concept, close the con¬
versation about the concept.
Nested-Know-Two: To get to know that the partner has a concept, close the conversation
about the concept.
Chapter 5 only described these operators as they could be used in any planner for this domain,
but in the JAM system, these operators must work in the message passing architecture. Since
the domain space is the bottom layer of the architecture, these operators do not send any
messages. The messages which they can receive occur in pairs. The first message of each pair,
postfixed with a question mark (?), asks the domain operator if it can be used for the associated
strategy, and the second message asks the domain operator to apply itself according to that
strategy:
Plan?: Asks the domain operator whether it can be used to plan the given goal. If it can,
the operator stores in its register the most highly evaluated instantiation of itself which
applies and returns the evaluation; otherwise, it returns nil.
Plan: Tells the domain operator to retrieve the plan which is stored in its register and push
it on to the plan tree as a solution to the current goal. Additionally, the name of the
domain operator is attached to the current goal for future reference.
Missing-req?: Asks the domain operator, which was used to plan the given node in the plan
tree, whether any of its prerequisites are not yet fulfilled. This message is only used when
the entire plan has been executed but the goal has not succeeded. If some prerequisites
have not been fulfilled (i.e., as a result of an inappropriate high risk communicative
posture), then the domain operator stores them and returns t; otherwise it returns nil.
Insert-missing-req: Tells the domain operator to retrieve the missing prerequisites which are
stored in its register and to push them onto the plan tree at the current point.
Adopt-goal?: Asks the domain operator to try to recognise (in a limited way) the partner's
current goal. This message is only sent when the agent has just reached a frame initiated
by the partner or when the agent is working on a goal which it is acquired by using goal
adoption. The recognition is done by having the domain operator see if it contains an
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equivalent frame if it instantiates itself "from the partner's perspective". If the frame
does occur in the operator, then the operator stores the instantiation of its effect (e.g.,
the partner's current bottom level goal) and returns t. Otherwise, the operator returns
nil.
Adopi-goal: Tells the domain operator to retrieve the partner's current bottom level goal and
push it as a sister node to the node in the plan tree which holds the frame which the
partner initiated to further that goal.
7.4.3 The Strategy Space
The strategy space contains operators which embody each of the recovery heuristics plus normal
planning and execution of dialogue games:
Plan: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by planning the current goal.
Applies? returns a numerical value or nil.
Communicate: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by communicatingwith
the partner, either by initiating a game which some other strategy has suggested, or by
continuing a game initiated by either the self or the partner. Applies? returns t or nil.
If the communication requires a response from the partner, apply returns "swap", telling
the agent to relinquish control of the dialogue after this step.
Replan: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by replanning any one of the
goals in the plan which have not yet been fulfilled. Applies? returns a numerical value
or nil.
One Level Replan: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by replanning
from a given goal in the plan which has not yet been fulfilled. This strategy operator is
only used by modes which place orderings on the application of recovery strategies, like
the mode reconstructing Moore's work. Applies? returns a numerical value or nil.
Repair: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by finding prerequisites to the
current goal's plan which have not been fulfilled due to a communicative posture that
was too high and fulfilling them. Applies? returns a numerical value or nil.
Adopt Goal: Considers ways to continue from the current situation by adopting what the
agent thinks the partner's goal is in initiating a game which is currently in progress.
Applies? returns t or nil.
These operators are controlled by two messages which are sent from mode space operators:
applies? to query whether or not they are useful in the current situation, to which they return
an evaluation, t, or nil, and apply to tell them to execute themselves. They, in turn, may need
to communicate with the domain space operators, asking for information about the best way to
apply themselves or passing on the call for execution. Communicate does not need to access
any domain level operators, so it does not send out any messages. Repair uses missing-req?
and insert-missing-req, and adopt-goal uses adopi-goal? and adopi-goal. Since plan, replan,
and one level replan all involve the same basic operation but on different outstanding goals,
they all use the plan? and plan messages but with different goals as the argument. Plan and
one level replan work on the current bottom level goal of the plan. Replan works on each
of the open goals in the plan successively.
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When the strategy operators receive applies? messages, they return values which are used by
the system to determine which one of the strategy operators to apply. Communicate and
adopt-goal return only t or nil, indicating whether or not these strategies apply. The other
strategies, plan, replan, one level replan, and repair, return a numerical value reflecting
the estimated relative costs of completing the entire task if that strategy is applied next.
7.4.4 The Mode Space
The mode space controls the set of recovery strategies that is available to the agent at the
present time and how the agent chooses to continue from the current situation. The modes
range from the nonreactive mode, which is a simple plan/execute loop, to the comprehen¬
sive mode, which can employ any of the recovery strategies. The mode operator chooses one of
the strategy operators it knows about and sends it a message to execute itself. The mode oper¬
ators themselves can receive only one message from the interpreter, siart. The mode operators
are as follows:
Nonreactive: Simply do normal planning, communicating as soon as the need arises or a
response to the partner is required. This mode allows us to check the effects of each
recovery strategy without interference from this agent.
Comprehensive: Consider every possible continuation from the current situation and choose
the least cost one, except always communicate as early as possible and always goal adopt.
This mode is as close as we can get to a completely rational mode without improving the
evaluation function.
No-Adoption: Work in exactly the same way as the comprehensive strategy, except do not
ever adopt the partner's goals.
Repairing: Communicate as early as possible, always goal adopt, and only consider repair as
a recovery strategy. This mode is useful for investigating repair.
Replanning: Communicate sis early as possible, always goal adopt, and only consider replan-
ning as a recovery strategy. This mode is useful for investigating replanning.
Moore: Reconstruct the behaviour of Moore's system as far as possible. In particular, go
through the recovery strategies in the strict order of any possible repairs and then any
possible replans. In addition, always adopt the partner's goals whenever possible and
respond to the partner's communications before anything else (be cooperative).
Mode operators choose a strategy to employ by either having a preference for a particular
strategy, as in, for instance, always completing communications first, or by considering a num¬
ber of strategies and choosing the one which requires the least amount of effort. A totally
rational mode would involve checking all the strategies and always applying the lowest cost
one. However, writing an efficient evaluation function that covers all of the different strategies
can be difficult. We have left our evaluation incomplete (so that some strategies, when polled
only return t or nil to show whether or not it is possible to apply them) because we are pri¬
marily concerned with modelling human planning abilities, and it is not at all clear that the
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typical resource-bounded human agent can evaluate his or her options so rationally. Our mode
operators are intended to investigate the different possibilities open to agents and to reflect
the surface-level behaviour from the human corpus of task-oriented dialogues. In addition,
one operator, Moore, reconstructs the ordering for recovery strategies given in Moore's thesis
[Moo90],5 thus modelling the behaviour of her planner.
7.4.5 The Interpreter
This space consists simply of one operator which can receive one message, start, from the
chair program which swaps between the two agents. At the moment, so that we can test the
various modes by matching them up in different combinations, we have a number of different
interpreters. Each agent uses a different one. The simplest interpreters run continually in
one mode, employing a static set of recovery strategies, while more complex interpreters swap
between modes baaed on whether or not recovery is necessary and whether or not the partner
is attempting the recovery.
7.5 Worked Examples
This section describes how the JAM system uses the layered architecture to plan, execute, and
recover from failures by giving two worked examples. It is not possible to specify one algorithm
which all of the agents use in deciding what actions to take, because the algorithm depends
on which interpreter (and hence which mode level operator) an agent uses. The first worked
example shows the initial extract of a dialogue between two particular agents, carol and torn,
and demonstrates communication, planning, repair, and goal adoption. This example both
expands step six of the algorithm which is given in section 6.4.3 (refined from section 5.11)
and fills in the gaps left in the worked example of section 6.4.4. The second example shows a
simple case of replanning early in a dialogue.
7.5.1 Communication, Planning, Repair, and Goal Adoption
In the following example, carol and torn are both agents which use an interpreter which only
calls the comprehensive mode and which both have high risk difference and context artic¬
ulation posture settings and low risk settings for the remaining parameters. When carol is
awakened by the chair program, she reads her mail, discovers the message which tells her to
5Reinstantiation is omitted for reasons given in section 4.2.5.
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initialise her plan, and creates a plan tree with the top level goal of (know tom route), as
indicated in section 5.11. Then she sends a start message to her interpreter (comprehensive-
interpreter), which begins a loop that continually sends start messages to the comprehensive
mode level operator until that operator returns the value 'swap, indicating that carol requires
torn to respond to one of her utterances, or until that operator returns nil, indicating that it
has reached the top of the plan with no more unfinished children and so carol has nothing to
do. In either of these cases, carol's interpreter returns control to the chair program, giving up
her turn.
In this case, the comprehensive mode has not just returned 'swap and carol does have a goal
on which to work, and so her interpreter sends a start message to the comprehensive mode.
The comprehensive mode first updates the currency pointer by the mechanism explained in
section 5.5. Then it sets out to determine which strategy level operator to use, beginning by
sending the applies? message to the communicate strategy.
The communicate strategy looks at the current node in the plan to determine whether or
not there is anything to say stored in that node (i.e., that node contains a frame which has an
utterance by carol which has not been said). In this case, the current node in the plan is a
goal, so the communicate strategy returns nil to the comprehensive mode.
If the communicate strategy had returned t, then the comprehensive mode would have
sent it an apply message, which would have sent the new utterance to the partner. Then the
comprehensive mode would have sent an applies? message to the goal-adopt strategy, since
this strategy sometimes applies when the partner has just initiated a dialogue game and this is
the case only if the agent has had to respond, since there are no one move dialogue games in the
current system. Then in turn if the goal-adopt strategy had returned t, the comprehensive
mode would have sent it an apply message, making it adopt whatever goal was inferable from
the partner's action. However, in this case the communicate strategy returned nil, and so
the comprehensive mode moves on to look for other strategies to apply.
Next, the comprehensive mode sends the applies? message to the plan strategy, which
indicates that the plan operator should determine whether or not it can do anything in the
current situation. The plan strategy responds by sending the plan? message to each one
of the domain level operators in turn. First the plan strategy sends the plan? message to
the route operator. This makes the route operator check to see if it applies in the current
situation. The mechanism by which domain level operators do this is given in section 5.8.
In general, the operator gathers together all possible instantiations which match the current
situation and evaluates each of them according to the task planning communicative posture
parameters as described in section 5.12.1; then the operator stores the list of goals and frames
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(including operations and, depending on communicative posture, prerequisites) constituting
the most highly evaluated plan in its register, and returns its estimated cost, as described in
section 5.9. In this case, there is just one possible instantiation of the operator which matches
the current situation (a plan which involves getting torn to know all four sections of the route),
and so the route operator stores a list of four goals in its register which correspond to getting
torn to know how to get around the four sections of the route. Then the route operator returns
the estimated cost of this plan to the plan strategy.
Next the plan strategy sends the plan? message to each of the other domain level operators.
However, none of these operators match the current situation, and so they all return nil to the
plan strategy.
Next, the plan strategy must decide which of the possibilities offered by the domain level
operators is most desirable. It does this by selecting the one with the least cost, route, storing
the name of the operator in its register, and returning that cost to the comprehensive mode.
So far, the comprehensive mode has worked towards determining the best strategy to apply
by querying two of its five strategies about what they can do in the current situation. There
are three remaining: replan, repair, and adopt-goal. It sends the applies? message to each
of these strategies in turn. Replan returns nil because there are no open goals in the plan
which could be replanned; so far there is only one goal on the tree, and it has not yet been
planned at all. Repair returns nil because there have not been any failures to repair as yet.
Now that the comprehensive mode has evaluated all possible actions, it chooses whichever
one has the least cost. In this case the only possible course of action is to use the plan strategy.
Therefore the comprehensive mode sends the plan strategy the apply message. The plan
strategy looks at its register to discover that the route operator was the best one that applied
in the current situation, and so it sends the route operator a plan message. This makes the
route operator push the plan stored in its register onto carol's plan tree underneath the current
goal. This gives her the following plan tree:
open: (know torn route)
unplanned: (know torn section-one)
unplanned: (know torn section-two)
unplanned: (know torn section-three)
unplanned: (know torn section-iour)
Carol's current point in the plan is the top level goal. Then the route operator returns t to the
plan strategy, which returns t to the comprehensive mode, which returns t to the interpreter.
At this point, the interpreter has completed one cycle. Since it did not receive a 'swap signal
(indicating that carol needs a response from torn) or nil (indicating that the comprehensive
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mode didn't find anything to do), it sends a start message to the comprehensive mode. The
mode begins by updating the currency pointer in carol's plan so that the current goal is (know
tom section-one), since that is the leftmost unfinished child of the goal on which she had
been working. Then, it begins to determine what strategy level operator to apply by sending
the applies? message to the communicate strategy. The communicate strategy returns nil
because the current point in the plan is a goal and hence there is nothing for carol to say.
Next the comprehensive mode sends the applies? message to each of the plan, replan, and
repair strategies in turn. Once again, the replan and repair strategies return nil because
they do not apply, and the plan strategy returns a cost which is associated with the plan of
getting torn to know the first section of the route by getting him to know some description
of it by using the know-three domain level operator. As in the earlier case of planning, the
comprehensive mode sends an apply message to the plan strategy, which sends an apply
message to the know-three operator, which makes that operator push its plan onto carol's
plan tree, giving it the following structure:
open: (know torn route)
open: (know torn section-one)
unplanned: (know torn (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0
swamp-O)))
unplanned: (know torn section-two)
unplanned: (know torn section-three)
unplanned: (know torn section-lour)
Then, as in the earlier case, the value t is returned up all the levels of the system to the
interpreter, and the cycle begins again. Next by exactly the same process, but using the
know-description-one operator, the plan tree is extended as follows:
open: (know torn route)
open: (know torn section-one)
open: (know torn (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0
swamp-O)))






unplanned: (know torn section-two)
unplanned: (know torn section-three)
unplanned: (know torn section-four)
At this point carol is ready to make an utterance. This time when the comprehensive mode
sends an applies? message to the communicate strategy, the strategy finds that there is a
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new utterance to say, which is the initiating move of the current frame. It therefore returns t
to the comprehensive mode, and the mode sends it an apply message, making it send the
utterance to torn:
carol makes an inform(i) move carol says to torn: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp"))
Then the communicate strategy returns the value 'swap to the comprehensive mode, in¬
dicating that the utterance requires a response before further action can be taken (as is the
case with every dialogue move which does not complete a game). The comprehensive mode,
because it receives the value 'swap, passes that value up to the interpreter, which cedes control
to the chair program. This concludes one turn in the dialogue, and next the chair program
gives control to torn.
Tom, upon being awakened, discovers the message which carol has left in his mailbox, reads
it, updates his beliefs in line with it, and adds the dialogue game which it initiates to his
discourse plan. Since he has no goals, this game is the only part of his plan. Then he sends a
start message to his interpreter, comprehensive-interpreter. Since his interpreter has not
just received the value 'swap from a mode level operator and because there is an unfinished
node in the plan (namely, the initiated dialogue game), it sends a start message to the com¬
prehensive mode, which first moves the currency pointer to the current goal in the plan to the
initiated dialogue game. Then the comprehensive mode begins determining which strategy
to apply by sending the applies? message to the communicate strategy. The communicate
strategy, seeing that the current node is a game which is waiting for a response, returns t
to the comprehensive mode. Then the comprehensive mode immediately sends an apply
message to the communicate strategy. This causes the communicate strategy to construct
an appropriate responding move,6 send the utterance to carol, update tom's beliefs in line with
the response, and return control to the comprehensive mode:
torn makes an inform(r) move torn says to carol: i do not
with content not-ok understand.
Unlike with the previous utterance, the returned value is t, not 'swap, because this move closes
the dialogue game and torn is free to continue his turn. Because torn has just received a message
from the partner initiating a new game and has responded to it, the comprehensive mode
next sends an applies? message to the goal-adopt strategy, which causes it to look at the
current situation for evidence of what the partner's goals are.
6It might perhaps be more appropriate to have the communicate strategy construct the new utterance
when it is sent the applies? message and store it in a register for later use, since the value returned by the
applies? message indicates that the agent has something to say. This requires only a very small modification
to the current arrangement.
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At this point, tom's currency pointer rests on the game which he has just completed. The
goal-adopt strategy sends an adopt-goal? message to each of the domain level operators in
turn, which asks them whether or not the current node is consistent with use of the operator.
A domain operator matches for the purposes of goal adoption if the current game or goal unifies
with one of the operations on the domain operator's list in such a way that if torn substitutes
himself for carol, carol for himself, what he thinks carol believes for what he believes, and what
he thinks carol thinks he believes for what he thinks carol believes in a use of the operator,
the nonrelaxable constraints of the operator are satisfied. In addition, the new goal which
is the effect of such a match must not already be an ancestor of the current node in tom's
discourse plan, since it would not be sensible to require the goal to be solved as just one part of
solving itself. All of the domain level operators return nil except for know-description-one;
this operator stores in its register the goal node which represents the effect of carol's plan
and returns t. Then the goal-adopt strategy sends it an adopt-goal message. The know-
description-one operator retrieves the goal node which it has stored, pushes that effect onto
the plan tree as the parent of the current node, and changes the former parent of the current
node to be the parent of the new node. Since torn does not believe that the goal is already
fulfilled, the new node is created with the status 'open, and since it arose as the result of goal
adoption, it is marked with a special flag which allows torn to adopt another goal which might
explain carol's having that goal. In addition, the new node is marked with a flag that makes it
so that torn does not consider replanning the goal; any change in plan must come from carol.
Then, the goal having been adopted, the know-description-one operator returns t to the
goal-adopt strategy.
Since a goal was successfully adopted, as explained in section 7.2.5 the goal-adopt strategy
recursively sends itself an applies? message but using the new node instead of the current node
to determine what purpose the partner might have in wanting the current goal to be fulfilled.
In this invocation it determines that carol used the know-three operator and adopts the goal
(know tom section-one). Then in the next invocation it determines that carol used the
route operator and adopts the goal (know tom route). At this point, the recursion stops,
since the goal-adopt strategy can not determine any higher level reason for carol's behaviour.
At the end of the recursion, tom's discourse plan has the following form
open: (know torn route)
open: (know torn section-one)
open: (know torn (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 tll4)))





and his currency pointer rests on the game at the bottom. The goal-adopt strategy finally
returns t to the comprehensive mode.
The comprehensive mode next updates the currency pointer, placing it on the goal (know
tom (describes section-one (between palm-beach-0 t114))). Then it polls the strate¬
gies with the applies? message to determine which one is best in the current situation. Com¬
municate and goal-adopt return nil because the currency pointer is not resting on a dialogue
game or a goal which has been adopted from the partner, and plan returns nil because there
is a failure from which the agent must recover before proceeding. Replan returns nil because
tom has adopted all goals in the current line of work from carol, and tom does not consider
changing any plans which carol has initiated. Repair, however, is applicable in this situation.
When the comprehensive mode sends the applies? message to the repair strategy, repair
looks for any prerequisites to the plan which might have been omitted by retrieving the name of
the operator which was used in constructing the plan and working out what the prerequisites are
but without eliminating any which might have been ignored due to the agents' communicative
posture settings. In this case, repair finds two missing prerequisites, (know tom palm-
beach-0) and (know tom t114). Only the one regarding tl 14 is unfulfilled, and so it
stores it in its register and returns the cost of the repair to the comprehensive mode. The
comprehensive mode then sends it an apply message, since it is the only strategy which is
applicable. The repair strategy then adds the prerequisite to tom's plan tree under the current
node. In addition, it adds a goal that, once the repair is done, carol know that it is done (i.e.,
carol know that tom knows the information that she has been trying to convey). After the
repair, tom's discourse plan has the following structure:
open: (know tom route)
open: (know tom section-one)
open: (know tom (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 tll4)))




unplanned: (know tom tll4)




At this point in the example, we have demonstrated the use of every recovery strategy except
replanning. The remainder of this dialogue can be found in section 8.3.
7.5.2 Replanning
The last section gave a worked example which used all of the different ways of continuing from
the current situation in a dialogue except replanning. For completeness, this section gives an
example in which the route giver, anne, decides to replan early in the dialogue. Anne and
andrew are both agents which use an interpreter which only calls the no-adoption mode
and which both have high risk difference, context articulation, and plan commitment posture
settings and low risk settings for the remaining parameters. When anne is awakened by the chair
program, she follows the same steps that carol followed in the last example in order to adopt
the top level goal (know Andrew route). Then she sends a start message to her interpreter
(no-adoption-interpreter), which begins a loop that continually sends start messages to the
no-adoption mode level operator until that operator returns the value 'swap, indicating that
control should be ceded to andrew so that he can make a required utterance. Anne and andrew
have exactly the same behaviour as carol and torn initially, since even though they choose what
to do differently, there is only one possibility at each of the initial steps. Thus, in exactly the
same way as in the last dialogue, except using the no-adoption mode, anne and andrew have
the following conversation:
anne makes an inform(i) move anne says to andrew: the first section
with content (describes "first of the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp")) andrew says to anne: i do not
andrew makes an inform(r) move understand.
with content not-ok
At this point, andrew's discourse plan has nothing but the completed game in it. In tom's
case, he next used three instances of goal adoption to reconstruct carol's reasons for making
the statement that she did. However, andrew uses the no-adoption mode, which does not
allow him to adopt anne's goals. With no goals to satisfy, andrew has no work to do. His
interpreter, since it is at the top of the discourse plan with no open goals, cedes control to
anne.
When anne is awakened, she finds and interprets the message in her mailbox in the same way
that carol does. At this point her discourse plan has the following structure:
open: (know andrew route)
open: (know andrew section-one)
open: (know andrew (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)))
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executed: (12 inform anne andrew (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0
swamp-0)) not-ok ?varll)
unplanned: (know andrew section-two)
unplanned: (know andrew section-three)
unplanned: (know andrew section-four)
Since the dialogue game is finished, her interpreter updates the currency pointer to the goal
above it and then sends an applies? message to each of the different continuation strategies
in order to determine what to do next. Communicate, goal-adopt, and plan all return
nil, since none of these strategies can be applied in the current situation. Repair constructs
the repair involving the two goals (know andrew palm-beach-O) and (know andrew
swamp-0), records this choice, and returns the cost of the repair (11), all as detailed in the
last example. Replanning is also applicable in this situation, when the replanning mode
receives the applies? message, since the current node is an open goal it gathers together a list
of the open ancestors of the current node (including that node itself) from top to bottom which
are not marked with a special flag indicating that they may not be replanned. Then it works
through this list in order, looking for the best replan to propose to the comprehensive mode.
Anne's first open node, (know andrew route), is marked as not replannable for efficiency
reasons, since she only knows one plan for that goal. Therefore the replan strategy only
investigates possibilities for the other two open nodes. Starting with the goal (know andrew
section-one), it sends the plan? message to each of the domain level operators in turn, asking
them to find their best replan for the node given anne's task planning communicative posture
settings. Replans are found in the same way as original plans, except that an additional check
is done to ensure that the new plan has not been tried before in the same situation7 and the
cost of the lowest cost replan so far is passed to the domain level operators so that they will
not propose any replans which are not improvements.8 In this case, two of the domain level
operators return non-nil values: know-one proposes the plan of asking andrew whether or not
he knows the concept section-one at a cost of 508.2, and know-three proposes the plan of
substituting the description (describes section-one (left-of palm-beach-0)) at a cost of 9.2. Then
the replan strategy broadcasts the applies? message to the domain level operators again using
the goal (know andrew (describes section-one (between palm-beach-0 swamp-0))).
All of the operators return nil since they are not applicable.9 At this point the replan strategy
7A replan is considered not to have been used before if not all of the operations of the replan are already
daughters of the goal which is being replanned.
8This is necessary to avoid register collisions. If the same domain level operator were applicable to two
different goals in the list, and the better replan were found first, it might be overwritten in the operator's
register by the worse replan and lost. However, if the registers were written in a more sensible way, for instance,
by allowing multiple entries in the register keyed on how each was determined, passing the lowest cost so far to
the domain level operators would not be necessary.
9The know-one operator does not apply because it contains a nonrelaxable constraint which says that the
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has exhausted the possible options. Since the lowest cost replan was the one which applied the
know-tliree operator to the goal (know andrew section-one), it stores the name of the
operator and the goal at which the replan would be done in its register and returns the cost,
9.2, to the comprehensive mode.
The comprehensive mode must now choose between repair at a cost of 11 and replanning at
a cost of 9.2. It chooses the lower cost option, and thus sends an apply message to the replan
strategy. This causes the strategy to mark as abandoned all of the nodes involved in the old
plan for the goal node stored in its register (that is, all unfinished nodes below that goal node),
move the currency pointer to that goal node, and send a plan message to the domain level
operator named in its register, know-three. The know-three operator then pushes the new
plan onto the discourse plan at that goal node in exactly the same way as it would do for a
new plan.
At this point anne's decision to replan is complete. The remainder of the dialogue is given in
section 8.6.
7.6 Conclusions
The JAM system improves upon previous methods for incorporating recovery strategies into
planning systems. The major part of the improvement comes from making an estimate of
the amount of effort which the task will require for each of the possible ways of continuing
from the current situation and then always choosing the option which requires the least effort.
As a side effect, replanning can be considered even in situations where no plan failure has
occurred, as sometimes happens in human dialogues. A JAM dialogue in which this occurs is
given in section 8.5. The JAM system also increases flexibility by making decisions about what
recovery strategy to employ via a layered architecture. In this system, recovery strategies are
meta-planning operators which manipulate the domain level operators and plan. In addition,
higher level operators decide which recovery strategy to employ based on both their estimated
costs and different partial orderings of the recovery strategies where no methods for calculating
such costs are available. This arrangement is simple to modify, making it easier to investigate
interactions among the recovery strategies and to simulate a range of human dialogues from
the corpus.
Although the JAM architecture was developed primarily for use in simulation, it may also be
useful for other purposes. Any planner which can operate in an uncertain environment must be
concept which andrew is to learn must be "describable", not a description itself.
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able to invoke recovery strategies sensibly, and so might profitably be built using the layered
architecture described. Moreover, work on recovery strategies and architectures which employ
them could lead to a different approach to planning altogether. In uncertain environments
where executing plans is not "expensive" (e.g., the objects involved are not easily damaged or
are replaceable, and not much effort is needed to restore the world to a state in which a new plan
for the same goal can be attempted), it may be rational for an agent to do minimal planning
in the first instance and rely heavily on recovery strategies to guide it to a solution. In the
human task-oriented dialogues, agents often initially leave out steps of their plans which turn
out to be vital. Presumably they assume that their failures will be recoverable and they think
that they will use less effort overall if they adopt this tactic. It may be that this behaviour will




Output from the JAM System
This chapter comments on a number of different dialogues which can be produced by the
JAM system, all of which come about because of the same piece of information which the
agents do not share. All of the dialogues cover the first section of map A in appendix A.
This chapter consists mostly of annotated output from the simulation. Section 8.1 gives a
dialogue extract in which both agents have low risk communicative posture settings for each
of the implemented parameters (ontology, partner modelling, difference, context articulation,
and plan commitment). To show the difference that the communicative posture settings make,
section 8.2 gives a dialogue extract in which both agents have totally high risk communicative
posture settings. The remaining sections give dialogue extracts which show different ways in
which agents can recover from a plan failure which arises due to a high risk difference setting.
Section 8.3 and section 8.4 give dialogue extracts in which repair is used by the route follower
and the route giver, respectively. Section 8.5 gives a dialogue extract in which the route giver
uses replanning at the lowest level goal to recover from the same failure. Section 8.6 contrasts
two dialogues which differ only in the setting of the plan commitment parameter, which controls
how much lower cost a replan must be in comparison to continuing from the current plan before
the agent will choose to replan. Section 8.7 gives a dialogue extract in which the route follower
begins with the top level goal and thus controls the course of the dialogue except where the
route giver initiates a recovery. Finally, section 8.8 gives two dialogues which the JAM system
can not generate and explains why. The extracts given in this chapter are representative of the
dialogues which the system can generate but do not cover all of the forms of dialogues that
can be generated. Extracts initiated using the "talk" procedure give the route giver the top
level goal of having the partner know how to get around the route. This is the more usual
arrangement in the corpus. Extracts initiated using the "rev-talk" procedure, such as that in
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Figure 8.1: The JAM Dialogue Agents
Role Interpreter Ont.
Posture Settings
Mod. Diff. Con. Com.
mary G comprehensive 0 0 0 0 0
john F comprehensive 0 0 0 0 0
mac G nonreactive 1 1 1 1 1
jack F nonreactive 1 1 1 1 1
carol G comprehensive 0 0 1 1 0
torn F comprehensive 0 0 1 1 0
tim G nonreactive 0 0 1 1 0
doris G no-adoption 0 0 1 1 0
fred F no-adoption 0 0 1 1 0
andrew F nonreactive 0 0 1 1 0
anne G comprehensive 0 0 1 1 1
janet G comprehensive 0 0 0 1 1
section 8.7, give the route follower the top level goal of learning how to get around the route.
Given which agent has the top level goal, the system generates different dialogues depending
on the agents' communicative posture settings and choice of interpreter. The settings for each
of the agents mentioned in this chapter are given in figure 8.1. In the figure, "role" is either G
for a route giver or F for a route follower, indicating which map the agent has. The interpreters
are those given in section 7.4.5. The communicative posture parameters are ontology, partner
modelling, difference, context articulation, and plan commitment, respectively. In addition, one
agent, andrew, has a slightly modified map which does not contain the waterfall to demonstrate
the influence of the plan commitment parameter.
8.1 A Low Risk Dialogue
In the following dialogue, mary and john are both agents with low risk postures for each of the
parameters that is implemented. This makes the agents explicitly open subdialogues about new
topics, choose descriptions which are detailed and are as appropriate for the current partner as
possible, and check the agent's knowledge about objects on the map before using descriptions
which mention them. For this dialogue, mary begins with the goal that john know how to
get around the route and john begins with no goals. First, since mary has a low risk context
articulation setting, she opens the first topic to be discussed:
(talk *mary'" *john*) (talk *mary* *john*)
mary makes an open(i) move mary says to john: i want to talk
with content "first section" about the first section.
john makes an open(r) move john says to mary: ok.
with content ok
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Next, mary chooses a particular description of this section of the route, which she will eventually
realise as "between the palm beach and the swamp". She chooses this description because it
is rated most highly according to the ontology and partner modelling parameters, as described
in section 5.12.1. Since she has a low risk difference posture, she checks first to see whether or
not john has these two map objects:
mary makes a yes-no(i) move mary says to john: do you have the
with content "palm beach" palm beach?
john makes a yes-no(r) move john says to mary: yes.
with content yes mary says to john: do you have the
mary makes a yes-no(i) move swamp?
with content "swamp" john says to mary: no.
john makes a yes-no(r) move
with content no
Here, mary has found a problem with her plan - in order to use the description she has chosen,
she must get john to know about the swamp. She considers herself to have run into a plan
failure at this point; her plan to get to know that john knows about the swamp by asking him
a yes-no question has not worked. Rather than replan her description of the first section of the
route, she decides to replan getting to know that john knows about the swamp, by telling him
a description of it. First she focuses his attention on the swamp:
mary makes an open(i) move mary says to john: i want to talk
with content "swamp" about the swamp.
john makes an open(r) move john says to mary: ok.
with content ok
Then she chooses a description of the swamp which involves the waterfall and the palm beach,
and tries to establish that john has these objects. However, she already knows that john has
the palm beach, so she only needs to ask about the waterfall.
mary makes a yes-no(i) move mary says to john: do you have the
with content "waterfall" waterfall?
john makes a yes-no(r) move john says to mary: yes.
with content yes
At this point, mary knows that john has enough information to understand her description of
the swamp, so she gives it:
mary makes an inform(i) move mary says to john: the swamp is
with content (describes between the waterfall and the palm
"swamp" ("between" beach.
"waterfall" "palm beach")) john says to mary: ok.
john makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
Furthermore, now mary knows that john has enough information to understand her description
of the first section of the route.
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mary makes an inform(i) move mary says io john: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp")) john says to mary: ok.
john makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
At this point, mary and john are done speaking about the first section of the route, and mary
begins again with the second section:
mary makes an open(i) move mary says to john: i want to talk
with content "second about the second section.
section" john says to mary: ok.
john makes an open(r) move mary says to john: do you have the
with content ok cliffs?
mary makes a yes-no(i) move john says to mary: yes.
with content "cliffs"
john makes a yes-no(r) move
with content yes
The dialogue continues until they have completed the task. Note that mary does not initiate
closing games for either the first section or the swamp, even though she explicitly opens dia¬
logues about them. As we noted in section 5.4, opening and closing games are not symmetric.
Opening games inform the partner about the current context and are used by agents with low
risk context articulation settings whenever there is a major context shift, while closing games
are used only when a recovery is complete which is not obvious to both agents and serve to
coordinate the knowledge of the two agents. In this case, mary does not need to close the
subdialogue about the swamp even though she had to replan because she knows that both
john must understand the swamp and john must know that she knows he understands it. This
comes about as a result of the belief propagation rules described in chapter 6; since mary has
firmly established every possible prerequisite to the plan, and because she only knows about
failures that have to do with prerequisites, she knows that john must understand the swamp.
Furthermore, since john has observed the same dialogue as she has, she knows that john must
know that she knows he understands it. Of course, in natural dialogue agents tend not to be
so sure about their beliefs, so they might well explicitly close the topic "just in case". We leave
it to further work to produce such a dialogue, since having a system allow both it and the john
and mary dialogue given would require reasoning about degrees of belief.
8.2 A High Risk Dialogue Without Recovery
In the previous section, we gave a dialogue in which low risk communicative posture yielded
a fairly trouble-free but inefficient dialogue. This section contains a dialogue in which the
agents use high risk postures and encounter a plan failure. However, in this dialogue we have
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handicapped the agents by not providing them with any means of recovering from failures
whatsoever; mac and jack only know how to create the original plan and communicate, and
neither agent tries to recognise the partner's goals. Note that mac chooses a simpler description
of the first section of the route than mary did because mac uses high risk task planning
parameters while mary's parameter settings are entirely low risk.
(talk *mac* *jack*) (talk *mac* *jack*)
mac makes an inform(i) move mac says to jack: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes around the swamp.
section" ("around" jack says to mac: i do not
"swamp")) understand.
jack makes an inform(r) move
with content not-ok
At this point in the dialogue, mac has goals which are not fulfilled but has no strategies which
she can apply to them, so she considers herself to be "stuck". On the other hand, jack has no
goals at all, and so says nothing.
8.3 Repair by the Route Follower
In this dialogue, high risk agents successfully recover from a plan failure. Carol and torn both
know all of the implemented recovery strategies and always adopt each other's goals. This
leads to a dialogue in which torn, the route follower, diagnoses the same problem as occurs
in the dialogue between mac and jack. He goes on to choose the recovery strategy which he
believes is best suited to the situation, in this case repair, and then tells carol that recovery is
complete. This is the same dialogue as was described in detail in section 7.5.
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(talk *carol* *tom*)
carol makes an inform(i) move
with content (describes "first
•section" ("between" "palm
beach" "swamp"))
torn makes an inform(r) move
with content not-ok
torn makes a wh-ask(i) move
with content (describes
"swamp" ?var356)




torn makes a wh-ask(f) move
with content ok




carol makes a close(r) move with
content ok
carol says to torn: the first
section of the route goes
between the palm beach and
the swamp,




torn makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
Because the system does not allow mixed initiative dialogues and because agents always answer
questions put to them, exactly the same dialogue occurs no matter which high risk route giver
is paired with torn. However, the route giver's record of the dialogue will differ depending on
whether or not it adopts tom's goals; in this case carol, who does adopt tom's goals, has a deep
tree representing why the dialogue has taken the course that it has up to the end of the extract
given, as shown in figure 8.2.
Although tim, a high risk agent who knows no recovery strategies, has exactly the same dialogue
with torn, his representation of it does not record why he thought torn initiated the dialogue
games that he did, leaving him with a flat structure except for those things which he planned
himself, as shown in figure 8.3.
As far as tim is concerned, the dialogue games initiated by torn are unrelated to his plan and he
merely places them in the current place in the dialogue history, responds to them, and moves
on.
(talk *carol* Horn*)
carol says to torn: the first section of
the route goes between the palm,
beach and the swamp,
torn says to carol: i do not
understand,
torn says to carol: where is the
swamp?
carol says to torn: the swamp is
between the waterfall and the palm
beach,
torn says to carol: ok.
torn says to carol: i am done talking
about the first section,
carol says to torn: ok.
carol says to torn: the second section
of the route goes between the
waterfall and the cliffs,
torn says to carol: ok.
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Figure 8.2: Carol's Discourse Structure
open: (know torn route)
succeeded: (know torn section-one)
succeeded: (know torn (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)))
executed: (815 inform carol torn
(describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)) not-ok ?var352)
succeeded: (know torn swamp-O)
succeeded: (know torn (describes swamp-O ?var361))
executed: (821 wh-ask torn carol
(describes swamp-O ?var361)
(describes swamp-O
(between waterfall-0 palm-beach-O)) ok)
executed: (826 close torn carol
(describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)) ok ?var365)
open: (know torn section-two)
open: (know torn (describes section-two
(between waterfall-0 cliffs-O)))




unplanned: (know torn section-three)
unplanned: (know torn section-four)
174
Figure 8.3: Tim's Discourse Structure
open: (know torn route)
succeeded: (know torn section-one)
succeeded: (know torn (describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-0)))
executed: (12 inform tim torn
(describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-O)) not-ok ?var21)
executed: (18 wh-ask torn tim
(describes swamp-0 ?var30)
(describes swamp-0
(between waterfall-0 palm-beach-0)) ok)
executed: (19 close torn tim
(describes section-one
(between palm-beach-0 swamp-0)) ok ?var34)
open: (know torn section-two)
open: (know torn (describes section-two
(between waterfall-0 cliffs-0)))
initiated: (28 inform tim torn
(describes section-two
(between waterfall-0 cliffs-O)) ?var35 ?var36)
unplanned: (know torn section-three)
unplanned: (know torn section-four)
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8.4 Repair by the Route Giver
In the previous example, the route follower, torn, was able to initiate recovery from the failure
because he could recognise carol's plan and therefore knew what prerequisites could have failed.
Of course, torn was in a better position to diagnose the error than carol would have been because
the prerequisites had to do with tom's knowledge. If torn had decided not to try to recognise
carol's goal, carol would have been forced to go through all of the prerequisites which her high
risk difference posture had allowed her to skip over, checking that each one holds. Doris and
fred are set up to produce the dialogue that results under these circumstances. Here, both
fred and doris know how to repair and replan, but neither of them adopts the partner's goals,
forcing the agent who originates a plan to initiate any recovery necessary because the plan
fails.
The dialogue begins in exactly the same way as the last example:
(talk *doris* *fred*) (talk *doris* *fred*)
doris makes an inform(i) move doris says to fred: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp")) fred says to doris: i do not
fred makes an inform(r) move understand.
with content not-ok
However, fred passes up his chance to diagnose the failure and returns control to doris, forcing
her to check each of the prerequisites in turn:
doris makes a yes-no(i) move doris says to fred: do you have the
with content "palm beach" palm beach?
fred makes a yes-no(r) move fred says to doris: yes.
with content yes doris says to fred: do you have the
doris makes a yes-no(i) move swamp?
with content "swamp" fred says to doris: no.
fred makes a yes-no(r) move
with content no
At this point doris has found a failure and works to correct it; in the map task dialogues, it
suffices to satisfy prerequisites after the fact, and so she simply sets out to get fred to know
about the swamp.
doris makes an inform(i) move doris says to fred: the swamp is
with content (describes between the waterfall and the palm
"swamp" ("between" beach.
"waterfall" "palm beach")) fred says to doris: ok.
fred makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
Just coincidentally, it was the last prerequisite which turned out to be the one that failed.
If there were more prerequisites to check, doris, who does not make any assumption about
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there being a minimal number of failures, would continue to check the rest. Unlike in the last
dialogue, the agents now move directly to the next section of the route:
doris makes an inform(i) move doris says to fred: the second section
with content (describes of the route goes between the
"second section" ("between" waterfall and the cliffs.
"waterfall" "cliffs")) fred says to doris: ok.
fred makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
Doris does not initiate a closing game to establish mutual understanding of the first section for
the same reason that mary in section 8.1 did not initiate a closing game to establish mutual
understanding of the swamp. Since doris has established every possible prerequisite to the
plan, and because she only knows about failures that have to do with prerequisites she knows
that fred must understand the first section and must know that she knows it. Thus fred and
doris are free to move on to subsequent sections of the route, and the dialogue continues in the
same manner.
8.5 Replanning
All of the high risk examples given so far which have successfully recovered from problems
with information about the first section of the route have used repair as the recovery strategy
because they have had low risk plan commitment settings, which, in the situation which we
are investigating, leads the agent to attempt repair first. In this section, we give a dialogue
in which the route follower does not know any recovery techniques and the route giver, janet,
has a high risk plan commitment setting, causing her to choose replanning instead of repair
even before the entire initial plan has been executed. In the example, janet also has a low risk
difference setting, and so she begins the dialogue by deciding to tell her partner, jack, to go
between the palm beach and the swamp and asking jack about the map objects involved:
(talk *janet* *jack*) (talk *janet* *jack*)
janet makes a yes-no(i) move janet says to jack: do you have the
with content "palm beach" palm beach?
jack makes a yes-no(r) move jack says to janet: yes.
with content yes janet makes janet says to jack: do you have the
a yes-no(i) move with content swamp?
"swamp" jack makes a jack says to janet: no.
yes-no(r) move with content
no
At this point, janet has discovered that her initial plan is not as good as she thought it would
be. Since she has a high risk plan commitment setting, she estimates the cost of repairing her
plan as higher than the cost of trying another plan which doesn't mention the swamp, and so
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she chooses the description "to the left of the palm beach". Of course, since she already knows
that jack has the palm beach, all she needs to execute of her new plan is the informing game:
janet makes an inform(i) move janet says to jack: the first section of
with content (describes "first the route goes to the left of the
section" ("left-of" "palm palm beach.
beach")) jack says to janet: ok.
jack makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
This behaviour is very common in human dialogues where agents use low risk difference settings,
since it involves making use of one's model of the partner in order to come up with a description
that the partner will be able to understand.
8.6 The Influence of Plan Commitment
In the last section, we gave an example of a high risk dialogue in which an agent used replanning
to recover from a failure in the dialogue even before the entire plan had been executed. This
was made possible by a low risk difference setting which gave the agent more information about
the likely success of the main informing game of the plan ahead of time and a low risk plan
commitment setting which made the agent choose to replan rather than repair the existing
plan. Of course, it is perfectly possible for an agent to decide to replan even when it doesn't
know exactly what the problem is; in cases where repair involves the effort of diagnosing the
problem whereas replanning might not, this is a likely scenario. This section contrasts two
dialogues in which the agents are identical except that the route giver in the first has a high
risk plan commitment setting whereas the route giver in the second has a low risk setting.
This makes the agent make different choices about when to replan or repair based on the
estimated cost to complete the task given each strategy. A low risk plan commitment setting
makes agents less likely to replan by making them more pessimistic about the expected cost of
replanning; although all agents believe that replanning does entail some extra cost in terms of
the effort needed to abandon the old plan and adopt the new one, agents who have low risk plan
commitment settings believe that the extra cost is higher than their high risk counterparts. In
both dialogues, the route follower, andrew, does not know any recovery strategies and has a
slightly modified map which omits the waterfall.
In the following dialogue, the route giver, anne, has a high risk plan commitment setting. The
dialogue begins in the usual way, and andrew, since he does not know any recovery strategies,
simply tells anne that he does not understand her statement and leaves her to diagnose the
problem:
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(talk *anne* *andrew*) (talk *anne* *andrew*)
anne makes an inform(i) move anne says to andrew: the first section
with content (describes "first of the route goes between the palm
section" ("between" "palm beach and the swamp.
beach" "swamp")) andrew says to anne: i do not
andrew makes an inform(r) move understand.
with content not-ok
Anne decides that the lowest cost way to finish the task is to try another description without
diagnosing the problem with her old plan:
anne makes an inform (i) move
with content (describes "first
section" ("left-of" "palm
beach"))
andrew makes an inform (r) move
with content ok
In this case, her high risk plan commitment setting "pays off" because her new plan works,
and the agents go on to discuss the next section of the route. In particular, the agents never
discover that the waterfall is not present on both maps.
anne says to andrew: the first section
of the route goes to the left of the
palm beach,
andrew says to anne: ok.
In the next dialogue, the route giver, carol, decides to repair the initial plan because she has a
low risk plan commitment setting. The dialogue begins normally:
(talk *carol* *andrew*)
carol makes an inform(i) move
with content (describes "first
section" ("between" "palm
beach" "swamp"))
andrew makes an inform(r) move
with content not-ok
Next, carol diagnoses the problem by beginr
(talk *carol* *andrew*)
carol says to andrew: the first section
of the route goes between the palm
beach and the swamp,
andrew says to carol: i do not
understand.
a repair:
carol makes a yes-no(i) move
with content "palm beach"
andrew makes a yes-no(r) move
with content yes
carol makes a yes-no(i) move
with content "swamp"
andrew makes a yes-no(r) move
with content no
In this case, carol decides that the cost of telling andrew the location of the swamp is less than
the cost of replanning the entire first section of the route, and so she tells andrew where the
swamp is:
carol says to andrew: do you have the
palm beach?
andrew says to carol: yes.
carol says to andrew: do you have the
swamp?
andrew says to carol: no.




carol says to andrew: the swamp is
between the waterfall and the palm
beach.
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Unfortunately for carol, we have modified andrew's map so that he doesn't have the waterfall,
and so her plan is unsuccessful:
andrew makes an inform(r) move andrew says to carol: i do not
with content not-ok understand.
Carol once again decides not to replan at the top level, but this time she decides to replan the
information about the swamp rather than diagnose what went wrong with her last plan:
carol makes an inform(i) move carol says to andrew: the swamp is to
with content (describes the left of the palm beach.
"swamp" ("left-of" "palm andrew says to carol: ok.
beach"))
andrew makes an inform(r) move
with content ok
Because carol has diagnosed the problem with her plan for getting around the first section
of the route, she knows that andrew has the palm beach on his map and thus chooses the
description "to the left of the palm beach" for her new plan for explaining where the swamp
is. At this point, carol has supplied andrew with enough information to get around the first
section of the route.
8.7 A Dialogue Initiated by the Route Follower
In all of the examples which we have given so far, the route giver has the top level goal of
getting the route follower to know how to follow the route. Since our goal adoption strategy
does not allow an agent to initiate plans for subgoals about which the partner has not already
spoken, this makes the route follower a fairly passive agent that can only initiates dialogue
games when it discovers a plan failure. However, it is also possible to run the system so that
the route follower has the top level goal of getting to know the route and the route giver is
the more passive agent. In the following dialogue, both agents have high risk communicative
posture settings for all implemented parameters, know about both repair and replanning, and
adopt goals wherever possible.
The dialogue begins with torn asking carol for the information he wants:
(rev-talk ""carol* *tom*) (rev-talk *carol* *tom*)
torn makes a wli-ask(i) move torn says to carol: where is the first
with content (describes "first section?
section" ?varl98)
Except for the initial questions about each section of the route which get each dialogue topic
established, the dialogue proceeds in much the same way as the other dialogue between carol
and torn:
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carol makes a wh-ask(r) move
with content (describes "first
section" ("between" "palm
beach" "swamp"))
torn makes a wh-ask(f) move
with content not-ok
torn makes a wh-ask(i) move
with content (describes
"swamp" ?var205)




torn makes a wh-ask(f) move
with content ok




carol makes a close(r) move with
content ok
torn makes a wh-ask(i) move
with content (describes
"second section" ?var215)




torn makes a wh-ask(f) move
with content ok
The full range of dialogues which can be run with the route giver having the top level goal
can also be run with the route follower having the top level goal. These dialogues do not differ
dramatically from the dialogues which we have already given, and so they are not duplicated
here. The major difference is that new propositional content about sections of the route is
requested by the route follower rather than offered by the route giver, leading to each section
being initiated by a wh-question.
8.8 Dialogues JAM Can't Generate
Of course, there are many behaviours which occur in the human corpus that we can not
generate. Most of these are due to not giving the agents a detailed enough representation of
the maps; these deficiencies were discussed in section 5.1. However, there are also at least two
dialogues which we would expect our agents to be able to have and which we still can not
generate. This section gives these dialogues and explains what extensions would have to be
made to the system in order to generate them. The changes to the JAM system which would
carol says to torn: the first section of
the route goes between the palm
beach and the swamp,
torn says to carol: i do not
understand,
torn says to carol: where is the
swamp?
carol says to torn: the swamp is
between the waterfall and the palm
beach,
torn says to carol: ok.
torn says to carol: i am done talking
about the first section,
carol says to torn: ok.
torn says to carol: where is the second
section?
carol says to torn: the second section
of the route goes between the
waterfall and the cliffs,
torn says to carol: ok.
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be required in order to generate the following dialogues are beyond the scope of the current
research, and it is instructive that neither of the dialogues arise naturally from the way in
which the system is built. Dialogues similar to the ones which we can not generate occur in
the human corpus.
The first of the two dialogues is a variation of the dialogues given in section 8.6. In those
dialogues, there are two relevant possible plan failures: the description of the first section of
the route is the first, and the description of the swamp is the second. The difference between
low and high risk plan commitment settings makes one agent replan as soon as the first failure
of the dialogue occurs and the other repair at the first failure and then replan the description
of the swamp at the second failure. In the dialogue which the current system can not generate,
the agent repairs at the first failure and then replans the description of the first section when
it encounters the second failure:
1A: The first section of the route goes between the palm beach and the swamp.
IB: I don't understand.
2A: Do you have the palm beach?
2B: Yes.
3A: Do you have the swamp?
3B: No.
4A: The swamp is between the waterfall and the palm beach.
4B: I don't understand.
5A: The first section of the route goes to the left of the palm beach.
5B: OK.
As we explained in section 7.3, an agent's choice to either repair or replan is governed by a
threshold value which determines how much better than the current plan a replan must be in
order to use it, and this threshold is lower for agents with high risk plan commitment settings
than for agents with low risk ones. The plan commitment parameter also controls at which
level the agent replans; a weighting system tends to make high level replans more desirable
for agents with high risk plan commitment settings, and low level replans more desirable for
agents with low risk plan commitment settings. Thus in section 8.6 anne, a high risk agent,
replans the first section of the route at utterance 2A, whereas carol, a low risk agent, replans
the explanation of the swamp at utterance 5A. It is carol's low risk plan commitment setting
which makes her repair the first section of the route rather than replan it. Since her initial plan
about the swamp (involving a yes-no question) fails, and her plan commitment setting makes
her favour low level replans, she is unable at 5A to abandon her repair in favour of the higher
level replan.
One way to avoid this problem while still allowing the agents to choose a strategy based on
cost would be to create a new communicative posture parameter which allows the replanning
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threshold and the weighting system for high versus low level replans to vary independently.
However, this approach might be too general, since it might be possible that further study of
the human corpus would show that agents decide between low and high level replans in some
systematic way. In this case, more work could be done on the way in which the agents make
cost estimates in order to match the human data.
The second of the two dialogues which we can not generate involves the amount of effort which
the route giver uses when the first problem of the dialogue is encountered. We would expect
our agents to be able to have the following dialogue:
A: The first section of the route goes between the palm beach and the swamp.
B: I don't understand. I don't have a swamp.
Here agent B's behaviour is somewhere between that of jack in section 8.2 and that of torn
in section 8.3, since agent B doesn't just indicate that it doesn't understand but also doesn't
create a plan to repair the failure. Of course, if we take the surface level behaviour "I don't
have a swamp" to mean the same thing as tom's "where's the swamp?", then we can generate
the structure of this dialogue. However, the same surface level of behaviour might mean "I
didn't understand your utterance because I don't have the swamp, and I'm not proposing any
particular way to recover from this failure"; this is the behaviour which we can not generate.
One of the reasons is that the languages which the agents use for planning and communication
(as described in sections 5.6 and 5.4 respectively) are not rich enough to express this infor¬
mation. Implementing the behaviour would also require a change to the way goal adoption
is implemented. Currently agents either adopt the partner's goals entirely or not at all, but
in this behaviour the agent must do some work towards the partner's goal (e.g., diagnosing
the problem) but not all of it. We do not consider the necessary changes to be very difficult
to make, but to do them properly would require more investigation of the human corpus to
determine whether or not this behaviour does occur, and so we have left them to further work.
8.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have commented on a number of dialogues which the JAM system can
produce as well as two which it can not but perhaps should. These dialogues encompass a
whole range of behaviours associated with the human corpus, although, primarily because of
limitations in the way the JAM dialogue agents represent knowledge about the maps, there
are many human behaviours which can not be generated. Further work on the knowledge
representation would allow more behaviours to be implemented, providing useful checks on the
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analysis of the human corpus given in chapters 3 and 4.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Further Work
The Principle of Parsimony states that by and large, agents try to complete tasks with as
little effort as possible [Sha84], This thesis demonstrates that this simple statement of Parsi¬
mony, taken as given, can be used to explain several different aspects of behaviour in human
task-oriented dialogue by showing the effects of Parsimony in a corpus of human task-oriented
dialogues about a map navigation task and by arguing that the analysis extends more generally
to interactive, collaborative problem solving, and then by using the main points of the analysis
to guide simulated conversations between two computer agents within the JAM system. Al¬
though this thesis does not present an argument for Parsimony in its own right or claim that
the categories for which it argues must be psychologically plausible at any meaningful level, it
does argue that the analysis is useful both as an explanation of human behaviour and for the
purposes of building computer dialogue agents. It makes four major contributions: an analysis
of "communicative posture", which is a range of choices in dialogue which can be characterised
by decisions to be either careful or risky about different aspects of communication, an analysis
of "recovery strategies" which allow the participants to recover from failures which have been
brought about due to risky postures, a heuristic model of belief which risks failing to capture
the full meaning of the dialogue in favour of efficiency, and a layered architecture which allows
simulated dialogue agents to choose what actions to take based on the Principle of Parsimony.
Despite the fact that our four major contributions suffice for demonstrating the central thesis,
there is still a great deal of interesting work which could be done in its support. This work
divides into further work on empirical evidence, communicative postures, dialogue interaction,
recovery strategies, the model of belief, and the layered architecture.
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9.1 Further Work on Empirical Evidence
The map task works within a fairly limited and unnatural domain; although we are confident
that the analysis of both the communicative postures and the recovery strategies will transfer to
other domains, it would still be instructive to try them. However, even within the map domain
there are a number of things which we could have changed about the task that would provide
an interesting contrast to the existing data, both in terms of problems which we encountered
with the experimental design and which may have affected the corpus and variations which
would show up different aspects of communicative posture.
The way in which the task is set up allows an ambiguity of viewpoint for the task participants;
most of the agents act as if they are pretending to walk along the route, but others act as
if they are drawing the route on the map itself. The former makes analysis simpler because
it restricts the kinds of referring expressions and descriptions that agents can construct; for
instance, reusing part of an example from chapter 3, the drawing viewpoint allows descriptions
such as:
MAP 10
L: my crashed plane is ABOVE + it's in the BASE of the quadrant + top right
hand imaginary quadrant of the + erm + picture
There is a bewildering amount of choice available if the drawing viewpoint is taken, and since
there is enough interesting behaviour which is produced by agents who use the role-playing
viewpoint, it would be useful for task to be limited to it. However, some of the maps themselves
are constructed in a way that favours the drawing viewpoint.1 For instance, on map two, found
in appendix A, the route very clearly swerves around an object which does not appear on the
route giver's map but which does on the route follower's (the old well). Since the "explorer"
drawing the route giver's map presumably would not have marked the route as going around
an object but not have marked the object itself, this may lead agents to take the drawing
viewpoint. This is especially the case where they do not discover that the partner has an
object exactly where the route swerves (through a very high risk difference setting) before the
route giver describes that section of the route, since, if the route giver has no object on which
to base the description, he or she has little choice but to fall back on the drawing viewpoint.
We believe that this flaw in the maps may introduce unnecessary confusion into the corpus.
One way of forcing the agents into a role-playing viewpoint would be to vary the scale, origin,
and orientation of the two maps, so that descriptions from the drawing viewpoint do not work.
1 We assume that this is accidental, since the instructions for the t ask seem to favour the role-playing
viewpoint.
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Further work would be required to handle these changes in such a way that the cognitive load
on the agents would not become too great.
There are also a number of changes to the experiment which would make an interesting contrast
to the present analysis by way of testing individual communicative posture parameters. The
specification and description resolution parameters could be more thoroughly tested by running
experiments which make building referring expressions more difficult; for instance, the labels
on the maps could be removed so that there is no default way of describing each of the map
features, and more features which are semantically related could be included on the same
map. The two focusing parameters could be investigated by looking at maps where the route is
unexpected (such as in the map, given in appendix A, with east and west lake) and by including
features with the same label but in totally different areas (such as in the castle map, which has
two woods). Other changes would highlight other communicative posture parameters.
9.2 Further Work on Communicative Posture
It is obvious that it would be possible to improve our definition of communicative posture by
carrying out a more complete analysis and to improve the JAM simulation by implementing
more of the parameters and by extending the current implementations. However, the most
pressing extension stems from the fact that in the JAM system, an agent's communicative
posture is held constant for the duration of a dialogue. This is the most important way in
which the simulation fails to match the dialogues in the corpus; human agents seem to be
able to adapt their communicative postures based on what actions the partner has taken and
how well they have fared in the dialogue so far. Thus JAM simulates limited segments of
dialogue from the human corpus, but cannot simulate an agent's behaviour throughout an
entire dialogue.
It seems likely that there are a number of relationships among the parameters settings which
agents will wish to establish and maintain as they vary their communicative postures. The
strongest of these occurs between an agent's difference and partner modelling parameters.
It seems counter-intuitive for any agent to have a low risk difference setting, thus gathering
information about the partner's knowledge, and a high risk partner modelling setting, which
in effect throws away any information which is known. In addition, it seems likely that agents
will move some pairs of parameters together simply because they help to provide the same
level of detail in the dialogue. For instance, an agent might prefer to keep focus and context
articulation at the same level, as well as focus and context resolution. These relationships
among an agent's own parameters help make the agent appear consistent to the partner.
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Besides maintaining relationships among their own parameter settings, agents might "balance"
their settings against those of the partner for the sake of efficiency. For instance, if one agent
has a low risk focus resolution setting, then there is no sense in the partner using low risk focus
articulation, since the first agent will interrupt if it doesn't understand a focus shift. This kind
of symmetry occurs for all of the parameters which occur in pairs, one for the explainer and
one for the explainee. Finally, Simon Garrod (personal communication) is developing a theory
of "focus systems" by which agents tend to mimic the decisions of their partners, using, for
instance, the same kinds of referring expressions, complexity of descriptions, and so on. This
helps make the agent more likely to be understood, since they know they are constructing
utterances along the same lines as those of the partner. Much further work must be done in
order to determine ways of varying the parameter settings which simulate behaviours in the
human corpus and then to implement the variations in a working system using, for instance,
game-theoretic techniques.
In addition to extending the treatment of communicative posture within dialogue, further
work could be done on developing an analogous notion which applies to other types of human
planning as well. Since, as we found in chapter 4, agents use recovery strategies during non-
collaborative activities as well as during collaborative ones, it seems likely that we could devise
a similar parameter system for non-collaborative planning domains. For instance, if an agent's
plan to unlock a door fails, it might check a number of prerequisites of that plan: is it using the
correct key? Is the key bent? Is the key inserted all the way into the lock? The fact that the
agent may be able to repair the plan by discovering that any of these prerequisites is unfulfilled
suggests that some high risk behaviour caused it not to check those prerequisites in the first
place.
9.3 Further Work on Recovery Strategies
The recovery strategies used by the JAM system are only implemented very simply; these
implementations could easily be improved. For instance, our implementation of goal adoption
reconstructs only half of Allen's process for plan recognition 2.4.2. In addition, our replan
operator is very inefficient in that it reconstructs from scratch a list of possible plans which
should already be available from the plan operator in the form of a list of rejected plans. All
of the recovery strategy implementations could be improved with further work; although this
work is not necessary for proving the point of this thesis, it would be useful for future systems
which were to use the recovery strategies.
A more pressing improvement of the recovery strategies involves widening the analysis and
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associating it more closely with high risk communicative posture. There should be recovery
strategies to handle all of the different ways in which high risk postures can introduce failures
into the dialogue; we have identified some of the correspondences (for instance, that failures due
to high risk difference are usually handled using repair, and that elaboration and omission work
specifically for problems due to high risk ontology) but a more thorough analysis is in order.
In addition, there are several suggestions for recovery strategies in the literature which are not
handled in the present analysis. For instance, Cohen [Coh81] suggests that subdialogues which
clarify referential miscommunication usually "downshift" into "low gear" by having the same
form as the dialogues which they interrupt but a carefully thought out amount of detail. This
strategy is related to both elaboration and repair, but isn't clearly either. Goodman [G0086]
presents a taxonomy of referential misunderstandings and some strategies which human agents
use to recover from them; these strategies are primarily more specific forms of elaboration and
omission. A wider analysis of the recovery strategies would match the high risk communicative
postures better as well as relating to more of the strategies which have been suggested elsewhere.
9.4 Further Work on the Dialogue Interaction
JAM's top level control structure has one serious disadvantage: it can not be used for dialogues
with more than two agents. We have shown in section 5.4 that for two-agent dialogues, the
control fits the Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson [SSJ78] model of turn-taking; further work is
needed to develop an arrangement for more agents which still gets the turn-taking correct. The
main difficulty in devising a workable scheme will be that it will require some way of simulating
simultaneous thought for the agents in order to give all non-speakers an equal chance to take
over the turn at transition relevance points where the current speaker has not selected who
is to speak next. Such a scheme would also benefit the two-agent dialogues because it would
allow the initiative to be taken by whichever agent comes up with something to say first.
Our dialogue interaction would also be improved by using a version of dialogue games which
is better attuned to the map task. Kowtko et al. [KID91] have developed a set of dialogue
games which are specifically designed to match the structures which are present in the human
map task corpus; she has found that there are much longer sequences of moves which tend
to occur together than is suggested by the current two and three move games, and using her
games would help make the simulated dialogues match behaviour in the corpus more closely
over longer segments of text. In addition, the games which are available to the agents should
be expanded so that agents can refuse to continue a game at any point. This could be done
by allowing not just positive and negative moves, but also refusal moves which immediately
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terminate the game. Refusal moves would allow the agents to interrupt each other, further
improving the ability of agents to take the initiative from their partners.
Finally, further work on a flexible mapping between dialogue moves and surface level behaviours
would provide better support for our claim that at the dialogue game level, we can best sim¬
ulate the human dialogues by having agents generate all the moves which are necessary for
completion of a game, even if at the surface level several moves are realised in one utterance
or in non-linguistic behaviour such as nods and eye movement. Our claim that all of the dia¬
logue moves exist in the structure no matter how they are realised is important to the belief
model, since it requires all moves to be present in order to update beliefs correctly. Research
which actually constructed a mapping would not only strengthen our claim that our simulated
dialogues are similar to the corpus dialogues in the relevant ways, but would also shed light
on important issues such as the role of coordination and non-linguistic behaviours in dialogue.
Some important groundwork for this mapping will be done in the projects described in section
9.7, since both of these projects involve extending the JAM system so that it can produce
natural language with a variety of syntactic constructions.
9.5 Further Work on the Model of Belief
There are two very obvious improvements which could be made to the model of belief. The first
is to implement the more general interface described in chapter 6; this would not be difficult
but it has not been done. The second is to implement the two-process model which is described
rather than just the heuristic state transition process. We have sketched an algorithm for the
interface between the two processes in section 6.6. Implementing the hybrid model would make
it possible to experiment with under what circumstances the system should use each of the
halves and would be a first step towards building a closer simulation of human belief modelling
in a domain which has a deeper inference structure than the map task. The next step would be
to build a compiler that could take the theorem proving half of the model and automatically
create the heuristic mechanism, either before the beginning of a dialogue, or, more interestingly,
as the dialogue progresses. Such a compiler could be motivated on a number of grounds. First
of all, it would make the model more accessible for future dialogue systems, since compiling
the model by hand is tedious. Second, it would investigate the difference between the heuristic
mechanism as a computer program and the theorem prover as an executable specification, in
software engineering terms. Third, it would provide an instance of a hybrid architecture in
which the communication is different from the standard arrangements; usually a number of
conscious rules control the use of a fast, subconscious process or a subconscious process control
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the firing of a number of conscious rules, but in the proposed architecture, the subconscious
mechanism would work wherever possible and only switch to the conscious process where
necessary. Finally, it can be used as an analogy for how one learns to engage in dialogue in
terms of human memory processes, and might be relevant to the discussion about the differences
between competence and performance.
None of this further work would substantially change the basic mechanism behind the heuristic
belief model. However, it would also be interesting to see how far one could push the anal¬
ogy between the heuristic belief process and what happens in human memory. The heuristic
mechanism is an agglomerative process, as Stenning [Ste91a] suggests human memory updating
is, and it avoids the kind of variable rebinding that he claims is difficult for human memory
[Ste91b]. It would be interesting to see if there are other variables which remain within the
heuristic process which should also be "compiled out" or other changes to the belief process
which will make it conform more closely to Stenning's theories about human memory updating;
such work would be likely to be beneficial to work in memory as well as work in belief mod¬
elling, since it could be used to test some of the assumptions about computation in Stenning's
theories. Another interesting extension would be to build a planner which reasons backwards
from the goal state in the finite state mechanism (i.e., that state which most closely represents
mutual belief) in order to decide what action to take next in the dialogue. Currently the plan
operators and the finite state belief mechanism contain redundant information, and exploring
how far the belief mechanism is reversible might point out interesting changes which could be
made to it as well as developing a fast heuristic method of planning.
9.6 Further Work on the Layered Architecture
The layered architecture would benefit from being rewritten with a richer planning language
so that the domain level operator schemas are easier to read and write. In addition, the com¬
munication between the layers could be improved by implementing a proper message passing
system; for instance, the current broadcast facility requires a layer to have access to the names
of all of the operators at the layer below, making the system more difficult to modify than it
needs to be. Beyond this rational reconstruction, the layered architecture could be improved
by making the planning operators more declarative. One motivation for building the layered
architecture in the first place was that we noticed that the repair strategy as it is currently
implemented can be represented in terms which are not very different from the representation
of the schematic component of a domain level operator. One constraint for attempting repair
is that the agent must be working on the goal to be repaired and that goal must have failed; in
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our planning operator language, if the planning agent is ?A and the desired effect of the repair
is the goal ?G, this can be represented as
(and (eq (g-node-goal (agent-dm ?A)) ?G)
(eq (node-status (agent-dm ?A)) 'failed))
The other constraint is that one of the plan's prerequisites must have failed; if we imagine that
the function "op-used" picks out the domain level operator which was used to plan the current
goal (which can be read directly off the plan tree), the function "op-prereqs" picks out the
prerequisites of an operator, and the function "failed?" tests whether or not a goal is satisfied,
then we might construct a list of failed prerequisites as follows2:
(forall ?P in (op-prereqs (op-used (agent-dm ?A)))
(if (and (typep ?P 'goal)
(failed? ?P))
?P)))
Thus the operations list of the repair is just this list of failed prerequisites, and the second
constraint is that this list not be empty. We think that it is probably possible to rewrite
at least the strategy level operators to match the language of the domain level schemas, and
that such a move would increase the elegance of the system as well as providing an interesting
relationship to, for instance, past work on Prolog meta-interpreters.
Finally, in addition to changes to the style of layering, the architecture could be improved by
exploiting a natural division of the domain level operators into subsets which correspond to
the different types of planning used to group the communicative posture parameters in chapter
3. By and large when an agent builds a plan for a section of the route, it works through the
groups of operators in order, first planning the task, second setting up the discourse structure,
and finally realising the utterance. Thus it would make sense for the planner to decide which
group of operators to consider first based on the current context rather than doing a brute
force search as in the current system. Of course, the difference would become more important
in a version of the system which had more than the seven domain level operators used by the
current system. In a large system, control of the domain level operators might be an interesting
problem in its own right; for instance, work by Gerlach and Horacek [GH89] describes a way of
grouping inference rules (or plans in which the action may be empty) which describe dialogue
so that they can be applied more efficiently.
2 Just as with our current implementation of repair, this definition only works if goals add up monotonically,
so that a fulfilled goal never becomes unfulfilled later on in the execution of the plan.
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9.7 Other Further Work
In addition to the further work described above which supports the core ideas of the thesis,
the JAM simulation is useful as support for research in other areas, since it generates a variety
of dialogues with different structures from which specific aspects of dialogue can be explored.
In this section, we describe two projects which will extend the JAM system in an investigation
of other research areas.
The first is an ESRC supported project entitled "Pragmatic Factors in the Intonation of Syn-
thesised Spoken Dialogue"; it is led by Bob Ladd at the Linguistics Department of Edinburgh
University. Its goal is to build a computational model of the interaction between pragmatic
factors of dialogue (such as shared knowledge, discourse structure, and speech act types) and
features of intonation (such as pitch accent, phrase accent, boundary tones, and pitch range).
Part of the research will involve extending the JAM system by adding a simple natural language
generator and a model of intonation which takes into account pragmatic factors.
The second is a Joint Councils Initiative supported project entitled "Natural Language Gen¬
eration under Time Constraints"; it is led by Stephen Isard at the Human Communication
Research Centre of Edinburgh University. Its goal is to characterise human behaviour during
language production under time constraints which do not allow fully grammatical utterances
to be produced. Part of the research will involve adding a natural language generator to the
JAM system which, when pressed for time, will produce the same kinds of false starts and
self-corrections that occur in the human map task dialogues.
9.8 Conclusions
This thesis demonstrates that a naive version of the Principle of Parsimony can explain, at least
at a superficial level, several different aspects of human behaviour during task-oriented dialogue,
and that making a computer dialogue agent act parsimoniously results in dialogues with more
natural structures. It divides into two parts: an analysis of a human corpus of dialogues about a
map navigation task, which demonstrates how Parsimony affects the structure of the dialogues,
and the development of a computer system, JAM, which demonstrates that the main points of
the analysis can be incorporated into a working simulation of the human data. This thesis has
made four major contributions: two concerning the analysis of the corpus and two concerning
the development of the JAM system.
The first major contribution is an analysis of a number of aspects of task-oriented dialogue
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along which agents must make decisions which can be characterised by "risk"; agents can either
risk successful completion of the current goal on the current attempt, taking the chance that
recovery from a failure will be needed, or expend extra effort in order to make the current
attempt more likely to succeed. According to the Principle of Parsimony, agents will make
whatever choices they believe will lead to completion of the task with the least amount of
effort overall. We identify twelve different aspects of the dialogue for which choice is governed
by Parsimony, and, following Shadbolt [Sha84], we term them "communicative posture param¬
eters". Although most of our examples come from a map navigation domain, we argue that
our analysis applies more generally to interactive, collaborative problem-solving.
The second major contribution is an analysis of recovery strategies which agents can use in
order to recover from plan failures that have been caused by choosing high risk communicative
posture settings. We identify nine recovery strategies in all, some of which are actions which an
agent can take in order to recovery directly from a failure and others of which only contribute
indirectly to the solution of the problem. In addition, some of the recovery strategies apply
generally in all planning domains, while others work specifically in collaborative domains where
communication is necessary. The first and second contributions together demonstrate how the
Principle of Parsimony affects the style of the dialogue interaction, and especially shows that
one of the things which makes human dialogue seem more natural than that generated by
computer systems is that the human agents tend to take quite substantial risks and rely on the
robust nature of dialogue in order to recover from any subsequent failures.
The third major contribution is a model of belief which risks failing to capture the meaning of
a dialogue fully by choosing to operate more efficiently but less precisely than previous models
of belief. Previous models have used theorem provers on knowledge bases of beliefs and typical
inference rules in order to derive all beliefs which are logical conclusions of the base set of
beliefs. They have the disadvantage that they are too powerful as a model of what humans
ordinarily conclude; humans can sometimes work out all of the logical conclusions of a set of
beliefs with a vast amount of effort by using theorem proving, but they more often reason
incompletely and use much less effort. Some techniques have been developed for limiting the
power of the logical approaches, but at the expense of the elegance of the approach. Our own
model of belief operates heuristically by failing to make some kinds of inferences in order to
simulate the results of ordinary human belief modelling better than the previous models. We
also describe how it could be integrated with a theorem proving approach in order to allow the
agent to use the heuristic approach whenever possible but do more complete reasoning when
that is required.
The fourth major contribution is a system architecture which allows agents to always choose
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what actions to take in the dialogue based on the amount of effort which remains in order to
complete the entire task. This architecture treats all possible ways of continuing from a point
in the dialogue uniformly and includes a representative sample of the recovery strategies from
the analysis: planning, communicating, adopting the partner's goals, replanning, and repair.
Previous systems have only implemented one recovery strategy at a time or have had very rigid
ways of choosing which one of the recovery strategies to attempt. The JAM architecture allows
the choice to be made more flexibly. In addition, the construction of the system allows changes
to the way in which the agent decides upon its actions to be made easily, making it simple
to vary the simulation and investigate the effects of different dialogue strategies. The JAM
architecture is useful not just for simulating task-oriented dialogue but also more generally for
systems in which there are a number of different ways to continue from each decision point
and there is a principled way in which to make the choice. The third and fourth contributions
combine to demonstrate that Parsimony can be used in a working system in order to more
accurately simulate the human dialogues.
These four contributions demonstrate the central thesis that many decisions in human task-
oriented dialogues can be characterised in terms of minimising the total amount of effort spent
on completing the task, and that if a computer system is constructed which also minimises
effort, the resulting dialogue will simulate the human dialogues more closely as well as seem





This appendix contains the instructions for the map task and the maps which
accompany the example dialogues given in the thesis, with the route giver's map
on the left and the route follower's map on the right. Where we give examples
from only one set of agents for a pair of maps, we show the route which the
route follower has drawn. For maps 9 and 10, which were from the early trials
used by Shadbolt, there were several pairs of agents using the same maps and
we do not give the routes which were drawn.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MAP TASK
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE ROUTE DESCRIBER
(A)
YOU AND YOUR PARTNER HAVE BOTH GOT A MAP
OF THE SAME PLACE. YOU'VE GOT A ROUTE
MARKED ON YOUR MAP. ITS THE ONLY SAFE
ROUTE THROUGH ALL THE DANGERS. YOUR
PARTNER HASN'T GOT A ROUTE MARKED ON THEIR
MAP. YOUR JOB IS TO DESCRIBE THE ROUTE TO
YOUR PARTNER SO THAT HE/SHE CAN MARK IT ON
THEIR MAP. YOU HAVE TO DESCRI3E IT
EXACTLY BECAUSE ITS THE ONLY SAFE ROUTE.
THE MAPS HAVE BEEN DRAWN BY DIFFERENT
EXPLORERS, SO THEY MIGHT NOT BE BOTH THE
SAME. THERE COULD BE SOME DIFFERENCES.
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE ROUTE DRAWER (B)
YOU AND YOUR PARTNER HAVE BOTH GOT A MAP
OF THE SAME PLACE. HE/SHE HAS GOT A ROUTE
MARKED ON HIS/HER MAP YOUR JOB IS TO
FINISH UP WITH THAT ROUTE MARKED ON YOUR
MAP. LISTEN TO WHAT HE/SHE SAYS AND ASK
HIM/HER ANY QUESTIONS YOU WANT. YOU MUST
DRAW IT EXACTLY. ITS THE ONLY SAFE. ROUTE.
THE MAPS HAVE BEEN DRAWN BY DIFFERENT
EXPLORERS SO THEY MIGHT NOT BE THE SAME,







































































Let a be the number of agents, g be the number of degrees of acquaintance, and n be the
number of nesting levels. Suppose that every degree of acquaintance is accessible to every
agent.1 Furthermore, suppose that the representing agent does not wish to represent any
agent's view of its own beliefs.2 Let 5c (n) be a recurrence relation on n which specifies the
total number of belief states that will be needed to represent certain knowledge up to n levels
of nesting. Then
Sc(0) = 9,
since g is the number of degrees of acquaintance which any agent can hold with respect to
the predicate or object. Furthermore, for all n > 0, 5c(n) is the number of states needed to
represent dialogue up to n — 1 levels of nesting times the number of different positions the agent
can take for the nth level of nesting. Any beliefs at the nth level of nesting must have the form
ao thinks ou thinks ... thinks an has 7 acquaintance with the predicate or object,
where there are g choices for 7. Since we are representing the views of a particular agent, c*o
must be that agent. Moreover, for all i > 0, a; must not be the same agent as a,_i. Therefore,
1This assumption just means that there are no degrees like "unaware" which agents cannot ascribe to
themselves or agents who are in some way defective, so that they can hold any of the degrees of acquaintance
with respect to any predicate or object.
2For example, we don't want to represent what A thinks of A's degree of acquaintance or what A thinks B
thinks of B's degree of acquaintance. We assume that, for the purposes of most domains, an axiomatisation
of belief which includes something like Believes(A,Believes(A,P)) +-► Believes(A,P) is appropriate. A similar
argument can be constructed without this constraint.
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working from left to right, there are a — 1 choices for each of the n remaining slots: a choices
minus the one which was used in the slot before. Therefore, for all n > 0,
Sc(n) = Sc(n - 1 )g(a - 1)".
Eliminating the recurrence,
5c = 9n+1(a- 1)§"("+1).
Similarly, let Se be the number of states needed to represent only the certain beliefs plus one
value for uncertainty at every nesting level. Then adding uncertainty is just like adding one
more degree of acquaintance for all but the zeroeth level of nesting, and
SE=g(g + l)n(a-l)^n+1\
The calculation of Su is somewhat more complicated. Let Su(n) be a recurrence relation on
n specifying the number of states necessary to distinguish among all of the different kinds of
uncertainty which can occur up to n levels of nesting. Then Sr/(0) = Sc (0) = g, since one
cannot be uncertain about one's own degree of acquaintance. Moreover, using an argument
similar to that for the calculation of Sc,
Su{n) = Su(n — l)(a — l)nU(n)
for all n > 0, where U{n) is the number of different positions (including uncertain ones) the
agent might take with regard to a belief at the nth level of nesting. Consider f/(l). Let 7
be the set of certain positions the agent might take (i.e., the set of degrees of acquaintance);
then | 7 |= g. But the agent might be unable to choose between these degrees of acquaintance
in any possible way except that the agent must venture some opinion, even if that opinion is
that any one of the positions might hold. Therefore the set of all possible positions, certain
and uncertain, is the power set of gamma minus the empty set, and so the number of possible
positions is 29 — 1. Therefore 17(1) = 2s — 1. But at any level of nesting beyond the first one,
the set of all possible positions is the power set of the positions at the level before minus the
empty set. Therefore for all n > 1,




and for all n > 0,
Su(n) = Su(n — l)(a — l)"U(n),
where U(n) is the number of different positions the agent might take with regard to a belief at
the nth level of nesting.
U( 1) = 2s - 1,
and for all n > 1,
f/(n) = — 1.
Simplifying in the same way as for Sc, when n = 0, Su = 9, and for n > 0,
n
Su = ff(a — 1)Wn+1> JJ tf(n),
»= 1
where U(l) = 29 — 1 and for n > 1,
U(n) = 2y(""1) - 1.
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Appendix C
The Belief Model for the
Simulation
This appendix gives the state transition network in tabular form for the implemented eighteen
state belief model described in section 6.7. The states are numbered as follows:
1. The self is aware of the concept, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and is uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with
regard to the concept.
2. The self is aware of the concept, thinks the partner is aware of the concept, and is
uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with regard to the concept.
3. The self is aware of the concept, thinks the partner holds the concept vivid, and is
uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with regard to the concept.
4. The self holds the concept vivid, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and is uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with
regard to the concept.
5. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks the partner is aware of the concept, and is
uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with regard to the concept.
6. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks the partner holds the concept vivid, and is
uncertain about what the partner thinks the self's position is with regard to the concept.
7. The self is aware of the concept, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
8. The self is aware of the concept, thinks that the partner is aware of the concept, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
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9. The self is aware of the concept, thinks that the partner holds the concept vivid, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
10. The self holds the concept vivid, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
11. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks that the partner is aware of the concept, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
12. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks that the partner holds the concept vivid, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self is aware of the concept.
13. The self is aware of the concept, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
14. The self is aware of the concept, thinks that the partner is aware of the concept, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
15. The self is aware of the concept, thinks that the partner holds the concept vivid, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
16. The self holds the concept vivid, is uncertain about the partner's position with regard to
the concept, and thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
17. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks that the partner is aware of the concept, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
18. The self holds the concept vivid, thinks that the partner holds the concept vivid, and
thinks that the partner thinks that the self holds the concept vivid.
This state numbering system is summarised in figure C.l.
Figure C.l: The States for JAM Agents
E is E is
E thinks II is aware vivid E thinks II thinks E is
uncertain 1 4 uncertain
aware 2 5 uncertain
vivid 3 6 uncertain
uncertain 7 10 aware
aware 8 11 aware
vivid 9 12 aware
uncertain 13 16 vivid
aware 14 17 vivid
vivid 15 18 vivid
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Figure C.2: The State Transition Table for JAM Agents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
E : Wj 7 X 9 X X X 7 X 9 X X X 7 X 9 X X X
E : WRP X X X X 16 X X X X X X X X X X X 16 X
E : PV™ X 8 X X X X X X X X X X X 8 X X X X
E : WFP X X X X X 18 X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : WFN X X 9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : h X X X 16 16 X X X X 16 16 X X X X 16 16 X
E : Irp X X X X X 18 X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : irn X X 9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : Yj 1 1 1 4 4 4 7 7 7 10 10 10 13 13 13 16 16 16
E : Yrp X X X 16 17 18 X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : Yrn 7 8 9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : Ot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
E : Orp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
E : Orpj X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
E : Cj X X X X X 18 X X X X X 18 X X X X X 18
E : Crp X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
E : Crpj X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 9 X X X
n : Wr 2 2 2 5 5 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 14 14 14 17 17 17
n : WRP X X X X X X 3V6 X 3V6 X X X X X X X X X
n : WRN X X X X X X 8 X 8 X X X X X X X X X
n : Wpp J. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18 X X
n : WFN X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17 X X
n: h 3V6 3V6 3V6 6 6 6 3V6 3V6 3V6 6 6 6 3V6 3V6 3V6 6 6 6
n : Irp X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18 X X
n : Irm X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17 X X
n : Yj 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
n : Yrp 3 X X 6 X X 9 X X 12 X X 15 X X 18 X X
n: Yrn 2 X X 5 X X 8 X X 11 X X 14 X X 17 X X
n : O/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
n : Orp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
n : Orh X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
n : C/ 15 15 15 18 18 18 15 15 15 18 18 18 15 15 15 18 18 18
n : Crp X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 18
n : Crn X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 17
Given these meanings for the state numbers, figure C.2 gives the state transitions used by the
agents of the JAM system. The left hand column gives the move and the column headings
give the initial state. Where the entry in the table is a number, then the state transition takes
the agent to that state. If the entry in the table is u(3), then the move is being made by the
partner and involves new propositional content. The state transition takes the agent to state
3 if the agent does not have vivid all of the concepts which combine to form the proposition
and to state 6 otherwise.
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Appendix D
How the Belief Model is
Implemented
The belief model is used in two ways, as described in section 6.2: it handles updating the beliefs
of the agent based on utterances that the agent has made or heard, and it allows the agent to
query it about its own beliefs.
D.l How Belief Updating is Implemented
Calculating the belief state update for the central concept of a dialogue game involves de¬
termining the old state of the concept, looking up the corresponding transition in the state
transition table, and storing the new state for the concept. This is implemented in an inefficient
but very simple-minded way. Concepts are data structures which contain names, states, a list
of referring expressions, the type of node which they are in the concept network (AND, OR,
or PRIMITIVE), a list of pointers to parent concepts, and a list of pointers to child concepts.
This network of concepts can be indexed in two ways: a hash table indexes the concepts by
their names, and a list of pointers to each concept allows the network to be searched by refer¬
ring expression. Of course, it would be more efficient to write the referring expression index
as a second hash table or as a trie (a tree in which every node has twenty-six ordered children
and in which entries keyed on alphabetic identifiers can be found by reading the identifiers
vertically down the branches [Sed88]); this change would be simple to implement. Once the
concept itself has been found, finding the state is just a matter of looking for the appropriate
slot in the concept data structure.
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In addition to having a concept network, each agent also has a discrimination tree which
implements its state transition network. When the agent wishes to update its beliefs based
on a particular move in the dialogue, it traverses the levels of the tree to find the new state
at one of the leaves. Starting from the top node, the agent chooses the child labelled with
the dialogue game of the move for which it is computing an update. It then chooses the child
of that node corresponding to the type of move (initiation, response, or feedback), the child
of that node corresponding to whether the self or the partner made the move, and the child
of that node corresponding to the old state of the concept. All levels of the tree except the
bottom one are implemented using two element list structures where the first element is the
key and the second element is a list of the child nodes. We exploit the fact that the states
are numbered sequentially and omit the keys at the bottom level, indexing the old state of the
concept by position in the list. The leaf of the tree that is reached usually contains the number
of the state which the concept is in after the agent hears the dialogue move. However, in the
cases where the transition network has two arcs with the same label leaving the same state, the
leaf node contains a code which triggers a procedure that the agent uses to decide between the
two possibilities. In the case of the belief model implemented in the dialogue system, code U1
triggers a procedure that chooses state 6 if the agent "understands" the propositional content
of the move (i.e., if all of the concepts involved are vivid for it) and state 3 otherwise. Once
the new state is found using this structure, it is stored in the appropriate slot of the concept.
So far we have explained how the belief update for the central concept is computed; we still
have to explain how belief propagation is implemented in line with the set of rules given in
section 6.7. The most simple-minded implementation of the set of rules would be to apply the
entire set of them in whatever order is convenient to the central concept of the dialogue move,
keeping a list of the parents and children that change. Then it would suffice to work down
the list recursively. This procedure will terminate as long as all rules only change the states of
surrounding nodes so that either the dimension of the state corresponding to the self's beliefs
or the dimension of the state corresponding to the partner's beliefs is the same as that of the
node from which the change is propagated. For instance, this does not allow a rule such as
"if a node becomes vivid to the partner, mark all parents as not vivid to the partner". This
condition guarantees that for each node in the network, the state will never change more than
a finite number of times.
The simulation doesn't use the most simple-minded implementation. Instead, the rules are
coded into a three-phase procedure; first it calculates changes to the self's beliefs, then it
calculates changes to the partner's beliefs, and finally it calculates changes to what the partner
believes about the self's beliefs. First it computes a combination of rules 1 and 2 for the
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self's beliefs working up through parents recursively until no changes occur. Then it works
on the partner's beliefs. It computes a combination of rules 1 and 2 for the partner's beliefs
in the same way as it did for the self. Then it computes rules 3, 4, and 5 for the central
node, completing the computation of changes to the partner's beliefs. Then it computes a
combination of rules 6 and 7 for the partner's beliefs about the self in the same way as it did
for rules 1 and 2. Finally, it computes the results of rule 8. This procedure is more efficient
than the simple-minded implementation, but it relies on the fact that the concept network is
a strict AND/OR tree (i.e., that no node has a parent or child of the same type) and on the
forms of these particular rules, especially the fact that each operates on only one of the nesting
levels represented, to pick out exactly where recursion may occur.
D.2 How Queries about Beliefs are Handled
The belief model allows two kinds of queries: questions about how the agent thinks each of the
agents stands with respect to particular concepts, and questions about the conceptual structure
of the domain. Queries about the state of a concept are handled by an interface that decodes
the meaning of the state numbers. This is implemented by using one of the two indices to the
concept network (retrieving a concept by internal name or by referring expression) and by using
one of a number of boolean functions which take a state and return particular information about
what that state represents. For instance, there are boolean functions for "vivid for partner?",
"vivid for self?", "uncertain about what the partner thinks?", and so on. The set of queries
which is implemented is not comprehensive in that it does not cover all of the possible queries
that one might wish to ask, but it suffices for the dialogue system and it would be trivial to
extend it.
Quite often agents wish to know not just what state a concept is in, but what propositions it
knows about a concept. Propositional beliefs are represented by the structure of the concept
network; for example, the proposition "the swamp is to the left of the palm beach" (or (describes
swamp-0 (left-of palm-beach-O)), as it might be represented in an agent's internal language) is
represented by the fact that the swamp concept has as one of its children an AND description
node, two of whose children are the concepts denoted by "left of" and "palm beach", and
which has one more child which represents the propositional "glue" of how to put together
these children to come up with the correct description. The system contains a routine which
can take any sentence of the agent's internal language with any part of that sentence omitted
in favour of a variable except the key word "describes", and will return a (possibly empty)
list of all structures in the network that match the sentence (except that, for historic reasons,
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it only returns those structures for which all the concepts are vivid). Thus if the agent asks
itself (describes swamp-0 ?X) it will receive in return all of the descriptions which it believes
hold about the swamp and which it also understands, if any. Only descriptions and questions
about knowledge up to two nesting levels are allowed by this routine. This baroque structure
should be replaced with a routine which allows queries about the structure of the network only,
relying on the state interface to handle questions about the state of the concept (including the
state of propositions, since they can be checked by looking at the "glue" node).
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